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ABSTRACT

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA:
ESSAYS ON ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN AND KENYA

MAY 2014
JAMES ALIC GARANG, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professors James Boyce and Leonce Ndikumana

This dissertation, consisting of three essays, uses data from field surveys of banks and
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) conducted in South Sudan and Kenya from July
2011 through September 2012. The first essay examines the role of financial sector
development in expanding access to finance by SMEs in Kenya. We find that while the
financial system in general, and the Central Bank of Kenya in particular, have made
headway in expanding financial inclusion in Kenya, small firms continue to face more
constraints in access to finance compared to larger firms. The policy emphasis on
financial inclusion, coupled with the widespread innovations in information and
communications technology, such as M-Pesa and agency banking, are furthering the
expansion of the access frontier in Kenya. The second essay assesses access to finance by
SMEs in South Sudan, based on a survey conducted in three of the country’s ten states.
Using a Probit model estimation, we find that not only does size of the firm matter, but
also that distance from Juba is inversely related to access to finance by SMEs. The final
essay draws lessons from the Kenyan experience, in light of the findings on access to

vi

finance in South Sudan, to formulate proposals for innovative financial services for
SMEs and with regard to the regulatory framework for financial sector development in
South Sudan. The aim throughout the dissertation is to explore how the financial sector
can serve to advance the goal of inclusive economic development. Policy
recommendations emphasize strengthening the regulatory framework, land rights
administration, channeling oil resource revenues to fuel broad-based economic
development, and pursuing financial inclusion as an objective in its own right and not just
a byproduct of economic development.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... vi
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xiii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... xix
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ xix

CHAPTER
1

SETTING THE STAGE ..........................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................1
1.2 Background of the Research Problem, Hypothesis and Justification
of the Study ..................................................................................................2
1.2.1 Background of the Research Problem.................................................2
1.2.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses ..................................................3
1.2.3 Motivation ...........................................................................................4
1.2.4 Significance.........................................................................................5
1.3 History of Political Instability and Financial Sector Underdevelopment ..........8
1.3.1 Genesis of the Tumultuous Political Economy in South Sudan .........8
1.3.2 Stylized Facts on the Economy in South Sudan ...............................13
1.4 Objectives of the Study ....................................................................................16
1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study .................................................................16

2

FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVLOPMENT AND ACCESS TO FINANCE BY
SMES: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................................20
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................20
2.2 SMEs and Access to Finance ...........................................................................21

viii

2.2.1 Definitions of SMEs .........................................................................21
2.2.2 Role of SMEs in Modern Economies ...............................................23
2.2.3 Problems of Access to Finance by SMEs .........................................25
2.3 Financial Inclusion ...........................................................................................29
2.4 Measuring Financial Sector Development and Financial Inclusion ................35
2.5 Interventions in Credit Markets .......................................................................39
2.5.1 Conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Markets ..................41
2.5.2 Non-conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Markets ..........43
2.6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................47
3

FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND SMALL AND MEDIUMSIZED ENTERPRISES IN KENYA .....................................................................54
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................54
3.2 Background of Financial Sector Development in Kenya ................................61
3.3 The Current Composition of the Kenyan Financial Sector ..............................64
3.4 Expanding the Financial Access Frontier in Kenya .........................................66
3.5 Analysis of the Survey Results ........................................................................70
3.5.1 Data and Methodology......................................................................70
3.5.2 The Banking Sector Survey ..............................................................71
3.5.3 Agency Banking................................................................................74
3.5.3.1 Equity Bank Pioneering Mobile and Agency Banking ..................75
3.5.3.2 The Safaricom Factor .....................................................................77
3.5.4 The SME Survey ...............................................................................80
3.5.5 Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial Competency ...........81
3.5.6 Credit Allocation ...............................................................................82
3.5.7 Summary Statistics for Selected Indicators ......................................85
3.6 Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs.......................................87
3.6.1 Econometric Model ...........................................................................87
3.6.2 Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results ....................89
3.6.3 Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results ......91
3.6.4 Credit Constrained Firms: Econometric Results...............................92
3.6.5 Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results ................93
3.6.6 Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates .................................94

ix

3.7 What Have We Learned From the Econometric Results? ...............................96
3.7.1 No Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit .....................................96
3.7.2 There is a Size Bias in Access to Credit ...........................................96
3.7.3 ICT Use, Business Networks and Perceptions of Financing
Obstacles ...........................................................................................97

3.8 Conclusion .......................................................................................................97
4

LACK OF ACCESS TO FINANCE BY SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISE AS A CONSTRAINT TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH
SUDAN ...............................................................................................................149
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................149
4.1.1 Pre-independence South Sudan’s Banking Sector, 2005-2011 ......153
4.1.2 Microfinance and Informal Finance in South Sudan ......................154
4.1.3 Difficulties in Measuring Financial Access ....................................155
4.2 Banking Sector in Post-independence South Sudan ......................................156
4.3 SME Sector in Post-independence South Sudan ...........................................157
4.4 Analysis of the Survey Results ......................................................................158
4.4.1 Survey of South Sudan Commercial Banks ....................................159
4.4.2 Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises ............................162
4.4.3 SME Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial
Competency ....................................................................................166
4.4.4 Credit Allocation.............................................................................167
4.4.5 Summary Statistics for Selected Variables .....................................171
4.5 Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs.....................................173
4.5.1 Econometric Model .........................................................................173
4.5.2 Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results ..................175
4.5.3 Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results ....176
4.5.4 Credit Constrained and Unconstrained Firms: Econometric
Results .............................................................................................178
4.5.5 Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results ..............179
4.5.6 Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates ...............................180
4.6 What Have We Learned From the Econometric Results? .............................181

x

4.6.1 Radius of Finance ...........................................................................182
4.6.2 Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit.........................................182
4.6.3 Firm Size and Access to Credit .......................................................183

4.7 Conclusion .....................................................................................................183
5

ENHANCING FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR SMALL AND MEDIUMSIZED ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN .....................................................224
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................224
5.2 Lessons from Kenya on the Financial Sector and Inclusive Development ...226
5.2.1 Transferability of “Best Practices” ................................................227
5.2.2 Reducing Information Asymmetries ...............................................229
5.2.3 Development Banks ........................................................................230
5.2.4 Sequencing Innovation and Regulation ..........................................231
5.2.5 Post Office Savings Bank as a Vector of Financial Inclusion ........232
5.3 Financial Regulatory and Institutional Framework in South Sudan ..............234
5.3.1 Lack of Clear Policy Stance on Financial Inclusion Agenda .........235
5.3.2 Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities ......................................................236
5.3.3 Poor Institutions and Lack of Land Titling .....................................237
5.3.4 Lack of Clear Enforcement Mechanisms to Protect Lenders and
Borrowers from Bad Deals .............................................................239
5.3.5 Policy on Bank Branching ..............................................................240
5.3.6 Lack of Industry Surveys ................................................................240
5.3.7 Central Bank Independence and Political Interference ...................241
5.4 How to Increase Financing for SMEs in South Sudan ..................................243
5.4.1 Embracing the Financial Inclusion Agenda ....................................244
5.4.2 Leveraging Oil Wealth for Financial Sector Development ............245
5.4.3 Strengthening the Regulatory Framework ......................................249
5.5 Conclusion .....................................................................................................251

6

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................256
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................256
6.2 Key Results ....................................................................................................257
6.3 Lessons and Policy Implications....................................................................261
6.3.1 Firm Size as a Constraint to Access to Finance ..............................261

xi

6.3.2 Institutional Cooperation ................................................................261
6.3.3 Proper Sequencing of Innovation and Regulation ..........................262
6.3.4 Persistence of Differential Access to Finance ................................262
6.3.5 The Radius of Finance ....................................................................263
6.3.6 Self-Exclusion from the Credit Market...........................................263
6.4 Future Work ...................................................................................................263

APPENDICES
A.
B.
C.
D.

INFORMED CONSENT LETTER .....................................................................265
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SMES .......................................................266
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS .........................275
POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA .................280

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................282

xii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

1.1

Stylized Facts of South Sudan Political Economy Relative to Selected East
African Countries and Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) ............................................18

1.2

Indicators of Financial Sector Development and Access to Finance in
South Sudan, East Africa and Sub-Sahara Africa, 2008-2012 ........................19

2.1

Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the EU, U. S and
Kenya ...............................................................................................................49

2.2

Different Types of Mobile Financial Services across the World ...........................49

2.3

Cost of a 200 USD Money Transfer (Person-to-person; P2P)...............................50

2.4

Use of Financial Services across Africa (% of Adult population) .........................50

3.1

Characteristics of Selected Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2011 and 2012 ..........100

3.2

Growth in Customer and SME Accounts in 2012 (in Million)............................101

3.3

Kenya Commercial Bank Lending to SMEs, 2012 ..............................................101

3.4

How Banks Describe their Top SMEs ................................................................102

3.5

How Kenya’s Banks Rank 5 C’s When Appraising SME Projects, 2012 ...........103

3.6

Products, Technology and Indicators of Performance ........................................104

3.7

Distribution of Nonperforming Loans among Businesses, 2005-2011 ...............113

3.8

Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs ..............................................114

3.9

Kenya Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served, 2011 ...............116

3.10

Mobile Payment Statistics, March 2007- December 2011 ..................................117

3.11

Agency Banking, Performance and Distribution Networks across Kenya .........117

3.12

Agency Model as Expanding Financial Services ................................................118

3.13

Agent Transaction Types .....................................................................................119

3.14

Geographical Distribution of Financial Services in Kenya ................................119

3.15

East African Comparative ATM Expansion, 2004-2010 .....................................120
xiii

3.16

A Glance at Kenyan Banking Network, ATMs and DTMs Growth, 19972011................................................................................................................121

3.17

Selected Bank Branch Distribution by Provinces, 1991-2012.............................122

3.18

Distribution of Agents by Province and Selected Banks, 2007-2012 ..................125

3.19 A Distribution of ATMs by Provinces .....................................................................126
3.19 B Bank Distribution of ATMs by Provinces, 2012 .................................................127
3.20

Equity Bank Distribution and Growth in ATM Cards over the Years ................128

3.21

Kenya’s Deposit-Taking Microfinance Institutions.............................................128

3.22

Distribution of Foreign Bureaus by City and Povinces, 2012 .............................129

3.23

Improvements in Formal Financial Inclusion over the Years, 2006-2009 ..........129

3.24

Classification of SMEs by Gender ......................................................................129

3.25

Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity ...................................................................129

3.26

Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity and Gender (Row % in parenthese) .........130

3.27

Firm Classification by Lagal Status ....................................................................130

3.28

Firm Size by Current Employment .....................................................................131

3.29

SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size .........................................131

3.30

SME Classification by Sector ..............................................................................131

3.31

SME Classification by Sector and Gender (on % representation) .....................132

3.32

SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size ......................................................133

3.33

Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities ...............................133

3.34

Firm Self-Appraisal ............................................................................................134

3.35

Loan Characteristics of SMEs ............................................................................134

3.36

Loan Approval by Lender ..................................................................................134

3.37

Loan Approval by Gender ..................................................................................134

3.38

Loan Approval by Sector ....................................................................................135

xiv

3.39

Loan Approval by Firm Size ..............................................................................135

3.40

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan ...................................................................136

3.41

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender .................................................136

3.42

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses) .....................137

3.43

Financing as Constraint on Firm Growth ............................................................137

3.44

Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender ......................................138

3.45

Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size ...........................................138

3.46

Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers ........................................................138

3.47

Lack of Access to Market as a Contraint on Firm Performance ........................139

3.48

Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Firm Performance by Gender ......139

3.49

Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Performance by Sector ...............140

3.50

Summary Statistics for Selected a Variables ......................................................141

3.51

Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received ......................141

3.52

Definitions of Variables in Tables 3.53 - 3.58 ...................................................142

3.52

Probit Estimates of Loan Aproval.......................................................................143

3.54

Probit Estimates of Access to Formal Financing ...............................................144

3.55

Probit Estimates of Access to Informal Financing ...........................................145

3.56

Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints ...............................................................146

3.57

Probit Estimates of Loan Applications ...............................................................147

3.58

Robustness Test for Loan Application and Approvals .......................................148

4.1

Characteristics of Commercial Banks in South Sudan, 2011 .............................187

4.2

South Sudan Bankable Indicator, Growth in Customer Accounts, 2011 ............188

4.3

South Sudan Commercial Bank Lending to Firms, 2011 ...................................188

xv

4.4

South Sudan Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served,
2011 ...............................................................................................................189

4.5

How South Sudan Banks Describe Their Lending to SMEs ..............................189

4.6

South Sudan Banks Ranking of 5 C’s in Appraising SME Projects, 2011 .........190

4.7

Indicators of Bank Services ...............................................................................191

4.8

Nonperforming Loan among Businesses, 2005-2011 .........................................194

4.9

Commercial Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs ........................195

4.10

The State of Microfinance Sector in the Republic of South Sudan as At
30th September 2011 ....................................................................................198

4.11

Commercial Bank Ownership in South Sudan , 2013 ........................................199

4.12

South Sudan Banking Sector Relative to East Africa, January 2013 .................201

4.13

SME Questionnaire Respondents by State .........................................................201

4.14

SME Questionnaire Respondents by City ...........................................................201

4.15

Classification of SMEs by Gender .....................................................................201

4.16

Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity ..................................................................202

4.17

Firm Classification by Legal Status ...................................................................202

4.18 A Firm Size by Current Employment ....................................................................202
4.18 B Firm Size by Current Employment ....................................................................203
4.18 C Firm Distribution by State .................................................................................203
4.19

SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size ........................................203

4.20

SME Current Employment by State/Geographical Location .............................204

4.21

SME Classification by Sector ............................................................................204

4.22

SME Classification by Sector and Gender .........................................................205

4.23

SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size ......................................................206

4.24

Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities ..............................206

4.25

Firm Self-Appraisal on Technology and Management Experience ....................207

xvi

4.26

Loan Characteristics ...........................................................................................207

4.27

Loan Approval by Lender ...................................................................................208

4.28

Loan Approval by Gender .................................................................................208

4.29

Loan Approval by Sector ....................................................................................208

4.30

Loan Approval by Firm Size ..............................................................................209

4.31

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan ...................................................................209

4.32

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender .................................................210

4.33

Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses) .....................211

4.34

State and Number of Loans Received .................................................................211

4.35

Loan Received by State and Lender (percentages in parentheses) .....................212

4.36

Financing Constraint to Firm Growth ................................................................212

4.37

Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender .....................................212

4.38

Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size ...........................................213

4.39

Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers ........................................................213

4.40

Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance .......................213

4.41

Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Firm Size ...........214

4.42

Lack of access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance by Gender .......215

4.43

Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Sector .................215

4.44

Summary Statistics .............................................................................................216

4.45

Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received .....................216

4.46

Probit Estimates of Loan Approval ....................................................................217

4.47

Probit Estimates of Formal Financing Constraints ............................................218

4.48

Probit Estimates of Informal Financing Constraints ..........................................219

4.49

Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints ...............................................................220

4.50

Probit Estimates of Loan Application .................................................................221

xvii

4.51

Robustness Test for Loan Applications and Approvals .....................................222

4.52

Definitions of Variables in Tables 4.46 - 4.50 ....................................................223

4.53

Credit Demand and Constraints across African Enterprises ...............................223

5.1

Kenya’s Bank Branch Distribution per Region, 2008 .......................................252

xviii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

2.1

Pillars of Financial Inclusion .................................................................................51

2.2

Global Mobile Deployments, 2001-2011 ..............................................................51

2.3

Number of Mobile Money Deployments by Region, March 2011 ........................52

2.4

Financial Inclusion Contribution to a Country’s GDP ..........................................53

5.1

Real GDP Growth in South Sudan (Annual %) ...................................................253

5.2

External Trade ......................................................................................................253

5.3

Capital Aaccount Balance and General Government Net
Lending/Borrowing (% of GDP) ...................................................................254

5.4

Analytical Framework of Potential Contribution of the Oil Sector to
Financing SMEs .............................................................................................255

xix

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS
AfDB
ADB
AMPI
ATM
BIO
BOSS
BRAC
CBK
CDC
CGAP
CPA
DFID
EIB
FI
FMO
FS
GoK
GoSS
ICT
IMF
MIGA
MFIs
NBFIs
NGO
NPL
PR
SACCO
SAP
SBA
SFC
SPLM/A
SMEs
SMS
SSA
SUMI
WB

African Development Bank
Asian Development Bank
Africa Mobile Phone Financial Services Policy Initiative
Automatic Teller Machine
Belgian Investment Company for Developing Countries
Bank of South Sudan
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
Central Bank of Kenya
Country Development Corporation
Consultative Group to Assist Poor
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Department for International Development
European Investment Bank
Financial Inclusion
Netherlands Development Finance Company
Finance Sudan
Government of Kenya
Government of South Sudan
Information and Communication Technology
International Monetary Fund
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Microfinance Institutions
Non-bank Financial Institutions
Non-governmental Organization
Non-performing Loan
Poverty Reduction
Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations
Structural Adjustment Program
Small Business Administration
Savannah Farmers’ Cooperative
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Short Message Services
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sudan Microfinance Initiative
World Bank

xx

CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE STAGE

1.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a policy shift to “finance for all” (Marshall, 2004; Helms, 2006;
World Bank, 2008; Chibba, 2009), including finance for Small and Medium-sized
Enterprise (SMEs), in particular (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012). Billed as dynamic
job creators (Buckley, 1996; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA, 2009; Ardic, Mylenko,
& Saltane, 2012), SMEs make up majority of firms in developing countries. Yet SMEs
tend to face significant constraints in accessing credit and other financial services, owing
to geographical distance from financial centers, affordability, lack of collateral, poor or
nonexistent credit history and other non-price barriers (Beck & Honohan, 2007; Ardic,
Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012;Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013).

However, individual governments, development financial institutions and other
stakeholders are realizing today that financial inclusion can bring many important
benefits (Chakravarty & Pal, 2013). Expanding the access frontier can have economywide consequences, especially by making SMEs as a powerful means to poverty
reduction and fostering the Financial Inclusion-Poverty Reduction-Millennium
Development Goals nexus(FI-PR-MDG nexus) (Chibba, 2009). An inclusive financial
sector can generate positive externalities to the governments, contributing to job creation,
and macroeconomic stability. From the standpoint of the banking sector, financial
inclusion brings about a broader client base and dependable source of funding. It also
reduces some risks in money laundering activities by bringing much of

1

unregulated/underground economy into the regulated sector, thereby achieving financial
stability and integrity. 1 Finally, from the perspective of households and SMEs, financial
inclusion provides opportunities to borrow and save, offers efficient means of making
payments, and facilitate investment in housing, education, insurance, and firm growth
(Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Hurtado, Torres, & Hayem, 2013).

1.2

Background of the Research Problem, Hypotheses and Justification of the

Study
1.2.1

Background of the Research Problem

Throughout the world, and in Africa in particular, the quest for financial inclusion and
inclusive economic development is now more than ever paramount (Aduda & Kalunda,
2012: Calice, 2013; Hayem, Hurtado, & Torres, 2013). Expressing this policy agenda, the
African Development Bank (AfDB) publication Financial Inclusion in Africa (2013)
states thus: “A clear paradigm shift has resulted in a more inclusive and sustainable
growth. For its part, the African Development Bank has launched its Ten-Year Strategy
2013-2022, the main thrust of which is inclusive and green growth” (Foreword, p. 9).
Despite high-level policy support, SMEs tend to face significant problems in all
economies (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013).
Nowhere are these problems more acute than in post-conflict and fragile states, where
weak institutions, poor infrastructure, political instability, lack of enforcement

1

Even though the largest amount of money laundering activities (MLA) is orchestrated
by individuals and agencies that are financially included and the MLA linked to lack of
financial service is minimal, financial inclusion brings to the open for policymakers to
see what was already underground.
2

mechanisms, and underdeveloped financial systems prevail (Sile, 2013). At the same
time, the desire to maintain harmony and provide peace dividends is compelling in these
settings, bringing greater urgency to the role of SMEs in creating jobs.

This study sets out to analyze credit market access by SMEs in the post-conflict setting of
South Sudan and to this end, draw lessons from neighboring Kenya. The aim throughout
the dissertation is to identify ingredients of successful financial sector development and
regulatory frameworks (see Chapter 5). The overarching goal is to formulate financing
strategies for South Sudan that will enhance SME job creation and poverty reduction.

1.2.2

Research Questions and Hypotheses

The study explores and seeks answers to the following questions:
1. What are the major obstacles to SME growth in South Sudan?
2. To what extent do SMEs in South Sudan have access to finance, and on what
terms?
3. In what ways are banks expanding the access frontier in Kenya, and how have
technology and mobile banking advanced the goal of financial inclusion?
4. How have financial innovations in Kenya affected horizontal inequality, by
accident or by design, among the regions?
5. What can South Sudan learn from Kenya’s experience in financial sector
development?

The ensuing chapters seek to test the following hypotheses:
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1. Lack of Access to credit on favorable terms is a major obstacle to the formation
and growth of SMEs;
2. Access to finance varies with distance from Juba and gender in South Sudan;
3. Access to finance varies with firm size and technology in Kenya;
4. Innovative financial sector development in Kenya has reduced horizontal
inequality by extending access to previously marginalized populations; and
5. South Sudan can learn from best practices in banking in Kenya, and from Kenya’s
successes and/or failures in expanding access across regions.

1.2.3

Motivation

Simply put, SMEs matter because they are dynamic enterprises and job generators
(Buckley, 1996; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA, 2009; Ardic, Mylenko & Saltane,
2012; Khanam, Rahman & Zarook, 2013). SMEs contribute to macroeconomic outcomes,
notably GDP growth, exports and employment. Yet Khanam, Rahman & Zarook, 2013,
p. 11) find that in the case of Libya, SMEs still suffer from lack of access to finance even
though they are seen as “economic engines of many economies worldwide.” The pecking
order hypothesis states that firms obtain capital as follows: Firstly, they exhaust internal
profits; secondly, they go for short-term financing; thirdly, long-term financing; and
fourthly, they go for least preferred option, new equity investors (Khanam, Rahman &
Zarook, 2013). Majority of SMEs do not observe this order; some do not even go beyond
the first option after exhausting internal fund. Hence, raising equity is not an option for
SMEs. With improved financial services, SMEs can access finance to expand their
operations (World Bank, 2008; Cattani, 2002; Beck & Honohan, 2007).
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In a post-conflict country such as South Sudan, the problem is all the more acute.
Grounds for optimism can be found, however, in recent development of financial sector
in Africa and global commitment to inclusive finance as a means to achieve inclusive
development (Chibba, 2009; AFI, 2010; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Dittus & Klein, 2011).
The efforts by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, AfDB and
other regional bodies to make the case for financial service inclusion has been of
particular interest to development economists. The phrase, “making finance work for
Africa” is now a shared goal among policymakers on the continent.

A typical SME faces many problems, including lack of liquidity, high transaction costs,
and weak managerial competence. However, access to finance is arguably a major
binding constraint on their growth. Any policy that eases financing constraints should be
welcome. Banking reforms and financial innovations that aim to reach the ‘bottom of the
pyramid’ are one way to relax those constraints and improve access (Beck, DemirgucKunt, & Maksimovic, 2004; Chakravarty & Pal, 2013).

1.2.4

Significance

This research connects to four contemporary issues in development economics. The first
is the growing literature on post-conflict development which recognizes that institutions
do not spontaneously arise out of thin air but instead must be built, with a key role for
public policy in enabling this institution-building, and that post-conflict situations call for
inclusivity. The recent inter-disciplinary scholarship on “horizontal inequality”, economic
inequalities across social groups defined on the basis of ethnicity, language, region and
religion, informs my research on access to finance for all at a fair price. Social scientists
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from a variety of disciplines, including economist Frances Stewart (2005), political
scientist Grudun Ostby (2008) and anthropologist Graham Brown (2009), are beginning
to open policymakers’ eyes to the importance of “whom” as well as “what” in economic
development. The Kenyan 2030 Vision, an economic development plan by the Kenyan
Government to develop several different economic zones in various parts of the country,
similarly recognizes the importance of inclusion and equitable development. My research
extends the analysis of horizontal inequality to the area of financial sector development.

The second issue is the debate on the role of the government in the marketplace. The
efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) that holds that financial markets are smoothly
self-correcting has been challenged, most recently by the world financial crisis.
Governments have an important role to play in regulating the financial sector and in
efforts to expand access (see financial inclusion, the role of public sector and central
banks in nurturing complementarities). This is a very important point; in the case of
South Sudan, a critical challenge has been to build viable government structures,
basically from scratch. Can South Sudan learn from the post-independence history of
other African countries and avoid making the same mistakes that other sister nations
made? Where does South Sudan want to be 50 years from now and in light of the recent
internal conflict which started on 15 December 2013? Will it be like Mauritius,
Botswana, and South Africa or will it be like Somalia and the like? This should be taken
in light of the recent thinking in development economics that a country’s process of
continuous technological change and industrial upgrading is determined by its factor
endowment but that this differs from one level to another as it climbs development ladder
(Lin, 2011).
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The third issue is whether effective policy can ensure that banks maximize social returns
as they seek to maximize their own profits. In other words, what is the appropriate
institutional and regulatory framework to channel the resources of the banking sector to
productive activities that support broader development objectives? This framework can
include public-private partnerships or NGOs partnering with banks to expand access. For
example, Equity Bank of Kenya, which is a licensed commercial bank, partners with
other multilateral or bilateral development agencies such as China Development Aid, to
lend to the sectors not previously served by the formal sector. Banks may serve the
financial inclusion mission in areas deemed unreachable a decade ago by using new
technologies such as mobile banking by phone or village vans to gain new customers. In
other words, mobile banking presents opportunities for cooperation or partnerships
between banks and other non-bank sectors. Furthermore, central banks are taking on
another role, that of being actively involved in financial inclusion. A number of central
banks in Africa, including the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) are currently engaged in
financial inclusion endeavors with view to creating an inclusive financial system and a
technology-driven process to deliver inclusive development (Chibba, 2012; Stephen,
2011; Ardic, Mylenko & Saltane, 2012).

The fourth issue pertains to the role of small businesses in economic development. In the
U.S., no administration has dared to challenge the job-creating ability of SMEs, and
Congress is obligated to come up with attractive policies to support small businesses. 2

2

First many in congress believe that SMEs create jobs. Second, it is politically suicidal to
fight this perception because one appears to be fighting for the top 1% and not the
underdogs.
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The Small Business Administration (SBA) in the U.S. exists for these reasons. The SBA
has, over the years, allocated loan guarantees to qualifying businesses, and empirical
studies indicate that the programs have worked in boosting local employment (Craig &
Jackson, 2007; 2008). SMEs can create jobs in developing regions, too (Audretsch,
2002). SMEs, for example, account for 80% of all new jobs in Kenya (FSD Kenya,
2008). As we will demonstrate in chapter four, 99% of all firms in South Sudan are
SMEs.

Loan guarantees are relevant for South Sudan. We will argue later in Chapter 5 that some
oil revenue should be set aside and used for targeted lending to SMEs.

1.3 History of Political Instability and Financial Sector Underdevelopment
1.3.1

Genesis of the Tumultuous Political Economy in South Sudan

The prevalence of civil violence and the miseries resulting from economic underdevelopment on the African continent leave everybody wondering what has become of
the Afro-optimism and euphoria which were in the air at the dawn of independence in the
1960s. Blame is assigned to internal and external political actors. For many Africans,
scholars and laypeople alike, the trinity of slave trade, colonialism and the colonial
legacy of ‘big men’ politics, and ethnic polarization are the scapegoats (Kamara,
Mlambo, & Nyende, 2009). Poor governance and corruption as offshoots of the colonial
institutional legacy are also mentioned as part of the problem (Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson, 2001). Soul-searching for political and economic solutions to the continent’s
problems continues to proliferate.
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For post-independence Sudan, civil conflict has been the norm rather than the exception.
Foreign invasion, starting with the Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1898) and Anglo-Egyptian
Condominium rule (1899-1956), provide the background for internal turmoil (Collins,
1976; Ali, El Badawi & El-Batahani; Young, 2003; Ylönen, 2005; Natsio & Abramovitz,
2011; D'Agoôt, 2013). Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956. Political
differences and divergent economic and social visions led South Sudan to wage war
against the Khartoum Government, starting in 1955. That initial war came to an end
through a peace accord signed in Ethiopia in 1972. The second war started in 1983 to be
concluded only by the Comprehensive Peace Agreements (CPA) signed in Kenya on
January 9, 2005 (JAM, 2005). Following a referendum mandated by the CPA, South
Sudan achieved independence on 9 July 2011 (World Bank, 2011; SSDP, 2011; BricénoGarmendia & Ranganath, 2011; Hale, 2012; D'Agoôt, 2013).

However, South Sudan is discovering that independence alone is not enough to change
relationships with bad neighbors or improve economic conditions overnight. The nation
currently faces tremendous development challenges arising from oil mismanagement,
structural problems, international political contradictions and the relationships with
Khartoum (World Bank, 2011; Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011). Delivering on
independence promises, dealing with the north, and managing expectations have not been
easy. Corruption has reared its ugly head, and not much of the country’s oil wealth has
trickled down. Even though South Sudan spent $450 million per year between 2005 and
2011 on infrastructure, it has a huge unmet infrastructural gap (Bricéno-Garmendia &
Ranganath, 2011).
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While South Sudan’s economy grew by 4% annually from 2009 through 2011, it
drastically declined in 2012 by 56% due to the oil shutdown that resulted from
differences over transit fees for passage of the oil through neighboring Sudan (World
Bank, 2013). This validly demonstrated how vulnerable South Sudan’s economic growth
is to oil shocks.

Austerity measures that the South Sudan parliament passed in July 2012, shortly after the
completion of the survey for this dissertation, put a freeze on capital outlays and
operation costs. The drastic cuts have affected households, the currency market, and by
extension, credit allocation to private sector.

Notwithstanding the government’s proclaimed intention to make South Sudan a middleincome country by 2040 (SSDP, 2011), there is little to show for it on the ground.
Reconstruction in South Sudan is proving difficult because oil resources have not been
equitably utilized. In addition, vital institutions such as law and order, civil society,
courts, and spirit of entrepreneurship were destroyed or severely degraded during the war
(Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011; SSDP, 2011) and have to be rebuilt.

Financial services are typically hard to come by in war-torn economies. For one, conflict
takes precedence and scarce resources go toward fighting. Political instability translates
into economic instability. In the case of South Sudan, instability has disrupted farming
activities which translated into high degree of dependence on humanitarian aid or on a
few individual family members when the others are maimed or killed. Low levels of
living and low levels of productivity reinforce each other. Political and economic
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instability are mutually reinforcing, too, as recognized in Gunnar Myrdal’s famous notion
of circular and cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1944).

War kills investment by leading to capital flight, misallocation of scarce resources, and
destruction of investment assets (Collier, 1999 & 2009; Arunatilake, Jayasurika, &
Kelegama, 2001; Kamara, Mlambo, & Nyende, 2009). War inhibits growth by damaging
the economy through disassembling part of the labor force, blowing up bridges,
disrupting social order, making some roads unsafe for travel, imposing undue costs on
travelers, suppressing civil liberties, and diverting public expenditure from growthpromoting projects (Collier, 1999 & 2009; Nojanic, 2008).

When the war is over, these challenges persist and consolidating peace is a tough hill to
climb. Encouraging investors to come in and gamble with their dollars is difficult and
costly because of the risk premium associated with investment in such a setting (Kasturi
& Toh, 2012). Local private funding for local projects is inadequate. Multilateral and
bilateral assistance for reconstruction normally comes to the country via the public sector,
and is often distributed through political mechanisms on a whom-you-know rather than
what-you-know basis. Notwithstanding these difficulties, with appropriate policies, a
seemingly failing state can turn around. Uganda has been hailed as one such success story
(Ndikumana & Nannyonjo, 2007) and so is Rwanda today.

Since 2005, South Sudan has opened the borders to neighboring countries. Regional
traders poured in from Kenya and Uganda. They set up businesses, from five-star hotels
to apparel shops to nightclubs. It is estimated that between 2009 and 2010, South Sudan
imported goods worth around $75 million from Kenya and around $55 million from
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Uganda. Many are lemon marketers because some of these services are substandard but
costly. Overall market activities are thin, however, limited or missing in some places.
Within a short time following the CPA, prices in the capital skyrocketed due to influx of
post-conflict aid/oil revenue, leading some commentators to nickname Juba the “second
Tokyo.”

On the financial sector development front, foreign banks, mainly from East Africa, also
came in search of business opportunities. A number of Kenyan commercial banks opened
branches in South Sudan because doing business immediately after the CPA was
perceived as lucrative. I speculate that donor money and oil-contract jobs were the main
motives for coming of some foreign entrepreneurs.
South Sudan, a yet-to-be member of East Africa Community (EAC) 3, is land-locked,
meaning that it depends on its relations with Kenya, Uganda and Khartoum for access to
seaports. However, land-lockedness is not an insuperable handicap. Some countries
overcome it, the classic example being Switzerland in Europe and Botswana in Africa.
Sound macroeconomic policies and financial sector development can help to create an
enabling environment for development (Akerlof & Shiller, 2009), and regional blocs are
an opportunity for small open economies such as South Sudan to expand their influence
on the international stages.

3

The application process for South Sudan to join this regional bloc is in progress. There
is an on-going debate among the current members whether the application should be fasttracked or allowed to follow the normal process of making sure that all conditions are
met; Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda are for quick admission of South Sudan into EAC
whereas Tanzania and Burundi advocate for due diligence and checklist. We do not know
when it will likely be decided.
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1.3.2

Stylized Facts on the Economy in South Sudan

Having emerged out of war, we can think of South Sudan as being at an early stage of
development. Countries at such level are typically characterized by relative scarcity of
capital and relative abundance of labor (Lin, 2011). Their productive activities are usually
labor-intensive and concentrated in sectors such as subsistence agriculture, fishery,
mining, and animal husbandry. The small firm size and incomplete markets lead to an
economy characterized by close networks. Because of war and development neglect
under the old Sudan, the economy of South Sudan today suffers many structural
problems. We can summarize these by means of six stylized facts:

First, South Sudan is a subsistence economy. Despite the huge potential for agricultural
exports, 78% of population still depends on subsistence farming (see Table 1.1; SSCCSE,
2010). Where there are exports to East Africa, they are handful primary agricultural
products.

Second, the high dependence ratio represents a heavy economic burden. Children and
people above 65 years old are usually nonproductive and depend on country’s labor force
for support. With an average household size of about seven members, each working adult
has many mouths to feed. Peacetime has seen higher birth rates and this adds to the
dependency burdens posed by widows, orphans, war disabled and other victims of the
concluded war. Seventy-two percent of the population is below the age of 30 (5th
Population and Housing Census, 2008). When the age dependency ratio is computed as
those below 14 and above 55 years of age, divided by those in the age range of 14-55, the
ratio is 88% for the country as a whole: 75% in the urban settings, and 91% in rural areas
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(SSDP, 2011). By way of comparison, the dependency ratio for Kenya is 82%, for
instance (World Bank, 2013; see Table 1.1).

Third, the formal private sector is weak and characterized by “hit and run” investors.
Because infrastructure and the regulatory and supervisory framework are weak (BricénoGarmendia & Ranganath, 2011; SSDP, 2011; Demombynes, Gubbins, & Romeo, 2013),
it is hard to attract long-term investors. Uncertainty about the outcome of the postreferendum political issues contributed to this phenomenon. The retail sector is the major
area of local entrepreneur occupation. There are no conglomerates or big wholesalers
(such as Uchumi, Tuskys, or Utawala in Kenya) to speak of, as of now. In Juba and other
urban areas, one sees the springing up of small shops, tea stalls, restaurants, fruit sellers,
sewing machine operators, garment hawkers, fish sellers, and many other small
enterprises that are either locally owned or foreign owned. The survey data collected for
this dissertation confirms the abovementioned proposition.

Fourth, the level of education is low. The country’s low level of education is a result of
the war and its impact on the human and physical capital development. To inject capacity
into civil service, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Initiative
brought about 200 civil servants from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to train South
Sudanese civil servants through twinning. So throughout the country, the South Sudan
government has hired expatriates, such as teachers and technocrats from neighboring
countries, to help with the foundation of the state. Recall that only 27 percent of the total
population is literate in South Sudan (SSCCSE, 2010), as cited above. This figure
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compares dismally with literacy rates of 87 and 73 percent in Kenya and Uganda,
respectively (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013).

Fifth, the telecommunications industry is in its infancy but growing. Based on the
National Baseline House Survey (NBHS, 2009), 15 percent of the households own a
phone. The ratio is 59 percent in urban areas, compared to only 8 percent in the rural
areas. ZAIN, MTN, Gemtel, and Vivacell are pioneering the telecommunications industry
(Bricéno-Garmenndia, & Ranganath, 2011). While the mobile industry is not regulated,
telephony is increasingly used by small traders to transfer money across the ten states 4
and it has a potential to lower entry barriers, reduce costs and expand access (DemirgucKunt & Klapper, 2013). Although it is not called M-PESA as in Kenya (where M-stands
for mobile while Pesa is a Swahili word for money, the coinage literally implies mobile
money) the emerging system shares some semblance. Despite the digital divide between
rural areas and urban centers, a number of South Sudanese are using cell phones
(provided they have network coverage) to transmit payments to places where commercial
banks or microfinance have no footprint (see Table 1.2). This is noteworthy given the
importance of financial inclusion in the economy as well as the promise for mobile

4

It works as follows: a person remitting money to a relative in the village or another
town comes to the independent money transfer service providers. He would give them
money and sending fees. After transaction is logged in a cashbook, he is instructed to call
his relative and tell him to go and collect the remittance at a designated collection stall.
But unlike M-Pesa agent network in Kenya, a South Sudanese recipient cannot just go to
any agent providing service. He must go to a particular service provider, say, Jong Bar
Money Transfer Service Company in Aweil, and the latter company happens to have a
sending branch in Juba. Another cash-in/cash-out provider, say, Tiger Money Transfer
cannot serve this individual because the two providers are not affiliated. But like in
Kenya, the mobile financial service is a non-bank-led model (Faye & Triki, 2013).
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phone-based data collection, the promise that mobile phones have for enabling
researchers to collect public opinion polls (Demombynes, Gubbins, & Romeo, 2013).

1.4

Objectives of the Study

The primary objectives of this study are to:
(i) assess the role of the financial sector in financing SMEs in Kenya and South
Sudan, and
(ii) draw lessons from the Kenyan experience to suggest possible strategies for
improving access to finance by SMEs and households in the post-conflict
Republic of South Sudan.

1.5

Scope and Limitations of the Study

Following the literature review in Chapter 2 the dissertation comprises three essays. The
first essay (Chapter 3) is on Financial Sector Development and SMEs in Kenya. The
second essay is on Lack of Access to Finance by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises as
a Constraint to Development in South Sudan (Chapter 4). We use econometric analysis to
distill determinants of financial access in South Sudan. The third essay is about
Enhancing Financial Inclusion for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in South Sudan
(Chapter 5). In this chapter, we look at lessons that can be learned from Kenya and
propose strategies to strength the regulatory framework and offer ways to channel oil
resources for broad-based development. The data come from field surveys in South
Sudan and Kenya conducted from July 2011 through September 2012.

We investigate the determinants of access, both from the standpoint of SMEs (demandside) and credit providers (supply-side) so as to provide a full picture of the mechanics
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and economics of credit provision. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research has
analyzed Kenyan financial sector development with a view to applying it to the South
Sudan situation. This is the first study of this kind in South Sudan, connecting it to the
current development policy debates on the financial inclusion agenda.

Analyzing access to finance in sub-Saharan Africa is often difficult due to the
rudimentary nature of available data (World Bank, 2008; CGAP, 2009; Jerven, 2013).
This study therefore faces the usual limitations relying on own-collected data. Let me
outline three of those issues:

First, the selection survivor bias from the interviews could not be ruled out. Firms that
went out of business were not available for interviews. Second, the data for South Sudan
came from three states rather than ten. Third, I had to rely on research assistants to obtain
data, and their biases could have influenced the inclusion or exclusion of some SME
respondents. While my interviews in South Sudan with commercial banks covered the
whole banking population (all eight banks) the situation was different in Kenya. For the
latter, I wrote letters to all financial institutions, but ended up using the snowballing
method in some cases and systematic sampling afterward. A colleague would ring up a
colleague in a bank on my behalf, and if they were willing to talk, then I would sit down
with them for interviews. Where I have no networks of friends in a given financial
institution, we often were unable to conduct interviews. As a result, I ended up with a
smaller sample of banks in Kenya than I would have liked.

The remainder of this dissertation proceeds in chapters as follows. Chapter 2 reviews
literature on Financial Sector Development; Chapter 3 presents the essay on Kenya, and
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Chapters 4 presents the essay on South Sudan. Chapter 5 draws lessons for South Sudan
from the Kenyan experience. Finally, Chapter 6 provides conclusions and policy
implications.

Table 1.1: Stylized Facts on the South Sudan Economy 5 Relative to Selected East
African Countries and sub-Sahara Africa (SSA)
Indicator
South Kenya Uganda Ethiopia SSA
Sudan
Average
Household Consumption
35
80
81
86
67
(% of GDP)
Age dependency
88
82
103
86
87
(% of Total Population)
Documents to Import
12
9
10
10
9
(Number)
Literacy Rate
27
87
73
39
60
(% of total population, 15
and over)
Mobile Cellular
19
72
46
24
53
Subscriptions
(per 100 people)
Military Expenditure
10.3
2.0
1.4
0.9
1.5
(% of GDP)
Sources: World Bank, 2013, Central Intelligence Agency, 2013; and South Sudan
National Bureau of Statistics, 2010.

5

Because of the large informal sector and the fact that oil revenues flow through the
government, the share of household consumption as a percent of GDP is very small in
2011. But when the oil was shutdown in 2012, total GDP declines by 47% while the
share of GDP going to household consumption rises to 93% (World Bank, 2013). This
shows the volatility of oil and narrowness of economy base or dearth of non-oil revenue.
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Table 1.2: Indicators of Financial Sector Development and Access to Finance in
South Sudan, East Africa and sub-Sahara Africa, 2008-2012
Indictor
South
Kenya Uganda Ethiopia SSA
Sudan
Domestic Credit Provided by
52.3
16.4
77.8
Banking Sector (% of GDP)
Money and Quasi Money
51
24
35
48
(M as % of GDP)
Private Credit Bureau
0.0
4.7
4.1
0.0
6.0
Coverage (% of adults)
Loan in the past year
67.4
52.8
46.8
(% age 15 and above)
Demographic Branch
1
5
3
2
4
penetration
(Number of Commercial bank
branches per 100,000 adults)
Demographic ATM
9.9
4.00
0.5
4.5
Penetration
(Number of ATMs per 100,
000 adults)
Mobile Phone Used to Pay
13.4
3.3
3.0
Bills (% Age 15 and above)
ATM is main mode of deposit 4.2
10.4
6.6
(% with an account, age 15+)
ATM is main mode of
69.2
41.7
41.8
withdrawal
(% with an account, age 15+)
Account at a formal financial
42.3
20.5
24.0
institution (% age 15+)
Account used for business
12.5
7.5
5.3
purposes (% age 15+)
Account used to receive
17.2
3.3
9.1
remittances (% age 15+)
Account used to receive wages 15.9
9.2
9.9
(% age 15+)
Credit card (% age 15+)
6.1
1.6
2.9
Mobile phone used to receive 66.7
25.2
14.6
money (% age 15+)
Mobile phone used to send
60.5
20.0
11.2
money (% age 15+)
Source: World Bank, 2012; Global Findex, 2012 (for the USA, the credit provided to
private sector by banking sector is 231.6%; for whole world, it is 168.9%).
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CHAPTER 2
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ACCESS TO FINANCE BY
SMES: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1

Introduction

Inequality takes many forms with respect to credit market participants. In general, there is
a vertical inequality in access to finance with regard to segments of the society with
unequal incomes. The well-to-do section of society tends to face higher probabilities in
accessing financial services, whereas the poor and often times, SMEs, tend to have
limited financial access (Beck & Demirkuc-Kunt, 2008; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane,
2012; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). In addition, there is the issue of horizontal
inequality in access to finance, when people of different ethnic groups, regions and
gender have differential access.

In Kenya, issues of constraints and uneven access have not faded away, particularly in
rural areas despite recent innovations in credit markets (Aduda & Kalunda, 2012). For
example, Atieno (2001) observes that commercial banks and other formal institutions
often fail to cater for small borrowers because of their strict lending policies and
conditions. Citing data from a 1995 survey, she observes that 33% of borrowers in Kenya
ranked credit constraints as among their problems and that 86% of borrowers got capital
from informal sources.

Countries have, from time to time, intervened in the credit markets to correct some
market failures and market imperfections due to monopoly power, adverse selection or
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moral hazards or externalities. Development economists increasingly see SMEs as the
“missing link” in the puzzle of poverty reduction, and financial inclusion offers
possibilities to advance inclusive development (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; Chibba, 2009;
Gencer 2011; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012).

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 examines the definition and role of SMEs
in modern economies, as well as the typical problem of access to finance. Section 2.3
discusses measurement of financial sector development, while section 2.4 takes on the
role of financial inclusion as a way to expand the access frontier and addresses SME
financing issues. Section 2.5 assesses conventional and unconventional measures in the
credit markets, and finally, section 2.6 concludes the chapter.

2.2

SMEs and Access to Finance

2.2.1

Definition of SMEs

There is a wide range of definitions and measures of SMEs that differ from country to
country (see Table 2.1). Though there is no universally agreed upon definition of SMEs
(Singh & Tandon, 2012), three commonly used criteria are the number of employees,
value of assets, and value of sales (Ganbold, 2008; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012).
The number of employees has gained prominence because it is easy to collect.

The European Union (EU) defines a small enterprise as one which has a headcount of
less than 50 employees and a balance sheet and turnover each of which is not more than
10 million Euros. A medium-size enterprise has headcount of less than 250, and a
turnover of not more than 50 million Euros or a balance sheet of not more than 43 million
Euros. Value of assets refers to the balance sheet of the enterprises which reflects the
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overall wealth of the enterprise, whereas turnover or sales simply refers to annual sales
volumes minus discounts and sales taxes in a given accounting period.

In the USA, the Small Business Administration (SBA) Size Standard Office is charged
with setting the size of SMEs to reflect sectoral differences and to aid policies targeting
SMEs. A firm with less than 500 employees is considered a small business (SBA, 2009).
The definition of SMEs is not simply based on the employees alone, however; it also
brings in considerations that differ across sectors. For example, an enterprise specializing
in service delivery is considered small if it has a balance sheet of $10 million or less.

In Kenya, a firm that employs between 5 and 50 persons is defined as small, while one
that employs 50 to 200 is a medium-sized enterprise. Kenyan SME eligibility criteria are
thus closer to those of the EU than U.S. At present, South Sudan does not have an official
definition for SMEs. For the purpose of this study, I adopt the World Bank Business
Environment criteria 6, according to which firms with one to four employees are
considered microenterprises, five to nineteen small, 20 to 99 medium, and 100 and
above, large.

6

These firm-level surveys by the World Bank are conducted every three years since
2002. The surveys cover most regions of the world on issues related or focusing on firm
financing, labor, payments systems and other topics that assess business environment and
firm parlance (see World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey, 2009).
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2.2.2

Role of SMEs in the Modern Economies

According to a 2004 OECD Survey, SMEs in emerging economies account for 60% of all
companies. In China, they account for 70% of foreign trade (Tung & Aycun, 2008). The
SME sector accounts for 80% of employment opportunities in Kenya (FSD Kenya,
2010). In Nigeria, SMEs account for about 95% of all jobs in manufacturing (Ganbold,
2008). A recent survey involving 47,745 firms in 99 countries across the world shows
that SMEs are first suppliers of employment and contribute 66% of all jobs in developing
economies (Bilandzic, Hommes & Stein, 2013).

SME peculiarities give them some advantages. According to Buckley (1996) SMEs are
innovators, employment creators and bridge builders in international trade. They exhibit
high levels of productivity and capability, quickly responding to market changes. They
are immediate end-users of indigenous research (Amaeshi, Jackson & Yauz, 2008). They
provide a breeding environment for entrepreneurs, and act as a bridge in flows of trade,
investment and technology. By using more labor intensively than large firms, they
generate more employment per unit investment. They outperform in innovations per
capita, and they help in transferring labor-intensive technologies and small-scale
technologies (Reynolds, 1997; Liedholm, 2002; Duarte, 2004; Ganbold, 2008; SBA,
2009). This growth potential prompted the World Bank (2004) to devote $10 million to
the promotion of small enterprises in Bangladesh. The Bank argues that small firms foster
competition and innovation (Audretsch, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, & Beck, 2005;
Beck & Honohan, 2007).
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The contribution of SMEs to modern economies is not without controversy. The first
criticism directed at SMEs posits that big firms come with advantages, too: better pay for
workers, safer working environments, and economies of scale and scope, including the
capacity to undertake and bear fixed costs associated with R&D (Rosenzweig, 1988). For
Alfred Chandler (1990) and other skeptics, size matters, and to participate globally, you
have to be big. Second, the concept of SMEs is not clear cut. Definitions are arbitrary,
and there is no common set of measures and policies (Nkurunziza, 2010). Third, some
critics argue that the scale-based approach is not the best way to develop and frame
economic policy making (Little et.al, 1987).

The pro-SME camp argues that critics are mistaken to posit a static minimum efficient
scale (MES) which if not achieved makes the firm Pareto suboptimal (Audtretsch, 2002).
Proponents pose the question: Who does not start small before they become big? Think
about Google, an idea hatched by two college kids; Microsoft, a brainchild of college
dropout; the invention of flight industry by the Wright Brothers; or Vodafone company,
an idea credited to Gerry Whent (he is both a founder and the first CEO of Vodafone
company). Each of these companies started small, the counterargument goes; the
weaklings of today can be the giants of tomorrow. This line of reasoning is consistent
with Jovanoic’s model of noisy selection, where inefficient firms fail and efficient ones
survive and grow (Audretsch, 2002).

A second pro-SME argument is based on innovation. SMEs produce twice more
innovations per employee than large firms (Preston, 1997). Larger firms have an
advantage only in appropriating but not in generating new knowledge, by buying
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property rights or enjoying spillover effects (Acs & Preston, 1997). Audretsch (2002)
theorizes that as the gap between the wage rate and return from starting a new firm
widens, the likelihood of an agent choosing to appropriate the value of his knowledge
internally through starting new enterprise becomes greater. This would help to explain
why SMEs are better at creating radical innovations, and why they record more patents
on a per-employee basis.

Third, SMEs are constantly churning, as some enter and others exit (Amaeshi, Jackson &
Yauz, 2008). If one focuses on aggregate measures, this dynamism is missed. Moreover,
SMEs come with spinoff effects (satisfying consumer demand) and spillover effects
(acting as suppliers to larger firms) that extend beyond the SME sector.

2.2.3

Problems of Access to Finance by SMEs

Access to finance is defined as availability of financial services in the forms of demand
deposits, credit, payments, or insurance (Beck & Honohan, 2007; Donovan, 2011; Aduda
& Kalunda, 2012; Arnold & Johnson, 2012; Massa, 2013). The availability of such
services can be constrained by physical access, affordability and eligibility. Barriers such
as high transactions cost, distance, and minimum balance requirements can exclude
individuals and firms. Access to finance also refers to the degree to which financial
services are available at a fair price.

Access to finance matters to SMEs. In particular, access to credit is associated with
positive growth (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; Ouma & Ramo, 2013). In the words
of Charles Ou, “access to credit for small business startup, expansion, survival, and
financial institutions plays an important role in providing capital to small firms (those
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with fewer than 500 employees) since these firms are not in a position to access fund
from equity capital or publicly traded markets” (SBA, p. 9). Special problems of credit
access by SMEs arise due to several reasons. First, SMEs lack strong and transparent
record-keeping systems. This leads to difficulty in assessing client creditworthiness and
enforcing creditor rights (Beck, & Honohan, 2007). Second, SMEs access to finance is
poor because of high default risk, collateral requirements, delays in loan processing,
inflexible conditions, and high interest rates. Third, SMEs face small markets, often
fragmented financial systems, and difficult business environments (Kauffamn, 2005;
Sacerdoti, 2005). Fourth, SMEs can and do fail due to lack of competent management,
poor bookkeeping, staffing, sales and marketing problems, and adverse economic
conditions.

For these reasons, formal banks often see lending to SMEs as unprofitable (Aryeteey,
1994). In African countries, commercial banks have not traditionally serviced small-scale
borrowers, and instead depended on lending to the state and larger private sector
enterprises. So, institutionally, banks have had little capacity (or incentive to build
capacity) to administer small-scale loans. Such loans are costly to manage (transactions
costs) and lack of information on borrowers can present a further problem (Kablan, 2010;
Sacerdoti, 2005; Boyko & Gottesman, 2011).

SMEs sometimes have turned to microcredit units, which themselves are constrained and
face limited expansion possibilities. Despite their revolutionary contributions to credit
availability, microfinance institutions (MFIs) typically lend on short terms and do not
provide long-term financing that SMEs need for expansion. MFIs also usually lend in
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small amounts which can be inadequate to satisfy SME needs. Constrained by lack of
savings mobilization, MFIs depend heavily on donor resources (World Bank, 2008). In
addition, MFIs operate under different mission statements, often rely on NGO support
that is not sustainable, and in some cases may crowd out commercially viable projects
(Basu, Blavy & Yulek, 2004). For example, focus on microfinance for poverty reduction
can shift attention to subsidies and charity, which can hurt the quality of services. The
poor lack of access to education, markets, technology, and other factors that expand
production frontiers and these may not be overcome by microfinance alone.

Improved access to formal finance can improve economic growth and social services
(IMF, 2008; Gencer, 2011; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012), consistent with the view that
growth can be good for both poor and rich (Dollar & Kraay, 2002). This does not mean
there are no distributional issues, nor is it an endorsement of trickle-down-ThatcherReaganomics. But when there are improved macroeconomic and institutional frameworks
and lower interest rates, formal bank lending to SMEs can bring substantial benefits
above and beyond those of lending by MFIs. Banks and MFIs can play complementary
roles, as well. For example, formal banks sometimes learn lessons from deposit
mobilization initiatives by MFIs such as the Indian Self-help Group initiative (Basu,
Blavy & Yulek, 2004).

In Kenya, a series of enabling financial-sector innovations have been tried, including
changes in regulation and supervision. Some measures indicative of policies to improve
access include: (1) investing in information infrastructures, and building credit registries,
(2) encouraging openness, competition, and increased transparency through periodic
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publication/surveys,(3) formalization and enforcement of lender responsibility (this
means central bank regulators are required to ensure that firms comply with regulations,
as well as have proper recourse to court to recoup assets from defaulting parties), (4)
public-private partnerships through club membership, guaranteeing solvency, and
awards, and (5) overcoming physical access barriers through the technology-based
agency model and mobile branches. One bank in Kenya that has taken mobile banks to
new heights is the Equity Bank. As of 2006, Equity has about 100 mobile vans providing
financial services in rural areas in Kenya with a scheduled frequency (Beck & Honohan,
2007). It also provides financial literacy training, same-day emergency loans, and
encourages women entrepreneurs to seek assistance.

Markets alone are not the solution, because markets can and do fail due to collective
action problems, power concentration, greed, and lack of foresight. Policy regulation,
supervision and some nuanced governmental controls are needed for macroeconomic
stability which means that government interventionist policies are here to stay to address
externality and coordination issues (Akerlof & Schiller, 2009; Lin, 2011). Because
financial markets, like other real markets, do fail, there is a burden on the financial
regulators and central banks not just to focus singly on price stability but also provide
prudent regulation to minimize undue system-wide financial risks.

Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006) find that while “inefficient
functioning financial markets, inadequate security, and enforcement of property rights,
poor provision of infrastructure, inefficient regulation and taxation and broader
governance features such as corruption and macroeconomic instability are discussed
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without any comparative evidence on their ordering” (p.1), not all obstacles are equally
constraining to firm growth. Rather they find that access to finance, crime and political
instability have direct impacts on firm growth, and that other obstacles affect firm growth
indirectly. On a further robustness test, they conclude that access to finance is “the most
robust of the three” (p.1). Similarly, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) find that average
size of the firm is larger in countries with better financial markets, suggesting that
financial constraint does in fact limit a firm size. Protecting property rights can enhance
external financing for small firms more than that of larger firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt &
Maksimovic, 2008). This implies that delivering political stability, and reducing crime
rate, as well as financial sector reforms, can help to foster growth in the SME sector
(Ayyagari, Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007).

2.3

Financial Inclusion

Access to finance is widely seen as the major binding constraint on growth (World Bank,
2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Laeven, 2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012;
Andrianaivo & Kpodar, 2012; Singh & Tandon, 2013). Recent efforts by international
financial institutions (Department for International Development [DFID], AfDB,
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency [MIGA], European Investment Bank [EIB],
Asian Development bank [ADB], Commonwealth Development Corporation [CDC],
Netherlands Development Finance Company [FMO], and Belgian Investment Company
for Developing Countries[ BIO]) 7 and a number of governments to support financial

7

Example of these include support to women-SME term loan for women and growthoriented women entrepreneurs in Kenya, gender empowerment program in Nigeria,
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service inclusion reflect the growing interest of development economists in the potential
role of banking in facilitating not only economic growth but also equitable growth (see
Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012; AFI, 2013; Calice, 2013; Hayem, Torres, & Hurtado,
2013; Massa, 2013; World Bank financial contributions to SMEs). After all, we know
that “An economy cannot thrive on a fraction of its citizens while excluding others”
(Aduda & Kalunda, 2012).

To illustrate the growing interest in financial inclusion agenda, a number of workshops,
conferences and symposia held around the world speak volumes. Examples abound: the
Maya Declaration and G-20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan (AFI, 2013), the United
Nations Conference on Financial Inclusion in Africa, held in Dakar, June 2006; World
Bank Access to Finance, Washington D.C, March 2007; Making Finance Work for the
Poor, April 2007 (jointly organized by DFID, USAID and WB); DFID’s Financial
Inclusion Conference, June 2007; Global Conference on Next Generation and Access to
Finance: Gaining Scale and Reducing Cost with Technology and Credit Scoring,
Washington D.C, September 2007 under IFC, CCAGP and VISA International (Chibba,
2009).

Already, according to the 2010 Financial Access Database, 74 out of 140 surveyed
countries report data on SME financing (Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane, 2012). Kenya is
among these and is one of the 59 countries where central banks report SME financing

Uganda women entrepreneurs, and women entrepreneurs program in Tanzania, among
others (see Massa, 2013).
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through regular reporting. Eighteen countries of the sample in Africa are collecting core
data for gauging success in financial inclusion.

Particular financial inclusion workshops or conferences in Africa include: Ready for
Takeoff: A High Level Conference on Kenya’s Economic Successes, Prospects, and
Challenges, Nairobi, September 2013; the 2012 Global Policy Forum (GPF) held in Cape
Town, South Africa, under the overall theme of Making Financial Inclusion Real, and the
first GPF AFI conference in Nairobi, September 2009.

The phrase, “making finance work for Africa” thus has become a widely shared goal
among policymakers (Beck & Honohan, 2007, p. 146-148). As of today, there is a
growing recognition among central banks, governments, mobile provider operators and
microfinance institutions that financial inclusion is essential for several reasons,
including employment opportunities and poverty reduction (Singh & Tandon, 2013).
Today a number of developing countries elsewhere around the world also have made
financial inclusion one of their policy objectives (Singh & Tandon, 2013). For instance,
Brazil, India, and the Philippines, have embraced the goal of financial inclusion. What is
encouraging in this drive is that central banks are in the driver seat. Many countries are
adopting mobile money applications as a way to further the financial inclusion objective.
For Kenya and the Philippines, in particular, the service provider “intimately” interacts
with the regulators, resulting in a conducive environment for mobile financial services to
take-off without premature or stymying regulation (Stephen, 2011; AFI, 2010). Financial
inclusion is no longer seen as a passive by-product of development but rather as an
objective in its own right to be pursued.
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In addition to their role of financial services, mobile phones are also increasingly being
used to collect data which can then be used to further improve financial services and
other services such as implementing surveys, monitoring conditional cash transfers,
interview enumerators via phones and monitoring of health programs among others
(Demombynes, Gubbins & Romeo, 2013). This holds a great prospect because mobile
phone subscriptions grew in Africa from 87 million in 2005 to 433 million in 2011
(Demombynes, Gubbins & Romeo, 2013, p. 2).

Financial inclusion, which AfDB (2013) defines as “all initiatives that make formal
financial services available, accessible, affordable to all segments of the population”
covers both demand and supply-side factors. On the supply side, a number of
fundamental pillars are in the forefront to drive financial inclusion: mobile financial
services, ATMs, NGOs, MFIs, and the public sector (Figure 2.1).

The first key pillar of financial inclusion is the role of non-financial private sector in
tapping the technology-based deployments (mobile applications or adoption of mobile
financial services such as M-Pesa in Kenya) through e-banking and telecommunication
(Chibba, 2009; see Figure 2.1). According to Donovan (2012, p. 61), “Mobile financial
services are among the most promising mobile applications in the developing world.”
This is due to the fact that mobile applications are easily adopted across diverse sectors
such as healthcare, commerce, larger manufacturers, agriculture and credit markets as
there are presently close to110 mobile money systems adopted in the developing world
and the most developed and well known among them is the M-Pesa (Donovan, 2011;
Chibba, 2009). As Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show, the deployment of mobile financial services

32

is growing and by this measure, Sub-Sahara is in the lead. This offers range of innovative
services including (1) payments through peer-to-peer transfer, (2) finance via offering
insurance products, such as Salama Kilimo in Kenya, and second generation mobile
financial services in South Africa, and finally, (3) banking such as checking account
access miles away from bank premises (Faye & Triki, 2013; Table 2.2). Unlike the
previous attempts, which were either credit or savings-led, the M-Pesa drive suggests a
third approach called the “payment rail.” In other words, proponents believe that there are
forces inherent in mobile money—ubiquity of data transmission, mobile money as new
industry and as infrastructure supporting new businesses and other industries, the infusion
of capital abroad and from informal sector, as well as efficiency gains from digital
currency— that will effectively drive growth (Gencer, 2011). Mobile banking offers
cheaper, safer and faster methods to transfer funds (Table 2.3). At the same time, mobile
money can have a positive impact on the GDP through (1) reducing the untaxable “gray
economy” and reduction of fraud, (2) productivity gains through efficient
communications, underscoring that connectivity is productivity and (3) increased
investments, hence producing more jobs (Figure 2.4). For example, by March 2010, due
to M-Pesa, Safaricom is believed to have created over 36,000 new agents and
telecommunications jobs in Nairobi, Africa’s New Silicon Valley (Gencer, 2011).

The second pillar of financial inclusion is financial literacy, defined “as the ability to
make informed judgments and to take effective decisions regarding the use and the
management of money” (Chibba, 2009, p. 222). It matters for expanding access
(Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2013). Today, a number of banks such as Faulu Kenya
(Cohen & Nelson, 2011) in Kenya are engaged in the promotion of financial literacy as
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they rollout many of their financial services through client workshops/face-to-face
training, campaigns on money management principles through radios, TV or print media.
Understanding the psychology of financial exclusion due to illiteracy, low income,
distance, and self-exclusion, is also another component of this pillar (Aduda & Kalunda,
2012) 8.

The third pillar of financial inclusion is the role of microfinance institutions (MFIs). They
have long and successful records in promoting financial inclusion. Some of the MFIs (for
example, Faulu) in Kenya are converting to deposit-taking to engage further with the
public. While MFIs alone are not enough, they complement other financial inclusion
toolkits.

The fourth pillar of financial inclusion is public sector support. This is a country-specific
politico-economic dimension that ensures appropriate legislation as well as supervision
and implementation (Chibba, 2009; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012). M-Pesa did not succeed in
a vacuum but rather thanks to the concerted efforts of the Kenyan government and
concerned stakeholders to cooperate in implementing appropriate regulations and
accountability mechanisms (AFI, 2010). Others argue that Kenya’s adoption rate was
boosted by the presence of a “perfect storm” in political, demographic and business
factors (Gencer, 2011).

8

Aduda and Kalunda (2012) classify types of financial exclusions as physical access
exclusion, access exclusion, condition exclusion, price exclusion, marketing and selfexclusion. Other researchers classify them differently; namely balance levels
requirements, insufficient documentation, and interest rate barriers among others.
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To the extent these pillars are transformative; they can be strengthened through five
models: financial sector consensus, private sector development, public sector leadership,
civil society and the catalytic model (Chibba, 2009):

2.4

Measuring Financial Sector Development and Financial Inclusion

Some consensus is emerging over the question whether there is a direct link between
financial sector development and economic growth through finance (Goldsmith, 1969;
McKinnon, 1973; Benhaib & Spiegel, 2000; Classens & Laeven, 2003; Love, 2003;
Beck, Levine & Loayza, 2000a, 2000b). Love (2003) argues that financial development
impacts growth by reducing financing constraints (legal constraints, enforcement of
property rights, creditor rights and accounting standards), hence removing distortions that
would have made investment more inefficient. In testing this relationship, Benhabib and
Spiegel (2000) conclude that financial sector development correlates with total factor
productivity growth and investment and that many of results are sensitive to country
fixed-effects, implying differences in broader characteristics and level of financial sector
development.

Using data on 80 countries from 1960 to 1989, Levine and King (1993) find some
associations between level of financial sector development on one hand and real GDP
growth, rate of physical accumulation and efficiency in which all factors are properly
utilized in the economy, on the other hand. This finding corresponds with Schumpeter
who held the view that financial system has a potential to promote economic growth.
Levine and King(1993) claim that “In 1911 Joseph Schumpeter argued that the services
provided by financial intermediaries—Mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing
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risks, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions—are essential for technological
innovation and economic development” (p. 717).

This view has not always been uniformly accepted within the economics discipline. Some
economists contend that finance is unimportant for growth. Robinson (1952) believes that
financial development only follows economic growth and more recently, Lucas (1988)
calls the relationship between financial sector development and economic development as
something “overstressed” (Levine & King, 1993, p. 717). Beck, Levine and Loayza
(2000a) argue that “Economic theories mirror these divisions” with some going back to
19th century. For example, Hamilton (1781) contended that “Banks were the happiest
engines that ever were invented” so as to spur economic growth while on the other hand,
others offered different claims, for instance Adams (1819), argued that banks had
negative effect on the “ morality, tranquility, and even wealth” of given states or
countries. In that regard, one group favors the role of financial intermediaries to
economic growth (Hamilton, 1781; Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1943) and while another
group minimizes its role (sees Adams, 1819; Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988).

However, recent studies have come to find stronger relationships between growth and
financial sector development. On their part, Gregoro and Guidotti (1995) examine link
between the long-run economic growth and financial sector development, proxied by
ratio between bank credit to private sector and GDP. They find a positive relationship
between the two in a large cross-country sample and vary across countries with negative
impact for Latin America when they used panel data. They also conclude that the channel
from financial sector to growth is through efficiency, not volume of investment. Other
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models they cited include “endogenous growth literature (Bencivenga & Smith, 1991;
Greenwood & Jovanoic, 1990) which focuses of marginal product of capital which
remains positive in their investigation.

Identifying sources of growth such as private savings rates, physical capital
accumulation, and total factor productivity, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find that
financial intermediaries impact growth through its positive effect on total productivity
growth.

Financial sector development, therefore, is now widely recognized as contributing to
economic growth and poverty reduction (Aduda & Kalunda, 2012; Jung, 1986).
According to Levine (1997, p. 703), “there is even evidence that the level of financial
development is a good predictor of future economic development.” Johnson and NinoZarazua (2011, p. 475) remark, “The role of financial sector as a leading contributor to
growth has been substantially accepted and recently the focus has turned to its
contribution to poverty reduction.” There are two views in this debate. The first view,
referred to as “demand-following” asserts that economic growth leads to expansion of
financial system and on the second view, referred to as “supply-leading”, argues for the
expansion of financial services before demand for financial services or “The financial
sector precedes and induces real growth” (Jung, 1986, p. 333).

There is no one-size-fits-all measure of financial development. Nevertheless,
conventional indicators of financial development include:
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(i)

Private credit from financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP.
Studies show that private credit is a good predictor of economic growth (Beck,
Demirkuc-Kunt & Levine 2005; Sacerdoti, 2005; Ardic, Mylenko, & Saltane,
2012; see Chapter 1.1, Table 1.2).

(ii)

The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (M2/GDP), which is an indicator of
“financial deepening.” This measure has received criticisms because it overlooks
openness, extent of public borrowing from domestic financial system, the
development of nonbank financial intermediation, and the competitiveness of the
banking sector (Kablan, 2010).

(iii)

The ratio of the total loans outstanding to GDP, another measure of financial
depth. Greater depth is associated with greater access, since access itself is hard
to measure (CGAP, 2009). This measure is also criticized because domestic
private credit is conflated with government borrowing which may crowd-out
private sector borrowers.

Financial development is associated not only with increased access to finance but also
with higher quality of services. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2007) put together a list
of indicators to measure banking sector penetration and outreach that also address quality
attributes:

1. Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1000 km sq;
2. Demographic branch penetration: number of branches per 100,000 people;
3. Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1000 km square;
4. Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people;
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5. Loan accounts per capita: number of loans per 100, 000 people;
6. Loan-income ratio: average size of loans to GDP per capita;
7. Deposit accounts per capita: number of deposits per 1000 people;
8. Deposit-income ratio: average size of deposits per 1000 people.

The financial inclusion agenda is concerned today about expanding the services through
improvement in each of the above criteria (see Chapter 1, Table 1.2; Table 2.4).

2.5

Interventions in Credit Markets

Credit markets in Africa tend to exhibit the following characteristics:
(1) Inability to satisfy existing credit demand, especially among SMEs and in rural
areas.
(2) Imperfect information, costly screening and monitoring, and poor contract
enforcement, all of which contribute to moral hazard and adverse selection
problems; according to Atieno (2009), credit markets tend to be segmented and
incomplete, hence making it harder for SMEs to secure credit.
(3) Dualistic markets—informal and formal markets existing side- by-side.

Small business enterprises often rely on their own savings or turn to friends and families
to finance expansion (see survey analysis in Chapters 3 and 4). Sometimes they go to
moneylenders who charge exorbitant rates. The result is a dualistic monetary system, in
which banks lend to big businesses and leave small borrowers out in the cold, where they
may be at the mercy of loan sharks. Nevertheless, informal finance in some cases
succeeds where formal finance fails.
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Aryeetey (1997) contends that informal financial markets serve niches that formal banks
cannot reach in Africa. The unorganized monetary system mobilizes household savings
and provides financing to small businesses. In order to overcome weaknesses in legal
structures and poor contract enforcement, informal markets use social sanctions,
collateral substitutes, reputation and group dynamics and personal relationships. For
example, informal finance has been important in Ghana for decades, whether the
government has pursued liberal or repressive financial policies (Aryeteey, 1997).

Even though informal finance serves niches that formal banks do not reach, it has its
limitations. SMEs often demand larger loans than informal finance can provide.
Moreover, some informal lending sources, such as moneylenders (who do not mobilize
deposits but raise capital from their own earnings, and economic activities such as
farming and trading), charge exorbitantly high interest rates.

At the same time, SMEs often have difficulty accessing formal-sector finance. In Kenya,
despite the more than doubling of banking assets between 1990 and 1995, few
commercial banks were lending to SMEs in the late 1990s (Atieno, 2001). Exceptions
include Barclays Bank which lent to women in groups and as individuals, and set up loan
guarantee funds. Also, Kenya Commercial Bank has offered government guarantee loans
to deserving SMEs.

Atieno (2001) found that Kenya’s Central Bank rules lowering entry requirements
(minimum capital requirements) led to growth of non-bank financial institutions (NFIs)
from 23 in 1981 to 54 in 1988, and that the number declined to 24 in 1997 following the
conversion of many NBFIs into commercial banks. I suspect that this growth of NBFIs
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exerted some competitive pressure on licensed banks and might have helped to expand
access to small borrowers. NBFIs include currency exchange bureaus, insurance firms,
cashier check issuers, and check cashing locations. NBFIs occupy an intermediate
position on the continuum between the formal and informal finance. Microfinance
institutions, Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (SACCOs) and Rotating
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) also fall on this continuum. In Kenya,
SACCOs, MFIs, and ROSCAs are categorized as “other alternative financial services”
(Central Bank Act, 2008). Let us now turn to general conventional and non-conventional
means of interventions in the credit markets.

2.5.1

Conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Market

In good times, a country’s central bank has at its disposal a number of conventional
monetary policy tools. Interest rate policies, open market operations and changes in
reserve requirements are applied to control credit supply. While the degree of
intervention is different, advanced as well as developing countries use these conventional
monetary policies.

Monetary theory holds that in a competitive credit market without externalities, the first
fundamental welfare theorem states that forces of supply and demand interact to produce
market clearing interest rates which are Pareto optimal. Any other interest rate would be
disequilibrating. But because the standard model of competitive market is rare to find in
developing countries due to market failures, governments have intervened in credit
markets. These interventions have taken varied forms, both in the past and present.
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First, governments in developing countries were frequently used to intervene through
selective credit schemes. But these schemes came under heavy criticisms for bearing
below-market interest rates and therefore becoming commercially unviable. In the face of
such criticisms, they have been largely abandoned on the ground they tend to lead to
financial repression (see McKinnon, 1973). Structural adjustment programs grew out, in
part, of this understanding of the need to correct the government inefficiencies in the
credit markets.

Second, governments in developing countries used to intervene in the rural credit
markets, including through nationalization as in India in 1969 and Mexico in 1982
(Besley, 1994). Compelling banks to set up branches in rural areas to lend to agriculture
is another such scheme.

Today, a number of conventional market based-solutions are being sought in which
developing country governments are intervening in credit markets through other means.
One such intervention is through pure regulation, which has been and continues to be
used to affect daily operations of bank, including capital ratios and other soundness
measures. There is also increased cooperation between the public and private sector in
rolling out some financial services, such as M-Pesa or agency models in Kenya. In
addition, not only are central banks issuing prudential guidelines to commercial
institutions, they are also using moral suasion to encourage implementation of the
financial inclusion agenda.
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2.5.2

Non-conventional Means of Interventions in Credit Markets

There are two kinds of interventions in this category, one dealing with stock markets and
the other dealing with banks to affect credit markets. In developing countries,
unconventional means of interventions include:

First, investing in informational credit databases, such as credit references. This can have
far reaching implications in access to credit. Commercial banks, central banks and
concerned governments such as the Government of Kenya (GoK) are pushing hard for
this investment because of the benefits it provides to the lenders, borrowers and the credit
market in general.

Second, there has been an interest in governments to subsidize early innovators, for
example, by giving them tax breaks. The growth of M-Pesa is a good example of such
early subsidization, in that the Kenyan Government did not heavily regulate the financial
service provider in the early stage (AFI, 2010). This model in which innovation precedes
regulation gave the M-Pesa platform a breathing space. Another example is the Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh. The latter pioneered the innovative group lending model which has
been embraced by the MFI industry because of its implication in reducing information
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Mashigo (2008) finds, for example, that
group lending improves access to credit by group members in Soshanguve informal
settlement in South Africa.
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Third, small loan guarantees, such as the ones offered by SBA in the US are hypothesized
to provide net positive social welfare gains 9. Craig, Jackson and Thomson (2007, p. 7)
find that there is a “significant correlation between the average annual level of
employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in the local
markets.” However, there are few studies in this area, which means that there is no
definitive answer as to whether guaranteed subsidies help small businesses or remain
ineffective though they are politically popular. This model is not peculiar to the western
governments. A number of developing country commercial banks are partnering with
development institutions to pool resources and lend them to SMEs.

In the developed economies, when policy interest rates reach the zero bound level, central
banks have the option of using monetary stimulus via “quantitative easing,” which is
another unconventional forms of intervention (Imus, Srinivasan & Vladimir, 2009; Santo
& Suchanek, 2013). Indeed, following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 that hit the
advanced economies, governments took a number of unconventional measures to
intervene in the credit market (Tong & Wei, 2010). These unconventional measures
included debt guarantee purchases of toxic assets and bank recapitalization. These
interventions, according to Tong and Wei (2010), helped alleviate the credit constraints
for the non-financial firms. These non-standard measures have been transitory and
tailored to the needs of each economy (Trichet, 2013). In the words of Santor and

9

For over half a century, SBA has been providing loan guarantees as mechanisms to
mitigate credit rationing. Consistently over the years, the federal loan guarantees grew
from $12.6 billion to $18 billion in 2006 and $25 billion in 2008 (see Craig, Jackson &
Thomson, 2007).
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Suchanek (2013, p. 11), “Unconventional monetary policies have thus become part of the
toolkit of central banks, permitting them to provide considerable policy stimulus should
circumstances require more action.”

While these unconventional measures have also helped real economies, such measures
have also created real potential costs and challenges for the central banks in the
mechanics of expanded balance sheets and how to exit (Bernanke, 2012; Santo &
Suchanek, 2013). Exiting too soon may undermine recovery, but exiting too slow may
lead to excess liquidity and building up of inflationary measures. Many have thus called
for clear communications and guidance.

Another problem is that a given central bank’s credibility (especially the U.S. Fed) may
be at stake if it is seen to continue propping up government spending through large fiscal
deficits. There is also a concern about “low for long”, a situation in which interest can
stay low for an extended period (Carney, 2012). This may have distributional and
spillover effects in other asset prices (Santor & Suchanek, 2013), and the commitment to
keep interest rate close to zero for extended time permits the operation of “zombie
banks,” which remain operating due to continued government support despite negative
net worth (Imus, Srinivasan and Vladimir, 2009).

At the end of the day though, developed and developing countries face different policy
settings and different challenges in applying unconventional measures. Advanced
countries have efficient financial infrastructures which make it easy to transmit monetary
policy injections across the entire economy. Second, developing countries are more
dependent on cash-based transactions than advanced countries. Cash-based economy
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(soft currency) comes with a baggage of disadvantage ranging from insecurity carrying
cash to losing value if there is hyperinflation. Having soft currency as opposed to hard
(strong) currency complicated interventions because in developing countries, much of the
economy is underground. That advanced countries have hard currency position does not
undercut their policy intervention; developing countries face the issue of soft currency,
which is constantly fluctuating due to political instability or lack of confidence in a given
national currency. In other words, the economic fundamentals are very weak in
developing countries than in developed countries which make monetary policy less
effective in the former.

Intervention in credit market is not a common experience in South Sudan because the
country, including its Central Bank just emerged on the scene recently. The Bank is
presently managed by 9-member board of directors which is the “highest policy and
decision making body” (GoSS, 2011). The board composes of a governor, and two
deputy governors who are generally appointed by the president as well as sixnonexecutive members who are not Bank employees, proposed and appointed by
Governor and the president, respectively. A governor who happens to be chairman of the
board and two deputies are appointed for five years and the other board members for
seven years each. An exception is made for first such two deputies and other members of
board who are slated to serve staggered terms to provide continuity.

Many of conventional and as well as unconventional means of intervening in the credit
markets are still foreign to South Sudan, which has only a bank-based weak financial
system. The only two major areas where the Bank has played a role in the economy are to

46

act as a banker and agent of the government (receiving its oil revenue and representing
the government in some international obligations falling within its competency). Except
through occasional fixed exchange rate policy, many of these policy tools are out of its
reach or have not delved into yet. For example, commercial banks are not lending, so
interest policy has not been an effective policy. On reserve requirements, many banks are
having enough liquidity sitting idly and only found a borrower in the name of the
government during austerity measures of 2012. Commercial banks were issued treasury
bills and lent money to ministry of finance.

There is no policy of providing credit guarantees to businesses or private sectors nor is
the Bank engages in quantitative easing policies as is the case in the West. In short, there
are no applications of both the unconventional and conventional means of intervention in
credit market today in South Sudan. First, the banking sector is limited in their lending
activities and is much concerned with exchange transactions, involving personal
remittances and bank transfers. Second, lack of skilled management in the Bank and
commercial institutions as well as lack of strong regulatory framework is constraining
any meaningful interventions. The recent devaluation of the currency on 11 November
2013 proves disastrous because of these limiting factors or weak regulatory system.

2.6

Conclusion

From 1956 through 2005, South Sudan has been a region which has put political
liberation above everything else. And between 2005 through 2011, the Southern Sudan (a
region then) was once again preoccupied with holding credible referendum and seceding.
While the secession came on 9 July 2011, the country came to the world scene as the
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youngest nation and among the least developed economies, with no experience in
virtually everything. Hence, its central bank is two years old and all its institutions are
beset by weak regulatory framework. Oil fueled consumption in the expense of other
pursuits such as access to credit and financial inclusion in general.

Aware of the current affairs of the banking sector in South Sudan, role of the CBSS and
the ills facing its economy, this chapter aims to shade some light on the role of SMEs in
modern economies and offer suggestions for enhancement of financial inclusion.

This chapter, therefore, defines SMEs and discusses why they are important in modern
economies as a vehicle to create jobs and reduce poverty. We argue that development
circles have come to a better understanding in advocating financial inclusion not only
through MFIs but also through technology-based applications such as ATMs, mobile
finance services such as M-Pesa, and innovative leadership in the public-private sector
nexus.

Central banks in the developing world are currently the prime movers taking on the
unconventional objectives of pushing for financial inclusion and greater interoperability
(the capacity for operations or to operate together, for instance, inter-operation between
M-Pesa platform and that of M-Kesho) in financial services. This is witnessed by the
growing number of financial inclusion workshops, symposia and conferences, as well as
interventions in credit markets to further these goals.

This dissertation’s exploration of the Kenyan experience in expanding financial access to
SMEs, and of the challenges of doing this in the post-conflict environment of South
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Sudan, builds upon these developments in an effort to formulate a strategy for promoting
financial inclusion in a setting where credit markets are singularly underdeveloped.

Table 2.1 Definition of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in EU, U. S and Kenya
Country
Enterprise
Headcount
Turnover
Balance Sheet
/Region
EU
USA
Kenya

Small
Medium
Small
Business
Small

< 50
< 250
< 500

≤ € 10 million
≤ € 50 million
$ 7 million
(service)
N/A

≤ € 10 million
≤ € 43 million
$ 7 million
(service)
N/A

Between 5
and 50
Medium
Up to 200
Ksh. 2 million
Ksh. 2 million
Source: U.S. Small Business Administration, and EU Recommendations (2003/361/EC)

Table 2.2: Different Types of Mobile Financial Services across the World
Type
Kind of Services
Mobile Finance
- Credit
- Insurance
- Savings
Mobile Banking
- Transactional
- Informational
Mobile Payment
- Person-to-person
- Government-to-person
- Business-to-business
Source: Adopted from Donovan, 2011
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Table 2.3: Cost of a 200 USD Money Transfer (Person-to-person; P2P)
Mobile Payment
Cash to Cash
Provider
Cost
Provider
Cost
(USD)
(USD)
Celpaid (Cote d’Ivoire)
8
WARI(Senegal) 20
Airtel (Burkina Faso)
6
CMS(Senegal)
2
Inova (Burkina Faso)
6
ACEP(Senagl)
2
Societe Generale (Senegal) 10
Eco-bank
8
(Burkina Faso)
M-Pesa (Kenya)
1
Orange Money (Senegal)
9
Source: AfDB Publication, 2013

Table 2.4: Use of Financial Services across Africa (% of Adult population)
Formal Formal Other Informal Excluded
Kenya
21.5
15
29.5
34
Tanzania
15
2
7
75
Uganda
18
0
29
52
Zambia
14
12
11
62
Botswana
44
5
5
48
South Africa
54
6
9
31
Namibia
53
3
1
42
Source: Beck et al., (2010)
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Figure 2.1: Pillars of Financial Inclusion
Technology-based
Financial Applications
(ATMs, E-banking,etc)
Agency
Model
(POS)

Public Sector
Leadership

Financial
Inclusion

Financial
Literacy

Postal
Services

MFIs and
NGOs
Source: Author (2013)

Figure 2.2: Global Mobile Deployments, 2001-2011
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Figure 2.3: Number of Mobile Money Deployments by Region, March 2011
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Note: E&CA = Europe and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SA =
South Asia; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; EA&P = East Asia and Pacific; SSA =
sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 2.4: Financial Inclusion Contribution to a Country’s GDP
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES IN KENYA
3.1

Introduction

Received wisdom links access to credit with economic growth through efficient resource
allocation and enablement of exchange of goods and services (Levine, 1997; Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005; Johnson & Arnold, 2012; IMF, 2008; Ouma &
Ramo, 2013). In development circles, emphasis is increasingly placed on financial
inclusion, based on the understanding that lack of basic financial services, such as credit,
savings mechanisms and insurance policies contributes to unrelenting income inequality,
poverty and lethargic economic growth (Dev, 2006; Kendall, Mylenko & Ponce, 2010;
Nkurunziza, 2010; Singh & Tandon, 2012; Cracknell, 2012; Koker & Jentzsch, 2012;
Lassila, 2012; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013; Bauchet & Murdoch, 2013). Demand-side
factors 10, such as lack of employment, fluctuating incomes, and illiteracy as well as
supply-side factors such as geographic distance, excessive cost of financial services, lack
of identification documents or high minimum balances, often lead to financial exclusion
of significant segments of the population in low-income countries (Atieno, 2009; Johnson
& Nino-Zarazua, 2011; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013; Aterido, Beck & Iacovone, 2013).
In the words of Singh and Tandon (2012, p. 49), “financial exclusion leads to social
exclusion, poverty as well as all the other associated economic and social problems.” For

10

Theoretically, we have come to understand constraints to access to finance in the lens
of New Institutional Economics which shines a spotlight on asymmetric information and
transaction costs that may arise from geographical distance, cost of services, and identity
card requirements, among others; (see Johnson and Nino-Zarazua, 2009).
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this reason it can be argued that financial services should be considered as “merit goods”,
defined as goods that should universally be provided to individual not so much on
willingness and ability to pay but on needs-based criteria (d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013,
p. 131). Merit goods may arise due to preference –distortion problem, distributional
problem and public good problem (Head, 1966). Examples of merit goods in our society
today include public education, subsidized housing and head-start programs because they
embody positive externalities.

This recognition has led international financial institutions, governments and private
sector agencies to advocate policies geared toward creating broad-based financial sectors
as one of the tools to achieve inclusive economic development (United Nations, 2006;
World Bank, 2008; IMF, 2008, AfDB, 2013). In addition, financial inclusion is pursued
for the goals of financial integrity, such as anti-money laundering (Koker & Jentzsch,
2012), based on the argument that bringing everyone into the formal financial system
stifles illegal activities (see Kenya’s Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012).

Access to finance by Small and Medium Sized enterprises (SMEs) is an important
element of financial inclusion agenda. In Kenya, Equity Bank has demonstrated that
banking with the bottom of the economic pyramid 11 can be safe and profitable
(Cracknell, 2012). Banks should, therefore, look at financial inclusion both as a business
opportunity and social responsibility (Dev, 2006). This awakening to the possibilities of
“banking the unbanked” is gaining foothold in Kenya, a country where the financial

11

According to Prahalad (2004), about 4 billion people fall in this category, many of
whom live on less than $5 a day.
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sector has been reasonably stable since the early 2000s. Based on my fieldwork and
review of the literature, financial stability in Kenya has been attributed to several factors,
including enforcement of capital requirements, strong regulation, a deposit protection
fund, strong audits which bring credibility to the banking sector, declining nonperforming loans due to credit referencing and window shopping, regulation of
microfinance institutions (MFIs) to mitigate systemic risks, and finally the fact that the
Kenyan economy is growing and integrating with the rest of the world (CBK, 2012).

The Central Bank of Kenya’s policy is to continue to improve financial inclusion through
agency banking, MFI regulation and provision of sound prudential guidelines. In order to
further these goals, the government, the central bank and the banking sector have
embraced technology—ATMs and mobile financial services— to deliver financial
services to all, especially those at the bottom of the economic pyramid. Postal services
are used to provide these financial services as is the case in Brazil and India. Kenya’s
mobile phone penetration grew from 15,000 users in 1999 to 24 million in 2011 (CBK
Report, 2012). Fewer than 3% of households in Kenya had a cell phone in 1990 whereas
by 2011, 93% of all households had mobile phones (Demombynes and Thegeya, 2012).
According to the latest national survey, about 48% of all adults own a mobile phone in
Kenya (FinAccess National Survey, 2009). According to Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper
(2012), 12% in Sub-Sahara Africa without a formal bank account now use mobile phone
financial service transactions.

The Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) describes itself as a “champion of financial inclusion
innovations through agency banking and mobile financial services,” and the Bank has
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hosted country delegations on “agency banking, consumer protection, financial
education, credit information sharing, mobile financial services and microfinance and
automation of bank supervision functions” (CBK, 2012, p.62). CBK is one of 95
members of the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), a network of financial
policymakers, founded by Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in 2008 with the expressed
goal of encouraging countries to adopt inclusive financial policies so as to help move
people out of poverty. AFI does this by encouraging interaction among its members and
knowledge exchange on financial inclusion policies, a paradigm referred to as peer-topeer learning model. These initiatives are bearing fruit. First, the use of formal bank
credit in Kenya in the entire population increased from 31% in 2006 to 38% in 2009 and
Second, most money transfers are now done through M-Pesa (National FinAccess
Survey, 2009). The ATM usage also increased from 7.8% of the adult population in 2006
to 13.4% in 2009. Despite all these efforts, the number of unbanked is still high in Kenya
(IMF, 2008) and SMEs still face significant barriers to growth (Rosemary, 2009). More
people still rely on informal financial services, networks between firms and the M-Pesa is
primarily banking the already banked population. Also, Kenya has seven regulatory
bodies in the financial market and there is more room for interaction to improve
efficiency (Cracknell, 2012).

While close to one billion adults worldwide have no bank accounts, most are assumed to
have mobile phones (Jack & Suri, 2011) 12 . The potential of mobile telephone for

12

We are by no means suggesting that the so-called digital divide or digital chasm, for
lack of better words, is completely narrowed. Despite these best efforts, the divide still
exists both across and within countries. Howard and Mazaheri (2009, p. 1159) find that
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revolutionizing access to financial services is illustrated by the successful story of MPesa in Kenya’s financial landscape (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Aker & Mbiti,
2010; Jack, Suri & Townsend, 2010; Mbiti & Weil, 2011; Jack & Suri, 2011; Cracknell,
2012; d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013). Launched in 2007 by Safaricom and Vodafone MPesa (where M stands for mobile and Pesa is a Swahili word for money) is the most
developed mobile phone payment system in the world. Currently operated by mobile
phone network Safaricom, it “allows users to deposit money onto their mobile handsets,
transfer e-money to another user with a simple text message, and withdraw cash at one of
thousands of outlets throughout the country” (Mbiti & Weil, 2013, p. 369). It holds
promises for financial inclusion, employment opportunities and poverty reduction
(Kamothi, 2009; Kendall, Mylenko, & Ponce, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010). For small
firms and individuals, M-Pesa has generated innovative uses ranging from sending pocket
money and school fees to students, to paying loans, transport fees, and other bills (Jack,
Ray & Suri, 2013).

M-Pesa is succeeding in Kenya because of mobile penetration, low transaction costs and
a concerted drive to increase access to financial services (Jack & Suri, 2011). Though it is
not a bank, Safaricom hopes that M-Pesa would substitute for bank accounts and reach
millions unbanked people (Jack, Suri, & Townsend, 2010). Citing Kimenyi and Ndugu
(2009), Demombynes and Thegeya (2012) state that four factors contributed to the rapid
growth in “mobile money” in Kenya, namely (1) a conducive legal and tax environment,

“while 7 out of 10 people in the United States have reported ever using the internet by
2008, only 7 out of every 100 people reported doing so in India, and only 7 out of every
1,000 people in Mali reported doing so.”
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(2) private-public policy dialogue, (3) strategic and prudent macroeconomic policies, and
(4) a guarantee of the existence of a competitive market, discouraging dominance by
initial entrants (p. 4).

Although the adoption of mobile phone is highest among those who are young, educated,
urban and wealthy, the technology is no longer restricted primarily to the elites (Aker &
Mbiti, 2010) 13. Mobile technology is a vital channel of financial inclusion (Koker &
Jentzsch, 2012). While the percentage of Kenyans using formal credit sources
(commercial banks, post banks or insurance) rose from 18.9% in 2006 to 22.6% in 2009,
the percentage using semi-informal sources such as M-Pesa (mobile-phone based transfer
service), MFIs, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs; considered as the largest
movement in Africa), rose from 26.8% in 2006 to 40.5% in 2009 (FinAccess National
Survey, 2009). These figures speak to the fact that Kenya’s financial inclusion crusade is
gaining ground. Access to finance in Kenya is higher than the neighboring countries in
East Africa (Beck et al., 2010).

Kenya has always seen development of SMEs as a priority to achieving industrialization,
employment creation, and poverty reduction (Atieno, 2009). SMEs accounted for 75% of
the nation’s workforce and 22% of the nation’s GDP in 2008 (Atieno, 2009; Mbiti &
Mainga, 2006; Ouma & Ramo, 2013). The Kenyan government shows that it values the
contributions of SME to the national economy by taking a number of initiatives including
the 1996 Sessional paper Number 2 on Industrial Transformation to the Year 2020 that

13

Mobile phone coverage in Africa grew from 10% in 1990 to 60% in 2008 (Aker &
Mbiti, 2010).
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emphasizes SME financing; Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment
creation 2003-2007 which identifies SMEs as one area of facilitating economic growth
and recovery; the 2005 Sessional Paper Number 2 on the Development of Micro and
Small Enterprises for Employment and Wealth Creation for Poverty Reduction (Mbithi &
Mainga, 2006), and in 2006, GoK drafted the Micro and Small Enterprises Bill as a step
toward SME legalization in the country (Ouma & Ramo, 2013).

This study uses firm-level data to analyze access to finance for SMEs in Kenya and what
banking sector is doing to expand the access frontier. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first study focusing on the question of access to finance by SMEs and channels of
financial inclusion in Kenya. Other studies on this issue have not analyzed specifically
Kenya (for example, Demirguc-Kunt, & Klapper, 2012; Aterido, Beck & Iacovone,
2013). The study draws on surveys and interviews with SMEs and financial sector
players, asking the latter what they are doing to expand financial access, the former what
is holding them back.

The data come from a 7-month field survey conducted in Kenya between March 2012
and September 2012, mainly in the greater Nairobi region. Three cities— Nairobi, Tala
and Machakos— were covered when administering the questionnaire to 341 SMEs and
interviewing relevant SME respondents. On the banking sector side, 12 out of the 44
financial institutions participated in interviews.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the context for Kenya’s financial
sector development. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the current composition of the
financial sector, respectively. Section 3.4 gives examples of what the banking sector is

60

doing to expand the access frontier. Section 3.5 analyzes the survey results of the banking
sector and SMEs in Kenya. Section 3.6 presents an econometric analysis of SME access
to credit. Section 3.7 draws lessons from the econometric results, and Section 3.8
concludes.

3.2

Background of Financial Sector Development in Kenya

Kenya attained independence from Great Britain in 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as its first
president. While there were some leanings toward African socialism in the early 1960s,
Kenya has gravitated toward a market- based economy (Ndung’u, Mitullah & Waema,
2012). The banking sector, despite several failures over the years, has come to play an
important role in the economy. While price stability, economic growth and sound
macroeconomic policies have been central to Kenyan economy, successful adoption of
mobile technology such as M-Pesa have made the Kenyan economy as of late, earning a
champion of financial inclusion (CBK 2012).

Relative to her neighbors in the region, Kenya has a well-developed financial sector
(Beck et al., 2010; Cracknell, 2012). The ratio of total financial assets to GDP is equal to
80%, 30% and 26% in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, respectively (IMF, 2008).
Furthermore, while 18.5% and 18.1% of population in Kenya and Uganda use formal
financial services, 62.2% in Uganda as opposed to 38.3% in Kenya are formally excluded
from financial services (Johnson & Nino-Zarazua, 2011). In both countries, government
employees are more likely to use formal services due to the fact that they are likely to
have back accounts to receive salaries (see Table 1.2).
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The roots of financial sector development or financial stability go back to the country’s
banking reform act of 1989, which drew inspiration and theoretical basis from the extant
scholarship of the day. Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) had argued
that high-growth economies tend to have well-developed financial systems, and that
growth tends to be weak in countries where there is financial repression. The McKinnonShaw hypothesis was embraced by the IMF, leading to the prescription and application of
structural adjustment programs that included financial liberalization—removal of
mandatory credit ceilings and directed credit allocation—as one key pillar. Liberalization,
the theory predicted, would lead the interest rate spread to decline, and lower interest
rates to borrowers would spur investment. This expansion of credit, all else equal, would
thereby lead to expansion of growth. Despite disappointing outcomes, financial reforms
in Africa did produce market-determined interest rate, a shift away from credit controls,
reductions in market distortions, and strengthening of regulation and supervision
(Ndikumana, 2009).

Growth did not take off as expected, but today Kenya does enjoy an improved level of
financial development thanks to landmark reforms, including the 1989 Banking Act, the
Capital Market Authority Act of 1989, the Treasury Bill Act of 1990, and interest rate
liberalization in 1991. Some positive effects of financial liberalization were also seen in
other parts of Africa. According to Aryeetey (1997), effects in Ghana have been the
emergence of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), finance houses, discount houses,
venture capital, and the stock exchange. And some of these finance houses, say in
Nigeria, had success in reaching SMEs through loans, equipment leasing, and hirepurchases agreements (Aryeetey, 1997).
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Following the reforms, CBK strengthened supervision, inspection and takeovers of ailing
banks. It also introduced a Deposit Protection Fund covering deposits up to Ksh 100,000.
Laeven (2003) finds that small firm financing constraints decreased following financial
liberalization in the 13 sample countries while loss of preferential treatment led to large
firms’ financing constraints increasing. 14

After the failure of several financial institutions in 1985-86, the Kenyan government took
steps to improve central bank ability to regulate and supervise NBFIs, and building
societies, and to impose stringent requirements on new institutions. Differential
regulations on commercial banks and NBFIs were removed. The Banking Act of 1989
aimed to enhance the central bank’s role through inspection, establishment of reports,
auditing, provisioning requirements, capital adequacy requirements, exposure units, and
assessments against compliance. Later amendments aimed to strengthen the balance sheet
of NBFIs to protect small depositors, and to foster financial prudence, discipline, and
better management of banking institutions (Kabubo & Ngugi, 1998). NBFIs were
eventually required to convert fully to commercial banks. The restructuring was intended
to promote competition, reduce government ownership and control, harmonize relations
among financial institutions, and upgrade services with ATMs and promissory notes.

Despite these achievements, structural adjustment, the mantra of neoliberal policy, is
widely regarded as failure in Sub-Sahara Africa. In the words of Aryeetey (1994),

14

The list includes Argentina ,Brazil ,Chile ,India ,Indonesia ,Malaysia ,Mexico ,Pakistan
,Peru ,Philippines ,Rep. Korea ,Taiwan ,and Thailand.
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“financial reform has at best had limited developmental effects in the region.” 15 In
particular, financial reform did not adequately address the financial dualism (existence of
organized and unorganized money markets; see Chapter 2, Section 2.5 for further
analysis) or steps taken to ensure that semi-formal and informal producers have access to
formal credit to expand operations. Moreover, liberalization was not properly phased.
The financial sector often was liberalized before prudential supervisions and regulations
were put in place. There was also an absence of institutions to reduce information
asymmetries (accounting, credit information agencies), which suggests that institutional
strengthening is critical to successful liberalization (Aleem, & Kesakende, 2001).

In Kenya, commercial banks and the CBK learned some helpful lessons from the
reforms. NBFIs did help in mobilization of resources following liberalization, as shown
through their increased liquidities between 1992 and 1995 (Kabubo &Ngugi, 1998).
Though outcomes of the SAP were not immediately positive, the financial reforms tended
to bring some benefits in the long-run (Chandra & Khanijo, 2009).

3.3

The Current Composition of the Kenyan Financial Sector

Kenya’s financial sector comprise of the banking sector, non-bank financial sector,
savings and credit cooperatives, securities market intermediaries, and insurance
companies. The Central Bank of Kenya, like most central banks on the continent, is the

15

According to Deng (1998), however, SAPs might have produced growth which was
saved in traditional ways in terms of cows or other means that are not captured in
conventional measurement.
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main regulator of the financial sector in the country. It was created through an act of
parliament and is an outgrowth of East African Currency Board created in 1966.

The composition of the financial sector has been dynamic. At independence in 1963,
Kenya had 10 commercial banks. Of these, the top three— National and Grindlays Bank,
Barclays Bank and Standard Bank—accounted for about 80% of all bank deposits. In the
1970s, other banks came to being; they include Cooperative Bank of Kenya, National
Bank of Kenya, and Kenya Commercial Bank. Thanks to the reforms of 1989, the
Nairobi Stock exchange is now the fifth largest in Africa, after those of South Africa, and
Nigeria. That is, by market capitalization, the ranking runs thus: South Africa, Egypt,
Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya. By 1996, Kenya had 51 commercial banks, 23 non-bank
financial institutions, 5 building societies, 39 insurance companies, 3 reinsurance
companies, 10 development financial institutions, a capital market authority, 20 securities
and equities brokerage firms, a stock exchange, 12 investment advisory firms, 57 hire
purchase companies, several pensions funds, 13 foreign exchange bureaus, and 2,670
savings and credit cooperative societies (Kabubo & Ngugi, 1998).

Today, the Kenyan financial sector comprises 43 commercial banks, one mortgage
finance company, eight deposit taking microfinance institutions, two credit reference
bureaus, five foreign bank representative offices, 112 foreign exchange bureaus (CBK,
2012), and the Association of Microfinance Institutions (AMFI) with 56 members
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(Cracknell, 2012). Also, based on individual asset classification 16, six banks were
classified as large, fifteen medium and twenty two small.

The banking sector has a footprint in eight former provinces (the country is now run
through county government) in terms of ATMs, agents and bank branch networks to
deliver bank services. In 2012, the banking sector added 111branches to bring total to
1,272. Because of high concentration in urban areas, 53 new branches were created in
Nairobi. The network will grow because Kenya had established county governments to
deliver services to 47 counties throughout the country. We thus argue that as county
governments take effect, the branch network is expected to rise. Additionally, a number
of ATMs increased from 2205 in December 2011 to 2381 in December 2012 (CBK,
2012). Furthermore, as of 31st December 2012, Kenyan banks had eleven subsidiaries
operating in other East Africa countries with 282 branches and before-tax profits of Ksh.
5.1 billion (47% of all the profits come from South Sudan subsidiaries).

3.4

Expanding the Financial Access Frontier in Kenya

Kenya’s financial sector is fortunate to be operating in an environment which is enhanced
not only by information and communications technology (ICT) but also by favorable
governmental policy. Scholars increasingly acknowledge the role of governments in
creating a supportive policy environment for financial development (Beck, & Honohan,
2007; Beck, Maimbo, Faye & Triki, 2011). In the past two decades, the Kenyan
government and the CBK have made concerted efforts to develop the financial sector

16

Commercial banks whose assets fall below five billion Kenya shillings are considered
small, a value between 5-15 medium and those above fifteen billion shillings large.
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with a view to expanding access. Though these efforts have not always been successful,
there are several lessons learned.

First, credit referencing bureaus now facilitate the sharing of information by institutions.
Since 2010, all commercial banks and Deposit Taking-Microfinance institutions (DTMs)
have been submitting both negative and positive credit information to a central unit based
at the CBK and this information sharing between the banks helps banks in appraising
credit worthiness (CBK, 2012). Nonperforming loans decreased by 1.4% in 2012 from
Ksh 58.3 billion in 2011 to Ksh.57.5 billion due to enhanced credit appraisals. Individual
banks are building strong data infrastructure, too.

Second, CBK is in the process of adopting Basel II principles in an attempt to conform to
international financial standards. Almost all countries in Africa except, South Africa and
Morocco, base their micro-prudential regulatory framework on Basel I (Calice, 2010).
The Basel II Accord on banking regulation, reached in 2004, has three main pillars. Pillar
I includes credit regulatory capital requirements, pillar II is intended to bridge economic
and capital requirements, while pillar III is on market discipline. Pillar III 17 asks lenders
to disclose details on risk- rating processes, risk distributions and risk -management
activities and recommends different risk mitigating techniques. Conforming to
international standards matters because standardization has attracted some foreign banks
to Kenya. Their role in lending to SMEs is mixed, since the presence of foreign-owned

17

Basel III concerns the needs to raising better capital quality, hence complying with
more capital, more liquidity and lower risks, and has overall positive effect on the
banking system (Abu Ghazaleh, N. Al-Hares, O, & El-Galfy, A., 2013).
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banks can have two opposing effects. The first is a “cream-skimming” phenomenon
whereby foreign banks are less likely to lend to small firms that lack adequate collateral
and accounting information (ACS and Preston, 1997). The second, however, is a positive
network effect as foreign banks transfer technology, import better regulation and
supervision, reap economies of scale, and increase competition such that smaller banks
find financing to SMEs a viable business strategy.

Market-based modern financial systems are also helping SMEs to do well in South
Africa, Mauritius, and North Africa, as well as in Kenya. SMEs are now participating in
regional blocs as exporters, and the growing market liberalization and use of new
communication technologies are creating new opportunities for SME internationalization
(Buckley, 1997; Audretsch, 2002; Fernandez, & Nieto, 2006; Ndung’u, Mitullah &
Waema, 2012).

ICT is increasingly used to reach financial sector customers (Donner, & Tellez, 2008;
Matambalya, & Wolf, 2001; Ondiege, 2010). Today, across the developing world, there
are more people with mobile phones than bank accounts. Mobile phone banking (“mbanking”) has vastly expanded access to financial services. In 2005, Vodafone teamed up
with Safaricom to develop M-Pesa, a payment service that enables users to make
payments on loans, transfer cash to relatives, and avoid carrying large amounts of cash
for security reasons (Beck, & Honohan, 2007). Convenience, support, cost and
satisfaction account for why small firms favor mobile money transfer. Some SMEs use
M-Pesa to pay staff allowances and replenishments. When a truck breaks down en route
from Uganda to Kenya, for example, the truck driver calls the head office in Nairobi and
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money is sent to him to cover the spare parts and repair. Parents can pay school fees
through their M-Pesa accounts; tenants pay electricity and water bills through M-Pesa
accounts.

M-Pesa was launched in 2007 with 900,000 subscribers; that number rose to 12 million
customers in 2010. In 2007, there were 450 agents for M-pesa against 600 ATMs and 350
Western Union agents across Kenya. By 2010, the number of M-Pesa agents had reached
19,500. In Addition to M-Pesa, there are other two mobile services, M-Kesho by
Safaricom and ZAP by Zain. Innovative mobile technology minimizes information
asymmetry and transaction costs (Matambalya & Wolf, 2001; Donner &Tellez, 2008).
Because ICT use is non-rival in nature, its increased usage generates network
externalities.

Through individual and collaborative efforts, banks and other alternative forms of
financial service providers in Kenya have begun making specific products for SMEs. In
2010, for example, Barclays Bank, AccessKenya Institute of Certified Accountants of
Kenya, Express Phone, and DHL joined forces to set up an SME account to provide
cross-product services. Another example is the partnership between Western Union, UK
Government and Kenyan Government to avail M-Pesa International Money Transfer
service between Kenya and UK. By reducing the cost of sending money from UK to
Kenya, this service boosts remittances to the country.

With increased competition some banks are seeking competitive advantage in financing
SMEs (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004). Every financial institution is now marketing
aggressively to the SME sector. Kenya Women Finance Trust (KWFT), for instance, is
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developing customized SME products for women entrepreneurs across the country, in the
belief that women tend to be time-poor and often face discrimination from banks which
prefer dealing with husbands. There can be very strong gender biases in access to credit
and many of the operators of very small SMEs are women. So, from a survey of 190
women entrepreneurs who happened to be KWFT borrowers in Kisumu District in
Kenya, Ouma and Ramo (2013) find that access to microcredit by women-owned SMEs
is positively related to net profit, sales and a size of the firm.

Venture capital can be a good start-up source for SME financing when an entrepreneur
cannot secure funding from banks. Lately a number of equity funds have begun to
participate in financing SMEs. In Kenya, they include Mirror, Fanisi, Kiboko, and Africa
Technology Media and Telecoms (ATMT) Funds. Two reasons are cited for this new
interest among equity funds in financing SMEs. First, there are plenty of SMEs in Kenya,
which means there are enough customers to go round. Second, government interventions
are promoting SMEs.

3.5

Analysis of the Survey Results

3.5.1

Data and Methodology

The data used in this essay come from the fieldwork that the author undertook in Kenya
between March and September 2012. Data was collected in greater Nairobi region—
Nairobi town, Tala and Machakos— with SMEs and commercial institutions as the main
respondents. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with those who accepted data
requests. Some respondents who needed ample time were given questionnaire to fill out
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at their own pace. The author would collect responses at a later date. As was the case in
South Sudan, five research assistants helped with the data collection in Kenya.

With respect to the sampling method, each street was identified and every other firm was
approached, that is, we alternated between inclusion and exclusion of the firms for
interviews or administering of questionnaire. Every street stands equal chance for
selection into sample.

On the financial sector side, the data request letters were sent to commercial banks,
central bank, and microfinance institutions. In this case, the entire population was a
candidate for inclusion. The central bank, ten commercial banks, Safaricom, and a
number of microfinance institutions chose to supply data upon request. Other banks such
as Barclay and National declined, citing reasons from privacy to proprietary
confidentiality. Throughout (three-components-research strategy), the analysis is
supplemented with existing data from the Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya National
Bureau of Statistics, World Development Indicators, and IMF databases. 18

3.5.2

The Banking Sector Survey

This section gives a brief description of the characteristics of the selected banks. While
the data request letters were sent to all 44 financial institutions in Kenya, I was only
granted interviews with twelve commercial banks (two other banks promised but reneged
on sending the data later). This is unlike in South Sudan where I managed to interview
and administer the survey questionnaire to all eight commercial banks.

18

The three components-research strategy include a review of the existing literature, a
qualitative/descriptive evaluation and econometric analysis of the survey data.
71

The commercial banks in Kenya are larger than banks in South Sudan in all respects. For
example, while Equity employs only about 125 in South Sudan (see Table 4.1), its total
employment in Kenya is 5,565 (Table 3.1). From bank total employment to loans as
percent of deposits, evidence emerges that the banking system in Kenya is more
developed than that of sister neighbor, South Sudan.

Table 3.2 speaks to the fact that banking sector is not static. Banks were asked to give
records of changes in accounts between July 2011 and March 2012. For customer bank
accounts, Chase Bank, for instance, states that it had about 500,000 individual accounts
in July 2011 and that this figure jumped to 1,500,000 by March 2012. The trends shown
in this table are indicative of the fact that the financial sector is expanding access frontier
through the account ownership.

Of the nine banks that provided data, all except Bank of India have lent to SMEs (Table
3.3). Only eight banks were able to describe their top SMEs and they happened to be in
different sectors throughout the economy (Table 3.4). But when we asked banks to rate
what factors they consider while appraising SME loans, commercial banks placed on top
the character of the owner, collateral requirement and capacity of the firm (Table 3.5).

Table 3.6 indicates that banks have come to appreciate the role of technology in
expanding financial access, and are also seeing the benefits of partnering with
development agents to pool resources and lend out to SMEs or those at the bottom of the
socio-economic pyramid.
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Table 3.7 is telling: commercial banks are seeing a declining trend in non-performing
loans. During the interviews, some respondents credited the policy environment and
central bank leadership for enhancing the business climate, noting prudential guidelines
and other bank circulars. By way of example, I & M Bank reported that it has less than
1% of its loan portfolio as nonperforming between 2010 and 2012. Though Consolidated
Bank started with the largest non-performing loans in 2005, the figures decreased from
98% in 2005 to 10% in 2012. This is a huge turnaround. For Equity Bank, the one bank
that has provided a breakdown of its non-performing loans, it was not the case that SMEs
are responsible for the bulk of the problem. Take for example, in 2009, SMEs had 8.11%
of their loans non-performing and for larger businesses for the same year, the amount
non-performing is 11.66%. The same story is true for 2012; SME nonperforming loan is
1.68% whereas large businesses had 2.55% of their loan non-performing.

No matter how far the CBK has come, commercial banks still have issues that need
attending to if they are to augment financial deepening (Table 3.8). Banks such as Chase
Bank want to see some regulations apply aggressively to MFIs and SACCOs so as to
have a level playing field. Others want the CBK to maintain stable interest rate, price
stability, and speedier review of guidelines or reduce the CBK rate. In order to lend to
SMEs, banks would like to see more strategic partners, literacy workshops to help small
businesses, records keeping, and timely loan repayment, avoidance of “bank hopping”,
proper management, enabling infrastructure and transparency during loan appraisal.
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As shown in Table 3.9, some banks have lent more loans to SMEs than others. Equity
Bank lends to 6,312 SME firms, compared to 3,900 and 60 for I&M and Development
Bank, respectively.

3.5.3

Agency Banking

The CBK published agency banking guidelines in 2010 to enable banks to operate
through third party agents (Cracknell, 2012). In brief, agency banking is a correspondent
banking agreement whereby bank services are sold by nonbank financial corporations on
behalf of the bank. Such arrangement has greater potential to reach wider markets,
especially in rural areas, where formal banks have issues to do with power shortage, bad
attitude toward rural folk, poor infrastructure and other technological impediments (Dev,
2006).

Table 3.10 shows the fact that since the adoption of the agency model in Kenya,
provision of financial services has expanded beyond the bank corridors. Agents who
provide these services on behalf of the banks or commercial institutions or Safaricom
have grown exponentially since 2007. As the above table shows, the number of agents
countrywide grew from 1,582 in 2007 to 50,471in 2011, an increase of 137.7% per
annum (See Table 3.10) 19. In tandem with a banking growth, the value of transactions in
Kenya shillings grew from 16.3 billion in 2007 to 1.2 trillion in 2012. Ten commercial

19

In addition to collecting the data on agents from the Central Bank, I asked the
commercial banks to provide their own data on agency distribution (Table 3.18). Of the
ten interviewed banks, four disclosed such information. Equity Bank led with 6,123
agents followed by KCB with 2,573. The other two banks, Consolidated and Chase had
30 and 380 agents in 2012, respectively.

74

banks had grown to 12,067 agents by 30 June 2012 (CBK, 2012) from 7,999 on 30
September 2011(Table 3.11).

In addition, deposit-taking microfinance institutions have also shown interest in agency
banking. As of January 2012, one DTM had acquired a license to operate agency
network, but by June 2012, five DTMs had 259 marketing offices operating (CBK,
2012). While ten banks and five DTMs have contracted agents by December 2012,
Equity Bank and Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) are leading the drive to financial
inclusion through agency banking (see Table 3.12) as well as Safaricom M-Pesa.

For illustrative purposes, let me provide a little background on Equity Bank and
Safaricom, a leading mobile phone operator in Kenya which launched M-Pesa, a product
that does not require bank accounts to operate. Safaricom innovation is forward-looking
as it recently launched in 2012 M-Shauri, which allows its subscribers to save money and
access short-term credit from Commercial Bank of Africa in Kenya.

3.5.3.1 Equity Bank Pioneering Mobile and Agency Banking
Equity Bank was founded as the Equity Building Society in 1984. It started in the
Murang’a District as informal family business providing mortgages to low-income
households. By 1993, non-performing loans (NPL) made up 54% of its loan portfolio.
CBK warned Equity Bank to reform or risk closure. This led to restructuring of the board
composition and leadership. Onto the management board came its current CEO and
Managing Director, James Mwangi, a man with considerable banking experience. He
transformed the bank through smart restructuring, introducing pro-small business and
pro-low-income customer services. Today, Equity Bank boasts many achievements: bank
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branch penetration, ATM penetration, listing of its stock on NSE, and the opening of
branches in Uganda, South Sudan, and Rwanda, among others.

Although KCB began mobile banking in 1976 to further rural financial intermediation by
making limited loans to farmers and businesspersons (David, 1981), Equity Bank is today
the leader in that regard. Equity Bank has the largest customer base with 7.1million
customers across the region by 2011 and has hopes to reach more millions through
launching of M-Kesho (Cracknell, 2012). M-Kesho, a product developed by Equity in
conjunction with Safaricom offers the Safaricom subscribers micro-savings, microinsurance and micro-credit after being a bank member for six months. M-Kesho uses the
existing infrastructure of M-Pesa. Customers do not have to walk to the agents in order to
transfer money; they can do it right on their phones.

Equity Bank has an interest in serving the SME sector and it has pursued this by seeking
partnerships with foreign partners. It obtained loan from China Development Bank to be
used for lending directed to SME sector in 2010. Within a short time, observers have
come to identify Equity Bank with innovative financial banking services and cutting-edge
technology. The questions about Equity Bank that everyone grapples with include: What
is behind its success? Is it managerial competency? Is it technology?

As mentioned above, some of the innovations in Kenya’s fast-growing ICT industry
include mobile telephone transactions, the celebrated M-Pesa, geographic penetration
through bank branching, availability of ATMs 24/7 in areas deemed unreachable a
decade ago, and mobile van ‘village’ banking (Donner & Tellez, 2008). Equity Bank and
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Postal Bank in Kenya are the two leading providers of financial services to rural areas,
thereby achieving geographic outreach (Beck, & Honohan, 2007).

Cracknell (2012) argues that Equity Bank achieved efficiency through delivery channels
by increasing branch efficiency, designing branches for volume, through supportive
infrastructures such as ATMs, point of sales (POS) devices, mobile branches, and finally
investing in alternative channels such as agency banking (Tables 3.11, 3.12, and 3.13).

3.5.3.2 The Safaricom Factor
M-Pesa is the innovative brainchild of Safaricom. As of 2010, Safaricom had about
40,000 outlets countrywide. Safaricom succeeded due to high level of cooperation
between regulators and government ministries. Mbiti and Weil (2011) find that use of MPesa increases the probability of being banked and lowers the chances of relying on
informal savings sources such as rotating savings and credits associations (ROSCAS). MPesa E-float/cash in transactions is secure. Speed, reliability, safety and network outlets
add to M-Pesa popularity (Mbiti & Weil, 2011). In the words of Mbiti and Weil (2013),
“the system is safer, cheaper, and far faster than the money transfer system it replaced”
(p. 369).The downside of M-Pesa is that it may weaken social ties, for example, urban
migrants who use it to send money may visit rural areas less often. Safaricom through its
M-Pesa and other products including M-Kesho, and M-Shauri products, is breaking down
factors of exclusion such as high cost, and non-price barriers. Like Equity Bank,
Safaricom is acting to remove adoption barriers, such as offering deposit of e-float
(mobile money that a subscriber deposits into his or her M-Pesa account), requiring no
minimum fees and making it free to register (Cracknell, 2012).
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Table 3.12 presents common financial services that commercial banks provide through
their agents, including cash deposit, withdrawals, bill payments and account openings or
balance enquiries. While Table 3.12 presents number of transaction per type, Table 3.13
breaks down the cumulative value of transactions by bank and type of transactions.
Equity Bank still leads and KCB follows. Table 3.14 is suggestive of the fact that
commercial banks are hovering all over Kenya even though they are more concentrated
in some regions than others. A glance at this table is instructive: being the capital city of
Kenya, more financial services are located in Nairobi.

While the spread of ATMs is not exclusive to Kenya, the latter is far ahead than her
neighbors in many aspects. By 2009, Kenya had 1,655 ATMs, compared to 46 in
Ethiopia or 47 in Rwanda (Table 3.15). These correspond to 0.1, 3.8 and 0.4 per 100,000
people, respectively. 20

The number of bank branches has been growing, too, but fluctuating in some years
whereas ATMs grow steadily (Table 3.16). Physical bank branch acts as complementary
to ATMs in some cases and substitute in others (Table 3.16). In terms of number of
branches, KCB leads with 170 (Table 3.17). In all cases, commercial banks have more
branches in Nairobi than in any other region. Table 3.18 gives us a number of agents of

20

Because I do not have some values for some countries in 2010, I used the 2009 ATM
figures to illustrate a point about demographic penetration. The number of ATMs in each
country is divided by population times 100,000 to arrive at the penetration ratios. The
population figures corresponding to each country are as follows: Ethiopia(,93,877,025)
Kenya (44,037,656), Rwanda(12,012,589 ), Sudan(34,847,910) Tanzania(48,261,942)
and Uganda (34,758,80) (Central Intelligence Agency, July 2013 estimates ). The ratios
correspond to each country are 0.05, 3.76, 0.39, 1.12, 1.65, and 1.54, respectively.
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each bank which were interviewed and recorded. Equity Bank and KCB are still leading
in that regard.

Table 3.19.A provides the number of ATMs by bank by province. Based on these figures
provided, Equity Bank leads with 510 live ATMs; KCB comes second with 449. Nairobi
province has the largest number of ATMs. Table 3.19.B gives the total number of ATMs
by four banks in each province in 2012. Again, Nairobi leads the pack.

The central message from Table 3.20 is unmistakable: commercial banks are reaching all
corners of Kenya, though not uniformly, and at the same time, the cashless economy is on
the rise as ATMS and ATM cards increase. Equity Bank has its footprint all over Kenya,
as shown in Table 3.20, although it has more ATM cards in Nairobi than in any other
province, both in relative and absolute terms. Nairobi, for example, has 26 ATM cards
per 100 people in 2009 compared to North Eastern Province where the ratio is 1.3.

By the end of 2012, only six deposit-taking MFIs were operational in Kenya. South
Sudan has no deposit-taking MFIs at the moment. But in Kenya, some of the DTM MFIs
are aggressive in deposit mobilization, such as Faulu Kenya with 27 branches (Table
3.21).

There are 111 foreign exchange bureaus in Kenya by 2012 (See table 3.22) compared to
75 in South Sudan as of 2011. Foreign exchange bureaus are the conduits through which
the public can access hard currencies allocated to the banks by the central bank.

The financial sector in Kenya thus is playing a positive role in achieving greater financial
inclusion via delivery of financial services to the poor or low-income segments of the
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society at reasonable cost. Though not comprehensive, the three surveys done by the
National FinAccess between 2006 and 2013 show some improvements. For example,
41.3% of the population was financially excluded, and only 18.5% were formally
included according to the survey in 2006. Three years later, 33% of the population was
financially excluded, and about 23% was formally included (Table 3.23). So in the words
of Beck, Cull, Fuchs, Getenga, Gatere, Randa and Trandafir (2010), “access frontier has
been pushed out between 2006 and 2009.” The data suggest that men more than women
tend to use formal bank services while women use more of informal financial services.

3.5.4

The SME Survey

This section provides an overview of the Kenya SME survey data. In sum, 341 firms
were surveyed. Unlike the South Sudan survey where men make up 80% of the sample
(see Table 4.15), in Kenya men only make up 56.6% of the sample (see Table 3.24).

Turning to the questions of ethnicity and nationality (Table 3.25), foreigners own less
than one percent of the Kenyan SMEs compared to 30% in South Sudan, reflecting
foreign entry into the local market following the CPA in 2005. Kikuyu, the largest ethnic
group, make up 21.4% of the sample. The next largest groups in the sample, Kamba, Luo
and Meru, make up about 18.5%, 12.3% and 7.6% of the sample, respectively. Breaking
down the above table by gender, we find that there are more Kikuyu men than Kikuyu
women (Table 3.26)

As is the case with many African economies, sole proprietorships make up close to half
of the SMEs in the sample (Table 3.27). The next largest category is partnerships, which
make up about 23% of the sample.
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As shown in Table 3.28, in term of firm size, 47.7% of the sample is microenterprises (a
firm whose size ranges from one to four employees). When we break down employment
by gender, the women are slightly more concentrated in “microenterprise” as well as
small enterprises (Table 3.29).

As a percent of the total sample, the retail sector is the largest (25.2%) and repair shops
are the smallest (2.9%) based on this sample (Table 3.30). As a percent of their respective
totals, there are more men than women in retail sector. Based on this sample, there are
more men in retail business and repair shop sector (Table 3.31).

While a greater proportion of retail sector are in the microenterprise category, 60% of
repair shops fall in small enterprise, 35.7% of agribusiness firms fall in medium
enterprise and 13.3% of construction fall under large enterprise (Table 3.32).

3.5.5

Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial Competency

The introduction and increasing usage of new technologies –email, internet and mobile
phones—are gradually changing the ways of doing business by the small and large firms
(Mitullah, Ndung’u, & Waema, 2013). Increasing prevalence of ATMs or installing them
at convenient places such as airport or supermarket malls has made it easier for customers
to access them than go to the banks. Taglines advertising this fact are widespread: KCB“banking as mobile as you”; Consolidated-“Growing with you, Instacash”, Standard
Charterer-“banking, 24 hr” and Equity Kayole Branch-“time is money, save it by using
ATM.”
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Table 3.33 bears this phenomenon out with respect to routine cash needs: 48.7% of the
sample use ATMs for routine cash while 33.7% walk to banks for habitual transactions.
As shown in the said table not everyone is banked since there are some people who still
prefer to keep their business cash under “mattress” in the shops, at stores or safekeeping
vaults at home. As thus, 11.1% of the sample uses personal safekeeping instead of banks
or ATMs for routine cash.

Table 3.34 seeks opinions on what is affecting the business performance. Close to 76% of
the sample believe that they are doing well because of managerial competence and
reliance on technology to some extent. While 13.8% of the sample do lay blame on
managerial incompetence and neglect of adopting technology, 6.2% of the sample faults
“unfavorable business environment” for firm poor performance in Kenya.

3.5.6

Credit Allocation

This survey still confirms the perception that not everyone who needs credit receives it in
Kenya. Despite the significant strides made in financial inclusion strategies to reach
bottom of the economic pyramid, some people are still excluded or they self-exclude
from the credit market. Table 3.35 shows a success rate of loans are 66.7%. If this sample
were truly representative of the firm population in Kenya, a firm that applies for loan is
likely to receive a loan two-thirds of the time. As a percentage of the total sample, more
than 50% have applied for loan.

Table 3.36 presents source of credit and types of lender. Over 50% of the loans come
from commercial banks, whereas MFIs make up 15.9% of total loans. Informal finance
— family members, friends, out-of-pocket contributions and moneylenders — make up
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another 11.5% of the sample. The category “others” which includes cooperatives,
SACCOs, and ROSCAs makes up the remaining 22.1%.

Turning to loan allocation on gender basis, about 57% of the loans approved went to men
and the remaining 43% to women (Table 3.37). If we express loans received as percent of
the gender totals, the percentages are almost even: overall, 34.0% of all women and
33.2% of all men received loans.

The greatest share of loans went to the retail sector, and the smallest to repair shops. But
as a percent of total loans, construction (53.3%) and restaurant (47.4%) received the most
while hotels received the least (Table 3.38).

Because the microenterprise as a category is the largest of all size classification, it
received more loans in percentage terms (Table 3.39). However, as a percent of the totals
in each category, medium enterprise received more loans.

In all, 47.2% of the firms did not apply for loans because of one reason or another (see
Table 3.40). These firms essentially self-selected out of the credit market and are credit
constrained in that regard. When asked why the firm did not apply for loans, 41.6% said
they doubted approval, 18.2% thought applications were burdensome and collateral
requirement strict and 22.1% believed interest rates were too high (Table 3.40). Still in
the same Table 3.40, 52.8% of the firms, which we considered unconstrained, did not
apply because they did not need credit.

Women are a little more constrained than men (25.4% vs. 24.3%; see Table 3.41). More
women cite high interest rate, collateral requirements and cumbersome application
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procedures as binding hindrances more often than men do. Men, on the other hand, are
overrepresented in doubting loan approval. In all sectors, a greater percent of firms doubt
that loan would be approved and they choose not to apply for loan on that basis (Table
3.41). Table 3.42 dissects why the firm did not apply, and it appears that 100% of the
repair shop owners who did not apply were not credit constrained.

As Table 3.43 shows, firms are more likely to rate access to formal, microfinance and
informal finance as a moderate obstacle. Going down the column, firms are more likely
to cite lack of access to formal finance as a major obstacle than informal or microfinance
(Table 3.43).

The statistics in Table 3.44 show that men are more likely to cite lack of access to formal
and informal finance as a major obstacle to firm growth whereas women cite lack of
access to microfinance as a major obstacle. More small firms are likely to cite lack of
access to formal finance as a major obstacle (See Table 3.45). The same is true for large
enterprises.

Table 3.46 is comforting in the sense that chances of getting loan approval outweigh the
rejection; hence it is worth trying applying for loans in Kenya. As a percent of total
sample, 34.1% are considered successful borrowers (they applied and received loans) and
17.1% are unsuccessful or denied borrowers. On the other hand, 23.1% and 25.8% of the
sample are regarded as discouraged and non-borrowers, respectively.

In terms of firm size, more micro, small and medium enterprises identify lack of access to
market as a moderate obstacle (Table 3.47). 46.2% of the large firms identify lack of
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access to market as a minor obstacle. Lack of access to market is cited by 52.8% of the
sample as a moderate obstacle to firm growth.

A closer dissection by gender tells us that more men (18.7%) than women (17.4%) cite
lack of access to market as a major constraint (Table 3.48). It is never an obstacle
according to 8.8% and 6.3% of men and women, respectively. Alternatively, 53.5% of
women and 53.4% of men cite this fact as a moderate obstacle. More women than men
classify it as a minor obstacle.

Reading across the column, it is visible that all sectors rank lack of access to market as a
moderate obstacle (Table 3.49). For example, 70% of repair shops cite lack of access to
market as a moderate obstacle while 10% and 20% cite it as minor and never an obstacle,
respectively. If we take another example of the sectoral classification above, 52.3% of
firms in retail consider lack of access to market as a moderate obstacle while 26.7% take
it as a major obstacle. In the same sector, 12.8% and 8.1% of the firms classify it as
minor and never obstacle at all.

3.5.7

Summary Statistics for Selected Indicators

Table 3.50 presents summary statistics for other selected variables in the survey. On
average, a firm takes less than one year to prepare necessary paperwork and fully launch
officially. The necessary paperwork, as well as the savings process or raising seed capital
to start a firm, takes time. Some firms have spent four years preparing. The average firm
has been in operation for over four years, since establishment. Some firms have been in
operation for few months.

85

Since close to 50% of the sampled firms in this survey are microenterprises, it is not
surprising that the mean firm size is about 16 employees and such representative firm is
small enterprise based on this study classification (the mean firm size in South Sudan is
five employees; see Table 4.44). The maximum firm size in Kenya sample is 333
employees. The 2012 mean revenue of over $282,000 is quite high but this is because of
some outliers. One firm, for instance, reported an annual income of almost $14 million.
Median firm income is $64,000. The minimum income is $80, and this is ten times less
the country’s GDP per capita income of $ 862. The fact that some respondents recall
these figures from memory means that they are subject to failing recollection or faulty
disclosure of accurate revenue from firms for fear of unknown, which may help to
account for these glaring wide ranges. The mean sample level of education of the head of
the enterprise of 14 years is really high. This implies that a typical firm owner, on
average, has reached high school. This is higher than the education levels of firm owners
in South Sudan where the mean is 11 years (see Chapter 4: Essay on South Sudan). The
minimum level of education is zero (never attended school) and the maximum (up to the
graduate level) number of years spent in school is 27 years.

Finally, among firms that had received loan, access to credit, the maximum is $1,167,000
and the mean loan received is $ 15,016. The loan receiving firm has 14 employees on
average.

Table 3.51 presents simple correlations between firm employment, revenue and loan
amount. As we can see, employment and revenue are positively correlated (r=.4). The
revenue and loan amount are weakly correlated (r=.1) while employment and loan
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amount are also weakly correlated (r=0.1). As far as we expect larger firms to receive
loans, employment may serve as a good proxy for size than revenue.

3.6

Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs

3.6.1

Econometric Model

This section endeavors to assess access to credit by SMEs. The key indicator is loan
approval. This is the response to the question “have you been approved loan.” The
variable takes value of 1 if loan was approved and 0 otherwise. We test a relationship
between loan approved and a range of factors, including gender, size, education and
sector. A firm size is measured by the number of employees in the firm; education level
is given by years of schooling completed, and the sector is a dummy representing one of
the ten identified sectors, namely retail, wholesale, agribusiness, manufacturing, repair
shops, business service, restaurants, construction, hotels, and a category “others” which
includes firms that are not classified in these first nine sectors (dummy = 1 for sector, 0
otherwise).

In addition to these core factors, we have a number of control variables, including years
in business and dummies for ethnicity (Kikuyu owner = 1, 0= other Kenyans), complaints
about the judicial system, ICT use through owning cell phones and websites as well as
access to market. Empirical evidence in the literature points to the fact that owning a
mobile phone is associated with increased likelihood of formal financial inclusion (Jack
& Suri, 2011; Johnson & Nino-Zarazua, 2011; Arnold & Johnson, 2012). The list of
variables with their definitions is provided in Table 3.52.
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We hypothesize that if there is a gender bias, women will experience higher credit
discrimination. The firm size as measured by employment is expected to enhance credit
approval, insofar as size of the firm acts as an indicator of profitability or signal to
lenders that loan repayment will not be an issue (Beck et al., 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
& Maksimovic, 2008; Bauchet & Murdoch, 2013). We do not expect any sectoral bias in
favor of any particular sector a priori. The impact of ethnicity could be ambiguous.
However, one may expect that Kikuyu SME owners could have preferential treatment in
Nairobi in the banking sector where the Kikuyu are heavily overrepresented. We
hypothesize that the probability of financial inclusion rises with the level of education
(see FinAcess National Survey, 2006, 2009 and 2013).

We use econometric analysis to answer the following questions:
(i)

What factors determine access to credit by SMEs?

(ii)

Does access to credit differ between SMEs headed by men and by women as
well as by firm size?

(iii)

Does technology enable access to finance for all in Kenya?

The analysis is based on the following model:
𝒚𝒊= Хʹ𝒊𝜷+ 𝜺і

(1)

Where у is a dummy for loan approval, Х′ is a vector of determinants of loan approval for
firm i, and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term. Given that the dependent variable is a binary

variable, the model above cannot be estimated with OLS because it does not meet the
necessary normality conditions ((Dyankin & Moffat, 2002). Specifically, we cannot
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guarantee that estimates of 𝑦𝑖 lie within the interval {0, 1}. The binary nature of the

dependent variable calls for Probit specification. The probit model is specified as follows:
Pr(𝒚 = 𝟏 ∕ Х) = Φ(Х′𝒊 𝜷 )

(2)

Where ɸ (phi) is a cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution, Х ʹ

=(x1…xk), Pr signifies probability and і refers to individual firm. We use the z-score to
infer increase or decrease in probability (pr) by b unit. In other words, an increase in 𝑥
changes Z or probit index by b standard deviation units.

Based on theory and empirical evidence on credit access to finance, we retain the base
model which includes a subset of the vector z, comprising three key determinants: size,
education, and gender of the owner. Other factors of interest will be tested using the
general to parsimonious model selection process.

The base model is the following:
Pr(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔)
3.6.2

(3)

Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results

Table 3.53 presents the results of the probit regressions for determinants of loan approval.
A look at the base regression is telling. Gender and the level of education of the head of
the firm seem not to be significant in explaining the variation in loan approval. In the
base model we see that only the size of the firm matters; its coefficient is statistically
significant at the 10% level and its sign in the expected direction. In other words,
increasing the size of the firm increases the likelihood of receiving loan if a firm applies.
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The results confirm that as expected, an increase in the size of the firm increases the
likelihood of receiving a loan (Table 3.53). This confirms the finding in the empirical
literature that larger firms are less financially constrained (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, &
Maksimovic, 2005, 2008) and have a greater chance of receiving credit.

Now we present the results from the estimate of the complete model where we implement
the process of the parsimonious model. First, we estimate the model including all the firm
characteristics. Then we interactively eliminate the factor with the lowest significance
level (higher p-value), and rerun the regression until we are left with only significant
values. In the full model (see the full model one in column 2 of Table 3.53).

All other control variables, including ethnicity, years in operations and all nine sectors
prove not to be significant though. But quite surprisingly, the coefficient on education is
negative and significant, meaning that more educated do no necessary have higher
probabilities in receiving loan. This latter finding still makes sense in so far as educated,
mostly young, have no experience in running business ,have little credit history, do not
have enough connections or networks in the business community, and therefore the
evidence suggests that having a higher level of education does not necessarily guarantee a
greater chance of securing loans from banks.

On the other hand, firms that own a website which connects them with the rest of the
world and those that are able to take advantage of business networks are more likely to
receive loans. The coefficients on ICT and business networking are positive both under
the parsimonious and full specification models (see Table 3.53). Again these results
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confirms that owning a website or networking with other businesses increases the
likelihood of receiving credit once a firm applies.

3.6.3

Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results

The previous section discussed the factors that affect the likelihood of receiving a loan. In
this section, we examine how individual SMEs rate access to formal and informal finance
and microfinance. The questionnaire asks whether a given firm considers access to
formal finance, microfinance and informal finance (money lenders, out-of-pocket
contributions, family or friends,) as a major, moderate or minor obstacle or never an
obstacle to its business operations and its growth. These ordinal responses are coded from
one to four, in that order. We collapsed these responses into a binary variable, whereby
major and moderate obstacle was coded as 1, minor obstacle and never as 0. Then we ran
regressions using the probit model, taking this as the dependent variable. Regressions for
microfinance yielded no significant results, and so they are not reported here. Estimation
results for formal and informal finance constraints are reported in Tables 3.54 and 3.55,
respectively.

Table 3.54 reports regression results for whether firms considered access to formal
finance as an obstacle or not. Like before we only report three model specifications: a
base model, full model and parsimonious model. The results show that larger firms are
less likely to indicate that they face obstacles in access to formal finance. The coefficient
on firm size is negative and statistically significant at ten percent in all three models. The
coefficients on the gender dummy variable are positive but statistically insignificant.
Business networking and restaurants have coefficients that are positive and statistically
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significant. Furthermore, we see that in the parsimonious model, business services
(salons, printing shops, etc) are more likely to indicate that formal financing constraints
affect their firm growth.

Table 3.55 reports comparable results regarding access to informal finance. While the
signs are in the right direction, the coefficient on gender is statistically insignificant.

Firm size again has a statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that larger SMEs see
lack of informal finance as unimportant. The same is true for firms that use business
networking ties; these firms are likely to cite lack of informal finance as unimportant
obstacle. Construction firms appear to be the only category that sees lack of access to
informal finance as a major obstacle.

3.6.4

Credit Constrained Firms: Econometric Results

For the firms that chose not to apply for credit, the questionnaire seeks the rationale
behind their actions. Some did not apply because they did not need a loan, others thought
they would be rejected, or reported that collateral requirements or the interest rates are
too high, or that applications are burdensome. Those that do not need loans are
considered unconstrained and those that chose not to apply for one reason or another are
considered as constrained.

While core independent variables remain the same as in the case of loan approval and
access to formal/informal credit, the dependent variable, credit constraint, is a binary
variable taking the value of zero for firms that need no loan and one for those who chose
not to apply for one reason or another. Table 3.56 reports results for the credit constraint.
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There is no significant gender bias. The coefficient on firm size is positive and
statistically significant, meaning that as size increases firms are likely to be credit
constrained. In other words, larger firms are more likely to be constrained than small
firms. This is anomaly but it can be explained this way: even larger, like small firms, are
likely to self-select out of credit if they see the prospect of approval as slim.

For firms that have been longer in business we find an insignificant coefficient meaning
𝝏𝒚

that 𝝏Х = 𝟎 so Х does not have any relationship with y.
The category “business services” includes haircut shops, beauty salons, and printing
booths. Some of these business services are run by few individuals, mostly the owners,
hence the size of such firms are small. While they have declined to apply for loan for one
reason or another, these regression results show they are credit constrained.

Moreover, wholesalers are credit constrained as well. The coefficient on wholesale is
statistically significantly and in the right direction in the full model as well as in the
parsimonious model.

3.6.5

Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results

The survey asks the question: have you ever applied for loan before? The respondents
either say yes or no. We take this as a binary dependent variable, taking the value of 1 if
the answer is yes and 0 otherwise. We wanted to explore the factors that influence the
decision to apply for a loan. Table 3.57 presents the results from robust probit
regressions. As a firm begins to place a higher premium on internet communications, its
probability of applying for loan increases. This is well documented. Owning a website
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reduces search cost and asymmetric information and the users are more aware of market
developments. Since the coefficient is positive and significant, owning a website is more
likely to increase firm likelihood of applying for loan. In other words, firms that own a
website are more likely to apply for a loan. The magnitude ranges from about 0.63 per
additional website owned (parsimonious model) to 0.83 (see full model). In a model,
𝑑𝑦

𝒚𝑖= аХ𝒊 and where Х𝑖 {𝟏, 𝟎}, 𝑑Х = 𝑎� is interpreted as y is on average .�𝑎 higher for units
𝑖

for which Х=1 relative to those where Х = 0. So in this case, loan application = 0.83

Website. Therefore, the results confirm that as expected, firms that own a website are
more likely to apply for a loan.

None of the variable is statistically significant in the base equation, although firm size has
the right sign. On the other hand, firms that own website, those that are in wholesale and
agribusiness are more likely to apply for loan as indicated by positive and statistically
coefficients on wholesale, agribusiness and website.

3.6.6

Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates

We examine whether loan approval estimates are robust. Robustness tests are performed
to tease out selection bias in the estimates. The survey questionnaire asks a given firm if
it has applied for loan and if so whether it has been approved or not. This question
sequencing introduces a selection dynamic in the loan approval process but we get only
to observe outcomes from those who have self-selected first to apply before we know
whether they have been approved or not.
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Therefore, following Heckman (1979) who first formulates selection bias as a form of
omitted variable and subsequent authors such as Berinsky (2004), the argument for
selection bias is motivated as follows: First, assume the outcome equation is as given in
equation (1). We further assume that y is observed if and only if a certain unobserved
latent variable exceeds a given threshold. Thus, let 𝑍𝑖∗ be a latent variable, indicating a
propensity to be included in the sample, Ω′𝑖 is a vector of covariates, α is a vector of

coefficients and 𝜇𝑖 is a random disturbance term. The selection equation is specified as
follows:

𝑍𝑖∗ = Ωα + 𝜇𝑖
𝑍𝑖 = �

(4)

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖∗ > 0;
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(5)

The selection equation can be expressed as a probit model of the form:
Pr (𝑍𝑖 = 1) = Ф(Ω′𝑖 α)

(6)

For this analysis, there are some factors that may cause selection bias, for instance, larger
firms may elect to apply for loans, and those whose owners are literate and
technologically savvy (for example, those owning a mobile phone) are more likely to
apply, hence selecting themselves into the sample. In conclusion small firms or firms
owned by illiterates are more likely to self-select out and we end up not observing them
in the sample, ceteris paribus.

We run several robustness tests and some of our results that are noteworthy are presented
in Table 3.58. We examine the base equation against a number of likely candidates for
selection dynamic. Reading out Fisher’s Z transformation (/athrho) in column 1, we
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cannot rule out the presence of some selection bias especially in the wholesale firms. One
of the variables of interest, years in business, explains a variation in the outcome
equation. The coefficient on years in business is positive and statistically significant in
the base model (column1) but is insignificant in the full model (column 2). But
altogether, there is no strong presence of selection bias in the model.

3.7

What Have We Learned from the Econometric Results?

From the econometric results, we find that business networking, schooling, owning a
website and firm size are important factors in explaining the variations in the probability
for applying for loan, receiving a loan or getting rejected, or rating lack of formal finance
as a major constraint on firm performance. We highlight some of these salient findings
below.

3.7.1

No Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit

Gender seems not to be a significant determinant of loan approval and the perception of
credit constraints by SME owners. This finding is similar to Aterido, Beck and Iacovone
(2013) who when controlling for all individual firm characteristics, find that the gender
gap disappears.

3.7.2. There is a Size Bias in Access to Credit
Larger firms are more likely to receive a loan (Table 3.53) and they are less likely to rate
access to formal credit as minor or no obstacle at all (Table 3.54). Also, we see that
construction firms are more likely to cite informal financial constraints (Table 3.55).
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3.7.3

ICT Use, Business Networks and Perception of Financing Obstacles

It appears that firms that engage in business networks are more likely to indicate they are
less financially constrained, both with regards to formal finance and informal finance.
Networks facilitate and enable information to flow between firms, providing a basis for
trade, credit and insurance options. This is consistent with the conclusion by Atieno
(2009) that cohesive solidarity networks can substitute for market supporting institutions.
Larger firms are more likely to say that they are credit constrained. This could be both a
reality and a perception since there is a typical regularity in literature which argues that
some firms are likely to shift the blame to financing obstacles when in fact they have
some blames to carry (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). It may well be that
these firms which are more exposed to credit market, are vocal about their experience;
hence they are likely to state more financial obstacles than they actually face. Uses of
mobile phones can have a positive impact on development through communication
channels and development projects. This is consistent with findings from Aker & Mbiti
(2011, p. 20-26) who conclude that phones or ICT in general connects families, brings
market information, reduces search costs, improves efficiency between firms, creates
additional employment, and reduces risks for the firm. They thus enhance chances of
receiving loans.

3.8

Conclusion

This essay, which is a descriptive and quantitative analysis of access to finance by SMEs
in Kenya, has interesting empirical findings. The essay studies access to credit by SMEs
and the factors that determine whether a firm applies for loans, whether it receives credit
or gets rejected, as well as how each firm characterizes the impact of access to finance on
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their performance. Because this is a discrete choice model, we employ probit model as
appropriate quantitative tool to analyze and gauge the impact of each factor on the
likelihood of loan approval or rejection, and the firms’ perception of finance as a major or
minor constraint.

We highlight four main emerging findings:
•

First, about 48% of businesses fall in the microenterprise category, defined as
firms whose size ranges between one and four employees? About 35.6% of the
sampled SMEs are small enterprises, 13% are medium enterprises, and about 4%
are large enterprises.

•

Second, small size is a disadvantage; there exists a size bias. The study finds that
larger firms have greater chances of receiving loans than smaller SMEs and are
less likely to rate lack of access to formal finance as a constraint. This is
consistent with the literature which finds that the smallest firms face the most
binding financial and legal constraints.

•

Third, some SMES are more likely to self-select out of the credit market if they
perceive that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit history.
Based on this analysis we could infer self-exclusion from the application behavior
of the firms. Wholesalers, agribusiness and firms that own a website, for instance,
are more likely to apply for a loan while other sectors are less likely to apply for
credit. There is evidence in literature about ‘sectoral selection’ in that women tend
to select themselves into firms that depend less on external finance. This state of
affairs also greatly reduces any chance of women-owned firm to apply for credit
(see Table 3.57).
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•

Fourth and finally, there is an ICT impact on access to finance. We find that firms
that own a website are more likely to apply for loans while at the same time those
who own cell phones are likely to be credit constrained.

The essay validates the role of three important factors with respect to access to finance.
First, there is a size bias in the sense that larger firms are more likely to access credit and
less likely to indicate financing constraints. The policy implication of this result is that
there is need to further spread access to financial services to reach out to both the
unbanked and bottom of the pyramid. This strategy could go a long way to ameliorate the
size bias, since smaller firms on average are more likely to experience more severe
constraints to access for formal finance.

Second, we find that firms which use business networks are more likely to face fewer
financing constraint. Third, we find that firms that own a website are more likely to
apply for loans. We speculate that owning website reflects a greater access to
information, or that those firms with websites are more visible and that this is a bonus in
the credit market.

In summary, the paper has attempted to provide evidence in favor of promoting financial
inclusion and why access to finance matters a great deal for the performance of SMEs
and their impact on the economy and poverty reduction. We cautiously conclude that firm
size, the level of education and business networks are significant determinants of access
to credit for SMEs.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Selected Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2011 and 2012
Bank

Year of
creation

No of
Branches

State's
share (%)

Bank of India

-

4

Chase Bank*

1996

22

Commercial Bank of

1962

21

0

Consolidated

1989

17

Development

1963

1

Equity Bank

1984

Family Bank*

Public
share (%)

Total
assets
(million
$)

Deposits
(million
$)

Loans
(million $)

Loan
/Deposits
(%)

Total Current
Employment

566.3

397.6

289.2

73

400

100

1,143

922

549

59.6

536

100

0

180.2

1,41.3

108.2

76.6

265

132

0

100

2,076

1,477

1,249

85

5,565

1984

64

0

100

1.2

0.3

0.22

80

1200

Faulu

2009

33

337

422

125

800

KCB

1896

170

3940

2511

2203

88

5,000

890

661

550

83

550

Africa

100

I&M

17.5

19

82.5

*Means that some of the figures were provided to me in Kenya shillings and I have exchanged them to dollars using the official

exchange rate of KSh.83.6 = $1 as of May 2012.

Table 3.2: Growth in Customer and SME Accounts in 2012 (in Million)
Bank Name
Customer Bank Accounts
Customer SME Accounts
July 2011 August
March
July 2011 August
March
2011
2012
2011
2012
Bank of India Chase Bank
0.5
0.65
1.5
0.2
0.28
0.49
Commercial
0.002671 0.002815
0.00294
Bank of
Africa
Consolidated 0.033654 0.35272
0.046786
0.033653 0.03514
0.04624
5
Development 0.003726 0.003726
0.002666
0.000022 0.000022 0.00006
Equity Bank 5.864,51 6.000,968 6.869,205
Family Bank

1

1

1.2

0.2

0.25

0.3

Faulu
KCB
I&M

0.358883
1
0.052641

0.329875
1.6
0.053485

0.316485
1.8
0.059147

0.004201

0.00431

0.00464

Table 3.3: Kenya Commercial Bank Lending to SMEs, 2012
Bank Name
Lending Size ( in US$ )
Minimum Loan
Maximum Loan
(Ever Approved)
(Ever approved)
Bank of India
Chase Bank
24,096
11,927,710
Commercial Bank of
6,024
1,313,253
Africa
Consolidated
1,000
1,500,000
Development
12,000
714,000
Equity Bank
11,893
11,892,608
Family Bank
25,000
600,000
Faulu
6,024
6,024,000
KCB
1,500
577,000
I&M
10,000
500,000
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Table 3.4: How Banks Describe their Top SMEs
Bank Name
Individual Bank Assessment
Commercial
Bank of
Africa

Consolidated
Bank

Development
Bank

Equity Bank

Family Bank
Faulu

Our top SMEs are in :
Real estate;
Building & Construction;
Business services;
Transport, Manufacturing and
Individuals in the property development sector.
Our three of top five SME borrowers are in retail and
wholesale business;
The businesses are mostly family owned;
The other two are in real estate and one of them is an
investment group, and
Retail and wholesale sectors as well.
Growing and exporting of cut flowers;
Provision of education services;
Manufacturing; Plastic products, industrial spares, and
fabrication of steel products;
General trading;
Building and Civil Engineering contractors & Real Estate
developers;
In addition to serving SMEs, DBK serves all other, and
categories of corporate.
Characteristics of our top SMEs :
They have inadequate education;
Inadequate business skills and management skills
Inadequate capital;
Lack of access to credit; global financial and economic
crisis increases cost of financial services and a drop in
demand for credit; low levels of relationship management
makes it difficult for their businesses to be seen as viable
for lending;
They also do their businesses in unsupportive national
policy and regulatory environment;
Technological changes affect their business
operations/whole sectors;
Poor infrastructure (roads, electricity etc) also affect them
so much;
They have very scanty markets information;
Equity does businesses in Building and Construction, and
Agriculture, Mining and Manufacturing
Large business with organized structures.
Bottom of the pyramid customers through group lending
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KCB

I&M

methodology.
They have:
Turnover from above Kes 100, 000;
Loan facility from US$ 350,000 to 36 million, and
Number of employees above 20.
We serve mid and large corporate sector;
We also serve agro-based exporters, and
We also serve mid and large sized mortgages market.

Table 3. 5: How Kenya’s Banks Rank 5 C’s When Appraising SME Projects, 2012
Ranking Criterion
Major
Moderate Minor
Not
Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle
Character of the owners
8
1
Capacity of the firm
7
1
1
Collateral Requirement
4
5
Firm initial capital
2
6
1
Macroeconomic conditions 3
5
1
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Name

Bank of India
Chase Bank

104
Commercial
Bank of Africa

Table 3.6: Products, Technology and Indicators of Performance
Customized Partnering Role of
Steps Toward
Ways to Expand
Products
Developme Mobile
Improving
Access Frontier
nt Agencies Technology
Customer
to all ,specially
Service
SMEs
Invoice
EIB;
clients able to agency banking
through strategic
discounting; government transact
and
partnerships that
Daraja loan; of Kenya;
through
Promotions on
enables the bank
Kilele planet women
agents;
ATM utilization to get cheaper
–portal for
enterprise
Synergies i.e,
lines which we
fund , and in post bank and
can later on lend
SMEs;
cheaply to the
Taalamika – discussions chase bank;
education
with about
Mobile
public i.e women
product;
10 others
banking;
enterprise fund
Kilele
Internet
lending at 8%
banking
current
On the system
account
we use finals
to try and
profile the
SMEs
Overdrafts;
Term Loans;
Asset
Financing;
Invoice
Discounting
Mortgages;
Construction

GOWE:
(Growth
Oriented
Women
Entrepreneu
rs) and
GROFIN

Mobile
technology
has enabled
the bank to
tap a wider
range of
customers
with a wide

By developing ebanking
products, mobile
solutions e.g.
M-Pesa and
partnering with
other banks for
provision of

Opening more
branches;
Developing
products to suit
SMEs, and
Playing an
advisory role to
SME clients

Loan

Consolidated
Bank
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LPO
financing;
Invoice
discounting;
Asset
finance;
Bind bonds;
Guarantees;
Mortgage
financing

European
Investment
Bank (EIB);
Industrial
and
Commercial
Developme
nt
Corporation
(ICDC)

geographical
reach;
Information
systems are
currently not
developed
enough to
facilitate
lending to
SMEs
Mobile
technology
has mostly
helped in
money
transfer
services to
remote areas
of the
country.
However due
to illiteracy in
the rural areas
it has not been
possible to
have a major
impact as far
as other
banking
services are
concerned;

ATM services
e.g. Kenswitch,
Pesapoint etc

Introduction of
technology
driven services
e.g. mobile
banking, internet
banking and
ATMs;
Increasing footprint and service
outlets by use of
agents; For
savings –Use of
bonus interest
where no
withdrawals
have been made
over a certain
time-frame,
elimination of
charges for
savings accounts

By use of
investment
groups and
informal merry
go-round groups.
Members in these
groups will be
required to
guarantee one
another;
Expanding reach
to the under and
un-banked
citizens through
the use of
banking agents
and mobile
banking services
using mobile
phones
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Development
Bank

Trade
Finance
Products;
Working
capital
facilities;
Short term
loans

Regional &
Internationa
l Financial
Institutions
– in lines of
Credit for
on lending.

Information
systems are
still not
developed
adequately to
facilitate
lending in
SMEs. This
is especially
pronounced in
the area of
credit rating.

and offering a
good return
through
competitive
interest rates.

Exploring a
suitable core
information
system
considering
the bank’s
mandate
/target market.

Efficient service
delivery system
is in place and is
continuously
reviewed
through
appropriate
feedback system
/ surveys.

Secure
appropriate lines
of credit (sources
of funds) to
support the
SMEs; Continue
to develop
suitable products
targeting SMEs;
Improve on
accessibility
through
sustainable
outreach
programmes.

Equity Bank

Working
capital;
Asset
finance;
Mortgage;
Development
Plot
purchase;
Project
Finance

This has
been
achieved
through
partnering
with
Developme
nt Financial
Institutions
(DFI’s) e.g
IFC, Blue
Orchard,
EIB, and
CDB.

The platform
allows 24/7
access to
banking
services and
also improves
communicatio
n between
customer and
bank by way
of transaction
alerts.
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There are
various
initiatives that
the bank has
employed to
ensure improved
customer
service, and
reduce long
waiting hours at
bank premises.
These include,
Offering of
financial literacy
training through
the Equity Group
Foundation as
part of the
Bank’s CSR,
No account
maintenance fees
are charged to
customers.
Cash deposits to
accounts are free
irrespective of
the bank channel
used.
Paying interest
on deposit
accounts with

Creation of SME
centers supported
by active SME
business club;
Re-designing &
tailoring products
and services;
Provisional of
more SMEfriendly delivery
channels like ebanking
Provision of
advisory services;
Relationship
management
approach

Asset
Finance;
Business
loans;
Trade
finance;
Overdrafts;
Capex loans

FSD ;
Euro Bank,
and
Africa
Guarantee
Fund

Faulu

Biashara
SME

AfDB
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Family

Increasing the
reach of our
customers;
Reducing the
costs of doing
business; and
Improving
turnaround
time in
decision
making
Everybody
from the rich
to the poor
has been able
to benefit
from their
mobile phone;
our customers

more
competitive rates
on the term
deposits.
Alternate
Banking
Channels - these
have widened
the bank network
to reach greater
populace. The
Channels include
Investing in
technology and
Investing in
Agency Banking

Customer care –
There have been
a lot of trainings
on how to handle
customers;
Customer
satisfaction
surveys to

Seminars
Being involved in
their workshops
Direct Marketing
Referrals

Offering
competitively
priced loans;
Training our
customers on
mobile banking;
Training our
clients on how to
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KCB

Biashara
club;
Mapato
account,

USAID,
IFC

can now
access money
from their
accounts
through their
phones;
Currently
lending to
SME is not
done on
phone but that
is the next
technology;
The current
information
system has
not been
designed in a
way that our
SME clients
can pay loans
through the
phone but
through
upgrade we
will be able to
achieve this.
Great dealmobile
banking has
created

understand the
areas of
weaknesses;
Supervision and
monitoring of
the branches ;
We do not have
challenges with
long queues ,
most of our
banking halls are
not very
congested

utilize their loan
funds to grow
business;
Group lending
methodology

Opening agency
banking where
clientele can get
same service as

Referrals from the
large corporate;
The bank
suppliers;

Simba
accounts
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flexibility in
payment that
one can
transfer
money from
phone to the
account and
from the
account to the
phone;
Mobile
banking has
created
branchless
banking and is
enabling the
banks to reach
a wider
clientele who
were
previously
using only
mobile;
Agent
banking is
also
facilitated by
mobile
technology in
that a
customer does

banking;
Signing in
customers in
different
channels of
transacting like
mobi bank,
ATM and
internet banking;
There are
products that are
tailor-made to
encourage
savings with
interest rates and
discourage
frequent
withdrawals
(Simba Savings)

Specialized bank
employees trained
to deal with this
segment from
small to growth;
Value chain from
corporate (s)

I&M
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Composite
loans to take
care of
working
capital and
fixed asset
financing;
Composite
working
capital
facilities
such as LC
cum
overdraft

IFC and
Proparco
(ProparcoFrench
Developme
nt Bank)

not have to
come to the
bank to open
an account or
give
instructions.
With the help
of mobile
technology,
mobile
banking has
taken off very
well. Mobile
banking has
become very
popular in the
context of
domestic and
international
remittances.
However, we
have not seen
any major
impact on
SME lending
business.
I & M is not
into micro
segment. We
are more into
middle

We spend a lot
of time and
money on
training of our
staff in the
branches and
delivery points;
We run on most
advanced
technology
platform, which
ensures all our
branches and
departments are
networked on a
real-time basis.
This helps us in
providing
anywhere and
everywhere
banking services
to our customers;
We have
launched internet
banking and

We are focusing
more on SMEs by
stipulating a
specific budget
for SMEs based
asset financing;
We are
penetrating in the
market in
partnership with
various credit
insurance
schemes, whereby
risk perception
for the Bank is
minimized;
We have
simplified our
process for SME
business, with
delegation of
sanctioning
powers to middle
management and
simplifying credit

segment
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mobile banking
appraisal formats
recently, which
helps our
customers in
managing in
their accounts by
them. This is a
major leap in
terms of
technology based
services; We
constantly
undertake
business process
re-engineering to
ensure our
process are
smooth and
deliver services
in the most
efficient manner

Table 3.7: Distribution of Nonperforming Loans among Businesses, 2005-2011
Chase Bank Year
Total NPL % of NPL
% of NPL Due to
(%)
Due to SMEs Large Businesses
2008
3
2009
3
2010
3
2011
3
Consolidated 2005
98
Bank
2006
83
2007
53
2008
45
2009
22
2010
16
2011
11
2012
10
Equity Bank 2004
10.90
2005
11.08
2006
6.95
2007
5.39
2008
5.84
2009
7.36
8.11
11.66
2010
4.65
4.75
2.24
2011
2.84
1.87
0.59
2012
3.18
1.68
2.55
Faulu Kenya 2010
18.45
2011
10.41
2012
8.3
I&M
2010
<1
2011
<1
2012
<1
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Table 3.8: Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs
Name
Things Banks Wish to See
Commercial bank
Happen in Order to Expand
Expectations from Central
Lending to SMES
Bank of Kenya
Bank of
India
Chase Bank More training on financial
The Kenyan central bank
literacy;
has come a long way and
More workshops to entrepreneurs we are proud of what they
on raising capital;
have done;
More strategic partners who will
Islamic banking needs more
lend funds to financial institutions scholars at CBK;
and they later on lend cheaply;
Regulation of MFIs, and
Cheaper sources of funds thus
SACCOs to the equivalent
reducing cost of funds, and
of banks to give us all at a
The government continues
level playing ground
intervention in reviving various
sectors.
Commercial Provide accurate information;
Lower interest rate;
Bank of
Utilization of facilities granted for More controls on inflation,
Africa
the purpose intended, and
and foreign bureaus etc to
Availability of industry
avoid erratic business
information / Data.
environment.
Consolidate Create proper structures
Maintain a stable interest
d Bank
(management and governance);
and exchange rate regime;
Keep proper records;
Maintain a low interest and
Formalize their business (not
inflation regime, and
Build confidence among the
jacks of all trades!), and
public for the banking
Improve on financial discipline.
sector.
Developme SMEs to maintain records and
Ensure Price Stability –
nt Bank
other relevant information on
including cost of funds;
Ensure Exchange rate
business activities in the
stability, and
prescribed form, including
Ensure effective regulations
statutory accounts;
and guidelines, and
SMEs to operate businesses on
monitoring of the
acceptable standards and
institutions.
practices;
SMEs to honor obligations on
borrowed funds, and
Banks / Financial institutions to
provide funds with appropriate
aspects such as cost and tenor;
and to offer relevant products,
and Regulatory authorities to
ensure conducive business
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Equity
Bank

Faulu

KCB

I&M

environment
Better legislation to foster better
business working environment
(e.g. business registration, tax
compliance, etc) ;
information sharing;
Use of technology by SMEs &
government, and
Adoption of new innovations
suited for emerging markets.
Investing in profit making
businesses – avoid miss use of
loan;
Timely loan repayment;
Saving with Faulu;
Consistency in banking – avoid
bank hoping, and
Transparency during loan
appraisal.
Regulation;
Stable macroeconomic conditions
i. e stable shilling, inflation;
Government subsidies on the
exports to start-ups;
Government to guarantee the
start-ups, and
Strong enablers like the
infrastructure.
Bookkeeping
Proper management.
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Speedier change/review of
guidelines to accommodate
changes in the market e.g.
new innovations,
development of trading
blocs like EAC, etc; and
Provision of business
related data or investment
opportunities through some
portal or any other means.
Reduce MFI regulations and
licensing, and
Lower lending rates.

Classification of the SME
assets, and
Reduce the BCR rate which
affects the lending rates

Continue being a stronger
regulator, and
Maintain stable fiscal and
monetary policy
environment.

Table 3.9: Kenya Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served, 2011
Variable/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Loan in
12.3
6.9
8.4
13.1
million US$
# SMEs
2057
2541
2671
2880
Consolid Loan in 000
9.1 12.7 13.2 13.3
15.3
19.6
26.7
32.7
49.7
72.0
109.5
118.7
ated
US$
# SMEs
Develop Loan in 000
149.2
92.1
118.6
292.9
ment
US$
# SMEs
43
27
29
60
Equity
Loan in 000
88.8
105.8
153.8
139.3
266.1
112.7
Bank
US$
# SMEs
2,788
4,667 11,107 11,247 15,231
6,312
I&M
95.0
3900
Bank
CBA
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Table 3.10: Mobile Payment Statistics, March 2007- December 2011
Year Agents Customers(Million) Transactions(Million) Value(Ksh.
billion)
2007 1,582 1.35
5.47
16.32
2008 6,104 5.08
62.74
166.57
2009 23,012 8.88
193.5
473.41
2010 39,449 16.45
311.05
732.22
2011 50,471 19.19
433
1,169.15
Source: Author's compilation based on CBK Industry Surveys, 2011

Table 3.11: Agency Banking, Performance and Distribution Networks across Kenya
Institution
Date of Agency
No. of Agents Percentage
Network Approval Appointed
of Total
agents
th
Equity Bank Ltd
5,874
73.4%
18 May 2010
Kenya
1,380
17.3%
nd
Commercial
22 July 2010
Bank Ltd
Transnational
25th October
Bank
2010
Consolidated
23rd November
4
0.05%
Bank
2010
Co-operative
578
7.2%
20th December
Bank of Kenya
2010
Ltd
Chase Bank Ltd
2nd February
37
0.46%
2011
Family Bank Ltd
9th June 2011
First Community
6
0.08%
21st June 2011
Bank
Diamond Trust
1st July 2011
Bank
Citibank
120
1.5%
4th July 2011
Total
7,999
Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance Returns, 2012
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Table 3.12: Agency Model as Expanding Financial Services
Institution
Number of Transactions Per Transaction Type
Cash
Cash
Bill
Account/
Deposit
Withdraw Payme Opening
al
nt
/Balance
Enquiries
Equity Bank
1,886,533 1,458,624 15,815 1,247,042
KCB
44,774
9,598
Transnational Consolidated Co-operative
32,251
50,743
1,513
20,945
Chase Bank
44
Family Bank
First
Community
Diamond
Trust Bank
Citibank
1,375
4
1,964,933 1,518,969 17,328 1,268,031
Source: BSD Databank and Off-site Surveillance Returns, 2012
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Total

4,608,014
54,372
105,452
44
1,379
4,769,261

Institution

Equity Bank

Table 3.13: Agent Transaction Types
Transaction Type
Bill
Cash
Cash
Payment
Deposits
Withdrawal
(Ksh.M
(Ksh. Mn)
(Ksh.Mn)
n)
13,473.18

8,019.31

70.35

KCB
332.70
57.85
Transnation
al Bank
Consolidate
d Bank
Cooperative
242.77
297.63
2.78
Bank
Chase Bank
Family
Bank
First
Community
Diamond
Trust
Citibank
247.0
1.60
Total
14,295.65
8,376.39
73.13
Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance returns, 2012

Total
(Ksh.
Mn)
21,562.8
4
390.56
543.18
-

248.60
22,745.18

Table 3.14: Geographical Distribution of Financial Services in Kenya
Province
No. of
Percentage Value of
Percentage
Transactions of
Transactions
of Value of
Transaction Conducted
Transaction
s
(Kshs’M)
s
Nairobi
1,436,237
30%
7,457.96
33%
Central
1,062,840
22%
5,413.64
24%
Eastern
998,444
21%
4,744.56
21%
Rift Valley
447,063
9%
2,140.57
9%
Western
297,658
6%
1,032.35
5%
Nyanza
306,439
6%
1,007.97
4%
Coast
196,236
4%
807.72
4%
North Eastern 24,346
1%
140.15
1%
Total
4,769,261
100%
22,745.18
100%
Source: BSD Databank and off-site surveillance returns, 2012
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Table 3.15 : East African Comparative ATM Expansion, 2004-2010
Number of ATM Machines Across The Great Lakes Region
2008 2009
2010
Country/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
8
8
13
18
31
46
145
Ethiopia
320 323 617
1,012.00 1,325 1,655
...
Kenya
2
12
12
16
22
47
...
Rwanda
0
0
87
200
292
390
681
Sudan
67
120 139
424
591
798
Tanzania
152 220 267
321
405
536
599
Uganda
Source: Authors’ compilation using IMF Database, 2013
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Table 3.16: A Glance at Kenyan Banking Network, ATMs and DTMs Growth, 1997-2011
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Branches 695 692
530
465
494
466
512
532
534
575
740
887
996
1063
ATM
166
230
324
555
617
1012 1325 1717 1979
DTMs
1
5
Source: Author’s compilation using the Central of Kenya various Publications, 2012

2011
1102
2183
6
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Bank
Name

Year

Chase
Bank
(32)
Consol
idated
Bank
(17)

2012
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1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Table 3.17: Selected Bank Branch Distribution by Provinces, 1991-2012
The Total Number of Branch Networks Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012
Central Coast Eastern Nairobi Northern Nyanza Rift
Western
Eastern
Valley Province
5

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

22

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
5
5

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2

3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I&M
(19)
Devel
opmen
t Bank
(1)
Equity
Bank
(142)
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2010
2011
2012
2012

0

1
2
2

0

13
13
14
1

0

1
1
1

1
1
2

0

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
6
7
9
9
9
9
10
12
14
20
24
25
26
26
26

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
4
5
6
9
11
12

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
6
9
11
14
14
14
15

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
5
8
10
16
23
26
29
34
40

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
4
4
4
5

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
3
7
7
7
9
10

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
6
8
11
18
22
23
25
26

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
5
7
8
8
8

Faulu
Kenya
(33)
KCB(
170)
Family
Bank
(57)

2012
2012
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

6

4

3

6

26

26

14

37

8
10
12
10
15
16
18
20

7

15
17
20
20
20

1

6

6

10

31

19

1
2
3
3
3

2
3
5
7
8
10
10

2
3
4
4
4
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Table 3.18: Distribution of Agents by Province and Selected Banks, 2007-2012
The Total Number of Bank Agents Per Province Per Year,
Total
1991-2012
Bank
Year Cent Coa East Nairo Norther Nyanza Rift Wester
Name
ral
st
ern
bi
n
Vall n
Eastern
ey
Provin
ce
Chase
2012
Bank
(380)
Consoli 2007 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
dated
2008 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Bank
2009 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(30)
2010 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2011 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2012 4
4
9
5
0
0
8
0
Equity
2010 156
30
73
103
0
36
81
39
Bank
2011 759
244 448
595
51
279
769 237
(6,123)
2012 476
109 279
440
26
117
556 220
KCB
(2,573)
21
2012 431
377 362
332
26
305
522 218

21

After two months, the interviewee wrote back to me clarifying that they have revised
their numbers. Thus, as of June 30, 2012 there were 2573 and in September the same
year, that figure rose to 3900 which is equivalent to 52% change.
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Table 3.19 A: Distribution of ATMs by Provinces
The Total Number of Live ATMs Per Province, 1991-2012
Bank
Year Cent Coast Eastern Nairobi Northern Ny Rift Wester
Name
ral
Eastern
an Vall n
za ey
Provin
ce
Consol 2005
idated 2006
Bank
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
I & M 2012
Chase 2012
Bank 22
(200+)
KCB
2012
Equity 2008
Bank
2009
2010
2011
2012

0
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

2
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

2
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
18

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

85
56
65
75
77
76

46
24
24
24
30
31

21
26
30
46
51
52

116
171
191
175
184
189

10
2
11
11
12
13

14
15
25
31
33
36

81
63
88
84
87
91

76
14
16
22
22
22

22

Chase Bank has over 200 plus ATMs in the country. In addition, one of the bank
interviewees states that “we are a partner to Kenswitch and through this partnership,
clients can access up to 1000 ATMs and also a member of Pesapoint, with over 200
ATMs our own 24 hours.”
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Table 3.19 B: Bank Distribution of ATMs by Provinces, 2012
The Total Number of Live ATMs and Ratios Per Province
Bank Name
CL
CO
E
NBI
NE
NY
RV

W

Consolidated
3
1
5
5
0
0
3
0
I&M
0
2
0
18
0
1
2
0
KCB
85
46
21
116
10
14
81
76
Equity
76
31
52
189
13
36
91
22
Total ATMs
164
80
78
328
23
51
177
98
23
Population
4.6
3.6
6.0
3.5
3.0
5.8
11.1
4.7
(in ‘000000)
ATMs/1000000 35.62 22.05 12.96 93.21
7.65
8.79
15.88
20.95
NB: The names of former provinces are provided in short form; CL = Central; CO =
Coast; E = Eastern; NBI = Nairobi, NE = North Eastern; NY = Nyanza; RV = Rift
Valley; W = Western

23

This population per province figures is based on my own projections using 1999 and
2009 census data from Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.
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Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

Table 3.20: Equity Bank Distribution and Growth in ATM Cards over the years
The Total Number of ATM Cards Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012
CL
CO
E
NBI
NE
NY
RV
W
74,368 15,476 25,705 122,698 0
11,658 89,839
3
200,839 56,022 89,983 363,798 8,399
49,823 231,465 33,599
372,506 109,603 163,892 644,178 19,502 108,932 422,878 84,871
488,055 150,651 221,284 840,195 30,999 163,922 561,450 124,085
1,014,7
599,333 186,225 275,456 72
38,692 207,010 685,012 157,468
1,213,4
726,055 276,769 442,219 34
47,424 250,192 848,363 198,865
1,340,7
805,728 311,482 490,909 25
63,105 279,693 952,844 224,124

Province Per Capita ATM Cards, 2009
Populati 4,383,7 3,325,3 5,668,1 3,138,3 2,310,7 5,442,7 10,006,8 4,334,2
on
43
07
23
69
57
11
05
82
ATM
488,055 150,651 221,284 840,195 30,999 163,922 561,450 124,085
Cards
Per 100 11.1
4.5
3.9
26.8
1.3
3.0
5.6
2.9
people
NB: The names of former provinces are provided in short form; CL = Central; CO =
Coast; E = Eastern; NBI = Nairobi, NE = North Eastern; NY = Nyanza; RV = Rift
Valley; W = Western
Table 3. 21: Kenya’s Deposit-Taking Microfinance Institutions
Name of DTM
Year Licensed Number of
Head
Branches
Office
Faulu Kenya DTM Limited
21/05/2009
27 Nairobi
Kenya Women Finance
31/03/2010
16 Nairobi
Trust DTM Limited
Rafiki Deposit Taking
14/06/2011
3 Nairobi
Microfinance
Remu DTM Limited
31/12/2010
3 Nairobi
SMEP Deposit Taking
14/12/2010
6 Nairobi
Microfinance Limited
UWEZO Deposit Taking
08/11/2010
2 Nairobi
Microfinance Limited
Total
57
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Table 3.22: Distribution of Foreign Bureaus by City and Province, 2012
Province
City/Town
Number of Foreign
Exchange Bureaus
Central
Mombasa
10
Coast
Malindi
2
Eastern
Nairobi
92
Nairobi
0
North Eastern
0
Nyanza
Eldoret
2
Nakuru
2
Rift Valley
Namanga
1
Kisumu
2
Western
Total
111
Source: Central Bank of Kenya, 2012
Table 3. 23: Improvements in Formal Financial Inclusion over the Years, 2006-2009
(In %)
Year Formal
Formal Other
Informal
Excluded
2006
18.5
7.8
32.4
41.3
2009
22.6
17.9
26.8
32.7
2013*
Source: FinAccess National Survey 2009, and 2013
Table 3.24: Classification of SMEs by Gender
Gender
Number
%
Female
144
42.23
Male
193
56.60
Non-respondents
4
1.17
341
100
Total
Table 3.25: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity
Ethnic Group
Number
%
Kikuyu
73
21.41
Kamba
65
19.06
Luo
41
12.02
Meru
28
8.21
Other Kenyans
115
33.72
Foreigners
4
1.17
Non-respondents
15
4.4
341
100
Total
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Table 3.26: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity and Gender (Row % in
Parentheses)
Ethnic Group
Male
Female
Total
Kikuyu
50
23
73
(68.5)
(31.5)
Kamba
36
29
65
(55.4)
(44.6)
Luo
20
21
41
(48.8)
(51.2)
Meru
14
14
28
(50.0)
(50.0)
Other Kenyans
65
50
115
(56.5)
(43.5)
Foreigners
1
2
3
(33.3
(66.7)
186
139
325
Total
(57.2)
(42.8)
Non7
5
12
respondents
(58.3)
(41.7)
Note = 4 firms which did not respond to the gender question

Table 3.27: Firm Classification by Legal Status
Firm Legal Status
Number
%
1. Sole proprietor
160
46.92
2. Private limited company
55
16.13
3. Public limited company
23
6.74
4. Partnership
78
22.87
5. Co-operative
13
3.81
6. Other Form
9
2.64
7. Non-respondents
3
0.88
341
100
Total
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Table 3.28: Firm Size by Current Employment
Classification
Firm Size
Number
%
Microenterprise
1- 4
162
47.65
Small Enterprise
5- 19
121
35.59
Medium Enterprise
20 - 99
44
12.94
Large Enterprise
≥ 100
13
3.82
Total
340
100
Missing =1

Table 3.29: SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size
Firm Men Women total As %
As %
As %
Classificat Size
of all
of all
of all
ion
Men
women
Microente 1- 4
161
91
70
47.15
48.61
47.77
rprise
Small
5- 19 68
121
53
35.23
36.81
35.91
Enterprise
Medium
2041
26
17
13.47
11.81
12.17
Enterprise 99
Large
≥ 100 8
12
4
4.15
2.78
3.56
Enterprise
Total 193
144 337
100
100
100
Missing = 4

Table 3.30: SME Classification by Sector
Sector
Number
%
1. Retail
86
25.22
2. Business Service
64
18.77
3. Manufacturing
31
9.09
4. Wholesale
36
10.56
5. Agribusiness
28
8.21
6. Construction
15
4.40
7. Hotels
27
7.92
8. Restaurant/Catering
20
5.87
9. Repair Shops
10
2.93
10. Other Sector (e.g gas)
23
6.74
Non-respondents
1
0.29
Total
341
100
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Table 3.31: SME Classification by Sector and Gender (on % representation)
Distribution by Distribution by
Gender
Gender as %
Sector
Number
Men
Women men
Women
1. Retail
86
47
39 44.56
27.08
2. Business
63
41
22 32.64
15.28
Service
3. Manufacturing
31
17
14 16.06
9.72
4. Wholesale
36
21
15 18.65
10.42
5. Agribusiness
28
16
12 14.51
8.33
6. Construction
15
9
6
7.77
4.17
7. Hotels
27
12
15 13.99
10.42
8. Restaurants/Cat
19
11
8
9.84
5.56
ering
9. Repair Shops
10
7
3
5.18
2.08
10. Other Sector
22
12
10 11.40
6.94
(e.g gas)
Total
337
193
144
57.27
42.73
Note: Missing = 4
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Table 3.32: SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size
Sector
Number of Employees
(% in Parentheses)
1- 4
5-19
20-99
≥ 100
1. Retail
64
18
2
2
(74.42) (20.93)
(2.33)
(2.33)
2. Business Service
35
19
8
2
(54.69) (29.69)
(12.50)
(3.13)
3. Manufacturing
10
12
6
3
(32.26) (38.71)
(19.35)
(9.68)
4. Wholesale
15
18
2
1
(41.67) (50.00)
(5.56)
(2.78)
5. Agribusiness
2
15
10
1
(7.14) (53.57)
(35.71)
(3.57)
6. Construction
1
7
5
2
(6.67) (46.67)
(33.33) (13.33)
7. Hotels
11
12
4
(40.74) (44.44)
(14.81)
8. Restaurants/Cater
9
7
4
ing
(45)
(35)
(20)
9. Repair Shops
3
6
1
(30)
(60)
(10)
10. Other Sector (e.g
12
7
3
1
gas)
(52.17) (30.43)
(13.04)
(4.35)
Total( as % of
162
121
45
13
341)
(47.51) (35.48)
(13.20)
(3.81)

Table 3.33: Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities
Facility
Number
%
ATM Withdrawals
166
48.68
Bank Visits
115
33.72
Store Safekeeping Vault
38
11.14
Both ATM Withdrawals and Bank Visits
18
5.28
Non-respondents
4
1.17
Total
341
100
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Table 3.34: Firm Self-Appraisal
Overall Assessment
Number %
Technology Adoption and Managerial Competence
259 75.95
Managerial Incompetence and technology Neglect
21 6.16
Unfavorable Business Environment
47 13.78
Non-respondents
14 4.11
Total
341
100

Table 3.35: Loan Characteristics of SMEs
Status
Number %
Received Approvals (success Rate)
114
66.67
Denied Applications (rejection rate)
57
33.33
Total Loan Applications
171 100.00
Memorandum: Loan Application % of Total #
171/341
50.15
of SMEs
Acceptance rate(Loan Approval As % of total #
114/341
33.43
of SMEs)

Table 3.36: Loan Approval by Lender
Lender Type
Number %
Commercial Banks
57
Microfinance Institutions
18
Informal Finance /Money Lenders/Family
13
Members
Others
25
Total
113

Table 3.37: Loan Approval by Gender
Gender Number
%
% ( of gender)
Male
64
56.64
Female
49
43.36
Total
113
100
(Note: One Loan Applicant did not specify gender; missing = 1)
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50.44
15.93
11.50
22.12
100

33.16
34.03
33.14

Table 3.38: Loan Approval by Sector
Sector
Quantity % of the total
Loans
Approved
Approved as
% of Sectoral
Totals
1. Retail
24
21.05
27.91
2. Business
24
21.05
38.10
Service
3. Manufacturing
10
8.77
32.26
4. Wholesale
10
8.77
27.78
5. Agribusiness
9
7.89
32.14
6. Construction
8
7.02
53.33
7. Hotels
7
6.14
25.93
8. Restaurants/Ca
9
7.89
47.37
tering
9. Repair Shops
4
3.51
40.00
10. Other Sector
9
7.89
40.91
(e.g gas)
Total
114
33.43
100

Table 3.39: Loan Approval by Firm Size
Firm
Quantity % of the total As % of Firm
Employees
Approved
Size
Loans
Classification
Total
Microenterprise
1-4
47
41.23
29.01
Small
5- 19
29.82
28.10
Enterprise
35
Medium
28
24.56
63.64
Enterprise
20-99
Large
≥ 100
54.39
38.46
Enterprises
Total
114
33.43
100
Size
Classification
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Table 3.40: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan
Reason Self-Selection Out from Credit
Number % of Total
24
Market
Constraint
1. Firm does not think it will be
approved
2. Application procedures are too
burdensome
3. Collateral requirements are strict
4. Interest rates are too high
Total Constrained Firms
5. The firm does not need loan
(unconstrained firms)

32

% of
All
(163)
41.56 19.63

14

18.18

8.59

14
17
77
86

18.18
22.08
100.00
-

8.59
10.43
47.24
52.76

Table 3.41: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender
Reasons
Men Women Total As %
As %
%
of all
of all
Total
men
women
1. It does not think it
21
11
32
10.88
7.64 19.88
will be approved
2. Application
7
7
14
3.63
4.86
8.70
procedures are
too burdensome
3. Collateral
8
6
14
4.15
4.17
8.70
requirements are
strict
4. Interest rates are
8
9
17
4.15
6.25 10.56
too high
5. The firm does not
49
35
84
25.39
24.31 52.17
need loan
Total
93
68
161
48.19
17.3
100
Two did not specify gender, Missing = 2

24

This means that the firms had wanted to apply but chose to not because of the reasons
enumerated one through four.
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Table 3.42: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses)
Doubted
Burdensome Strict
High
No Need
Category
Approval Application
Collateral Interest
1. Retail:
12
2
3
5
31
quantity
(22.64)
(3.77)
(5.66)
(9.43)
(58.49)
2. Business
8
4
4
3
12
Service
(25.81)
(12.90)
(12.90)
(9.68)
(38.71)
3. Manufacturi
3
1
3
1
6
ng
(21.43)
(7.14)
(21.43)
(7.14)
(42.86)
4. Wholesale
2
1
1
5
(22.22)
(11.11)
(11.11)
(55.56)
5. Agribusines
2
1
1
6
s
(20.00)
(10.00) (10.00)
(60.00)
6. Constructio
2
1
3
n
(33.33) (16.67)
(50.00)
7. Hotels
2
3
4
8
(11.76)
(17.65)
(23.53)
(47.06)
8. Restaurants/
2
1
3
Catering
(33.33)
(16.67)
(50.00)
9. Repair
4
Shops
(100.00)
10. Other Sector
3
1
1
7
(e.g gas)
(25.00)
(8.33)
(8.33)
(58.33)
Total as % of 341
32
14
14
17
85
(9.38)
(4.11)
(4.11)
(4.99)
(24.93)

Table 3.43: Financing as Constraint to Firm Growth
SMEs Identifying a Factor as a Constraint
(% in parentheses)
Major
Moderate Minor
Never
Total Sample
Formal
70
196
43
27
336
Finance
(20.83.)
(58.33) (12.80)
(8.04)
(98.53)
Microfinance
39
145
75
73
332
(11.75)
(43.67) (22.59)
(21.99)
(97.36)
Informal
50
144
88
50
332
Finance
(15.06)
(43.37) (26.51)
(15.06)
(97.36)
Source of
Credit
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Table 3.44: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender
Source of
Number Identifying a Factor as % Identifying a Factor
Credit
a Constraint
as a Constraint
Male
Female
Total
Male Female Total
Formal
98.61 97.65
Finance
191
142
333 98.96
Microfinance
97.92 96.48
188
141
329 97.41
Informal
97.22 96.48
Finance
189
140
329 97.93

Table 3.45: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size
Source of Firm Identifying a Credit Source as a Major Constraint
Credit
(% in parenthesis)
Small
Medium
Large
Microenterprise Enterprise
Enterprise
Enterprise
Formal
158
121
44
13
Finance
(97.53)
(100)
(100)
(100)
Microfin
ance
158
119
42
12
(97.53)
(98.35)
(95.54)
(92.31)
Informal
157
121
42
13
Finance
(96.91)
(100)
(95.54)
(100)
Missing = 4

Table 3.46: Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers
Type of Borrowers
Number
% of Total Sample
Successful borrowers
34.13
114
Denied Borrowers
17.07
57
Discouraged Borrowers
23.05
77
Non-borrowers
25.75
86
Total
100.00
334
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Table 3.47: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Firm Performance by Size
Number Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint
(% in bracket of each size)
Firm Size
1-4
5-19
20-99
≥ 100

Total(%
out of 341)

Major
28
(17.72)
25
(21.19)
7
(15.91)
1
(7.69)
61
(17.89)

Moderate Minor
Never
92
25
13
(58.23)
(15.82)
(8.23)
65
19
9
(55.08)
(16.10)
(7.63)
18
15
4
(40.91)
(34.09)
(9.09)
5
6
1
(38.46)
(46.15)
(7.69)
180
65
27
(52.79)
(19.06)
(7.92)

Table 3.48: Lack of access to Market as a Constraint on Firm Performance by
Gender
Male
Female
Category
(% in bracket) (% in bracket)
36
25
Major
(18.65)
(17.36)
103
76
Moderate
(53.37)
(53.47)
32
31
Minor
(16.58)
(21.53)
17
9
Never
(8.81)
(6.25)
5
2
Non-respondents
(0.25)
(1.39)
Total
193
144
(as % of 337 SMEs )
(57.27)
(42.73)
Missing = 4
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Table 3.49: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint on Performance by Sector
Category
Major
Moderate Minor
Never
1. Retail
23
45
11
7
(26.74)
(52.33) (12.79)
(8.14)
2. Business Service
13
28
17
4
(20.97)
(45.16) (27.42)
(6.45)
3. Manufacturing
3
19
6
3
(9.68)
(61.29) (19.35)
(9.68)
4. Wholesale
3
22
8
2
(8.57)
(62.86) (22.86)
(5.71)
5. Agribusiness
4
17
7
(14.29)
(60.71) (25.00)
6. Construction
3
9
2
1
(20.00)
(60.00) (13.33)
(6.67)
7. Hotels
5
14
4
3
(19.23)
(53.85) (15.38)
(11.54)
8. Restaurants/Cate
5
7
4
3
ring
(26.32)
(36.84) (21.05)
(15.79)
9. Repair Shops
7
1
2
(70.00) (10.00)
(20.00)
10. Other Sector (e.g
2
12
5
2
gas)
(9.52)
(57.14) (23.81)
(9.52)
Total (As % of all 341
61
180
65
27
firms)
(17.89)
(52.79) (19.06)
(7.92)
Missing = 8
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Table 3.50: Summary Statistics for Selected Variables
Variable Name
Mean Median St.
Max
Min Observations
/Description
dev.
Time to Start SME
0.66
0.33
0.68
4 0.08
337
Years of business
Operations
4.36
3
4.48
54 0.08
340
Current Number of
Employees
15.76
5
33.73
333
1
340
Employment History
15.66
5
33.92
333
1
336
Revenue in 2012 (‘000
$)
282
64
1,103
14,000 0.08
0.318
Years of Schooling of
the Firm Head
14.47
15
5.05
27
0
336
Average Distance from
Nairobi in Miles
1.64
0
7.69
40
0
341
Number of Employees in
year when firm received
loan
14.01
4
32.11
333
1
337
Revenue in year when
loan was received (‘000
$)
279.2
64.0 1,089.2 14,000.0 0.12
0.32
Loan received in the
latest year
15.0
88.4 1,167.1
0
0.33

Table 3.51: Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received
Employment
Revenue
Loan Amount
Employment
1
Revenue
0.40
1
Loan Amount
0.08
0.11
1
N = 341
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Table 3.52: Definitions of Variables in Tables 3.53 - 3.58
Variable
Explanation
approved
A dummy for whether a loan is received
Employment
Current number of employees; a proxy for firm size
Distance
Distance from Nairobi in miles
Foreign
A dummy for a foreign owned firm; SME nationality
Retail Sector
A dummy for retail firm; proxy for sectoral bias test
Wholesale Sector
A dummy for whether a firm is a wholesale
Business Conferences
Whether a firm participates in business networks to gain
skills for running the business
Manufacturing
Whether a firms is a manufacturing
Agribusiness
Whether a firm is classified as agribusiness
Construction
Whether a firm is a construction company
Hotels
Whether a firm is considered a service sector specializing in
lodging
Restaurant
Whether a firm specializes in food or catering service
Repair shops
Whether a firm deals in repair or maintenance business
Gender
A dummy for gender. Female = 1 ; male = 0
Ethnicity
Whether a firm is owned by an ethnic group Kikuyu
Education
Years of school of the head of the firm owner
Technology Constraint
Whether firm considers implementation of new technology
as a constraint on firm growth
Collateral Requirement
Whether a firm considers collateral requirement as an
obstacle to growth or not
Bureaucratic Constraint
Whether firm cites bureaucratic hurdles as obstacle to
growth
Poor Judicial System
Whether SME cites poor Judicial system as harming them
Business Service
Whether a firm is a business service such as haircuts,
printing shops, photocopying or not
Interest Rate Constraint
Does the firm consider interest as a constraint on growth?
Years in Business
Years business has been in operation
Launch Time
Times to start a company
Poor Infrastructure
If the firm considers poor infrastructure as obstacle
Market Access
A dummy indicating whether a firm considers lack of
access to market as a constraint to growth or performance
ICT Use/Telephone
If the firm uses mobile phone for communications
Study Visits
If the firm participates in study visits to other firms or
conferences to learn how to run own business
Own Website
A dummy indicating whether a firm owns a website
Business Training
If the firm has participated in skill training offered by
business association, government or NGOs
Theft insurance
Whether a firm has a theft insurance/protection against theft
Source: Author’s Compilation
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Table 3.53: Probit Estimates of Loan Approval
Base
Full
Parsimonious
Equation
Specification Model
Gender
0.008
0.109
(0.146)
(0.153)
Employment
0.006*
0.001
(0.003)
(0.004)
School
- 0.020
- 0.042**
- 0.33**
(0.015)
(0.018)
(0.015)
Owning Website
0.671***
0.747***
(0.255)
(0.239)
Business Networking
0.488***
0.503***
(0.164)
(0.157)
Years in Business
0.016
(0.024)
Ethnicity
0.204
(0.180)
Retail
-0.238
(0.327)
Wholesale
-0.187
(0.375)
Business Service
0.088
(0.345)
Manufacturing
0.145
(0.401)
Agribusiness
- 0.178
(0.380)
Construction
0.301
(0.481)
Hotels
- 0.380
(0.402)
Restaurants
0.271
(0.408)
Repair Shops
0.163
(0.528)
Constant
-0.205
- 0.187
- 0.206
(0.230)
(0.377)
(0.222)
Prob>chi2
0.316
0.008
0.000
Wald chi2
3.38
32.84
23.85
No. Observations
328
321
325
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for loan approval (= 1 if approved, 0
otherwise); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.54: Probit Estimates of Access to Formal Financing
Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model
Gender
-0.005
-0.022
(0.156)
(0.160)
Employment
-0.005*
-0.010*
- 0.004*
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
School
0.012
0.021
(0.017)
(0.018)
Ethnicity
0.327
0.266
(0.204)
(0.212)
Years in
0.032
Business
(0.022)
Owning A
0.218
website
(0.290)
Business
- 0.371**
- 0.279**
Networking
(0.171)
(0.163)
Retail
0.052
(0.338)
Wholesale
0.345
(0.405)
Business
0.427
0.348*
Service
(0.374)
(0.212)
Manufacturing
- 0.024
(0.414)
Agribusiness
0.155
(0.388)
Construction
0.438
(0.581)
Hotels
0.319
(0.427)
Restaurants
- 0.396
- 0. 664**
(0.419)
(0.300)
Repair Shops
- 0.189
(0.512)
Constant
0.633**
0.393
0.943
(0.261)
(0.372)
(0.113)
Prob>chi2
0.304
0.283
0.003
Wald chi2
4.84
18.73
15.94
Observations
331
325
335
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers
access to formal finance as major and moderate, 0 if they consider it minor or never an
obstacle); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively and while
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.55: Probit Estimates of Access to Informal Financing
Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model
Gender
0.005
0.008
(0.141)
(0.147)
Employment -0.010**
-0.007**
- 0.007**
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)
School
- 0.001
- 0.010
(0.015)
(0.017)
Ethnicity
- 0.138
(0.176)
Years in
0.007
Business
(0.021)
Owning A
- 0.206
website
(0.253)
Business
- 0.249
- 0.262*
Networking
(0.160)
(0.149)
Retail
0.216
(0.316)
Wholesale
0.004
(0.370)
Business
0.423
Service
(0.337)
Manufacturin
0.468
g
(0.383)
Agribusiness
0.189
(0.369)
Construction
1.103**
0.680*
(0.497)
(0.371)
Hotels
0.212
(0.385)
Restaurants
0.613
(0.391)
Repair Shops
0.974*
(0.551)
Constant
0.303
0.238
0.359***
(0.225)
(0.364)
(0.093)
Prob>chi2
0.116
0.272
0.004
Wald chi2
5.92
18.94
13.14
No.
333
325
335
Observations
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor
or never an obstacle); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively,
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.56: Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints
Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious
Model
Gender
0.024
0.075
(0.153)
(0.161)
Employment 0.008**
0.007*
0.006*
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)
School
- 0.030**
- 0.054***
- 0.030**
(0.015)
(0.019)
(0.015)
Ethnicity
- 0.155
(0.199)
Years in
- 0.013
Business
(0.023)
Owning
- 0.530
Telephone
(0.366)
Business
0.129
Networking
(0.173)
Retail
0.022
(0.331)
Wholesale
0.941**
0.538**
(0.430)
(0.279)
Business
0.596*
0.397*
Service
(0.363)
(0.204)
Manufacturin
0.556
g
(0.417)
Agribusiness
0.396
(0.399)
Construction
0.594
(0.500)
Hotels
0.055
(0.396)
Restaurants
0.661
(0.459)
Repair Shops
- 0.050
(0.527)
Constant
1.007***
1.503***
0.359***
(0.234)
(0.493)
(0.093)
Prob>chi2
0.062
0.042
0.038
Wald chi2
7.35
26.93
10.14
Observations 333
325
336
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor
or never an obstacle); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively,
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.57: Probit Estimates of Loan Applications
Base Equation Full Specification Parsimonious Model
Gender
- 0.040
0.009
(0.140)
(0.149)
Employment
0.002
-0.004
(0.003)
(0.004)
School
- 0.003
- 0.025
(0.014)
(0.017)
Ethnicity
0.093
(0.178)
Years in Business
0.025
(0.022)
Owning Website
0.826***
0.631***
(0.255)
(0.225)
Business
0.332**
Networking
(0.162)
Retail
- 0.169
(0.314)
Wholesale
0.742**
0.553**
(0.368)
(0.235)
Business Service
0.307
(0.335)
Manufacturing
0.430
(0.382)
Agribusiness
0.629
0.450*
(0.388)
(0.253)
Construction
0.302
(0.490)
Hotels
- 0.097
(0.383)
Restaurants
0.525
(0.405)
Repair Shops
0.050
(0.527)
Constant
0.044
- 0.118
- 0. 137*
(0.217)
(0.357)
(0.081)
Prob>chi2
0.873
0.002
0.001
Wald chi2
0.70
37.36
15.81
No. Observations
332
324
334
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit application (= 1 if firm applies, 0
otherwise); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.58: Robustness Test for Loan Application and Approvals
Probit Model with Sample Selection
Outcome Equation: Loan Approval Base Equation 1 Model 2
Gender
0.135
0.170
(0.164) (0.195)
Employment
0.010
0.015*
(0.007)
(0.009)
Education
-0.016
-0.022
(0.022)
(0.023)
Years in Business
0.043*
0.041
(0.026)
(0.030)
Ethnicity
0.210
(0.235)
Business Services
0.295
(0.276)
Retail
0.450
(0.307)
Constant
-0.422 -0.394
(0.448) (0.500)
Probability Chi2
0.386
0.496
Wald Chi2
4.15
6.38
No Observations
329
328
Selection Equation: Loan Application
Education
-0.001
-0.001
(0.014)
(0.014)
Owning Mobile phone
-0.334
-0.386
(0.0262)
(0.264)
Wholesale
0.545**
0.508**
(0.210)
(0.229)
Business Networking
-0.256
0.194
(0.273)
(0.293)
Constant
0.341
0.291 (0.333)
(0.329)
/athrho
1.104
0.664
(0.834) (0.635)
Prob>chi2
0.186
0.296
Chi2(1)
1.75
1.09
Note: Loan approval and loan applications are outcome equation and loan application are
selection equation, respectively; also, ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively, and standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 4
LACK OF ACCESS TO FINANCE BY SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISE AS A CONSTRAINT TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN
4.1

Introduction

South Sudan attained independence in 2011 with weak economic and financial sector
development indicators (SSCCSE, 2010; Natsio & Abramovitz, 2011; BricénoGarmendia & Ranganath, 2011). Sudan and pre-independent Southern Sudan were locked
in conflicts over resource allocation, political autonomy, and governance issues,
including the tug-of-war between the center versus periphery (Deng, 1990; Nyaba, 1998;
Young, 2003; Akol, 2007; de Waal, 2007; SSDP, 2011; Hale, 2012; D'Agoôt, 2013) and
the role of religion in the public sphere (Ylönen, 2005; Natsio & Abramovitz, 2011;
Collins, 1976). The impact of those longstanding conflicts remains partly responsible for
the present-day South Sudan dismal development outcomes.

Preoccupation with the civil wars meant that economic development and access to
finance for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) were never central issues in the
political economy of Sudan and pre-independent South Sudan. For more than 50 years,
South Sudan has preoccupied itself with issues of liberation at the expense of
development. While Kenya and Uganda, for instance, have literacy rates of 87.4% and
66.8% respectively, South Sudan has a literacy rate of 27% (SSCCSE, 2010; Central
Intelligence Agency, 2013). Saying that South Sudan is a “poor performer” is not a
hyperbole, with 51% of the population below the poverty line. In addition, 83% of the
population is rural (5th Population and Housing Census, 2008), only 55% has access to
clean drinking water, and only 1% of the households have bank accounts (NBHS, 2009).
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A World Bank report on Doing Business in Juba, which compares 183 economies of the
world, highlights a number of issues that affect private sector development in South
Sudan (World Bank, 2011). It mentions a few factors that constrain access to finance.
According the report, only about 10% of total loans provided by South Sudan banking
sector go to SMEs (SSDP, 2011).

The report adds that: “On the ease of protecting investors, getting credit and closing
down business, Juba would rank 173rd, 176th and 183rd” (p. 8). The last rating is
disquieting since the existing literature tells us that higher exit costs correspond with
larger informal economies (Ayyagari, Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2007).

On a scale 0 to 6, Juba scores zero when it comes to credit information depth, because it
does not have a public registry or credit bureaus (World Bank, 2011). As of today, there
are still no credit bureaus or public registries that play a role in sharing such information
on the borrowers and between lenders. Regarding cross- border trade, Juba ranks 181st,
just above Central Africa (182nd) and Afghanistan (183rd). This reflects being landlocked and the fact that goods have to travel from the port of Mombasa in Kenya through
Uganda (Bricéno-Garmendia & Ranganath, 2011).

Although Juba ranks ahead of Kenya and Uganda when it comes to enforcing contracts
and paying taxes as well as starting a business (World Bank, 2011), institutional
persistence (that institutions persist and that much of the cross country differences in
economic performance could be explained by “impacts of institutions on economic
development”; see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001)
and lack of trust in disjointed systems (old Sudan laws vs. New Sudan laws) mean that
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few people in South Sudan trust the country’s legal system. This is why fewer people
look to courts as a way to resolve disputes in South Sudan because they think that no one
would care. Such a path-dependent predates the independence of South Sudan.

There is both empirical and theoretical evidence in the literature regarding institution
persistence. Poor legal system according to Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic (2005)
tends to constrain firm growth. As to the persistence of institutions, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) cite a clear example of Southern United States. According to this
hypothesis, South was relatively poor in the antebellum period and after the war, nothing
much changed because low wage, low education level, labor intensive production and
repressive economy like before the war still characterize southern economy (Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2006). In other words, abolition of slavery and following enfranchisement had
no major impact on economic institutions in Southern United States, hence the argument
for persistence of institutions.

Since fewer cases pass through the courts for adjudication, the main reason for faster
enforcement mechanisms may be short court caseloads. Similarly, many firms in Juba
remain informal and avoid paying taxes altogether, so that tax collectors concentrate on
the few registered firms. This partly explains the dominant role of the oil sector which
account for 98 percent of government budget before the shutdown (SSDP, 2011).

This study is unique in that to the best of my knowledge, it is the first such study on this
subject in South Sudan. Various reports done by South Sudan National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) have looked at private sector development but they have not focused on
the question of access to finance and goals of financial inclusion. The World Bank report
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on Doing Business in Juba 2011 analyzes nine specific private sector development
indicators, and the question of access to finance was not one of them. Other studies that
do focus on access to finance do not analyze the context in South Sudan (for example,
Demirguc-Kunt, & Klapper, 2012; Asiedu, Freeman & Nti-Addae, 2012; Sacerdoti,
2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005, 2006, 2008).

This essay analyses SME characteristics with a view to understanding how SME access
to finance could play a role in economic development. The data for this essay comes from
7-month field survey in South Sudan conducted between July 2011 and February 2012.
This research was conducted in three of the ten states in South Sudan. The three states
include Central Equatoria, Western Bahr el Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Five
cities— Juba, Yei, Wau, Aweil and Mayom Angok— were covered in those states when
administering the questionnaire and interviewing relevant SME respondents. The SME
sample size is 334.

Since this study was before independence, the number of commercial banks in South
Sudan was small. All eight commercial banks that were operational at the time provided
data on the banking sector for the study. The number of commercial banks has increased
since then to reach 20 by the end of 2011 and 25 by 3 July 2013 (Bank of South Sudan,
2013). The same is true for number of foreign exchange bureaus which stands at 80 as of
23 July 2013 .This essay does not only ask SMEs what constraints they face, but also digs
deeper by speaking to financial sector players, asking what they are doing to expand the
financial access frontier and what is holding them back. The aim is to hear both sides of
the argument to formulate a diagnosis.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides the context of South Sudan’s
political economy. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 give an overview of the banking and SME sectors
in Post-independence South Sudan, respectively while 4.4 analyses survey results of the
banking sector and SMEs in South Sudan. Section 4.5 presents an econometric analysis
of SME access to credit. Section 4.6 draws lessons from the econometric results, and
section 4.7 concludes the essay.

4.1.1

Pre-independence South Sudan’s Banking Sector, 2005-2011

Banks have a central role in financial sector development. They intermediate fund
between savers and borrowers. In pre-independent South Sudan, small scale and
informality of banks, political interference/poor governance of banks, and unpredictable
shocks to banks, made intermediation difficult. Poor infrastructure and communications
made matters worse (World Bank, 2011; Bricéno-Garmenndia, & Ranganath, 2011).

Before independence, the dual banking system in Sudan comprised Islamic banking in
the north and the traditional banking system in the South. This arrangement was referred
to as ‘two systems, one country.’ But after the July 9, 2011, South Sudan adopted a
traditional banking system. During the interim period, from 2005 through 2011, a few of
Khartoum-based banks opened up throughout the ten states in South Sudan, but mostly in
Juba. Nonetheless, Kenya Commercial Bank was the largest of all banks with head office
in Juba and branches in Rumbek, Yei, and Bentiu.

Foreign bank presence is a post-independence phenomenon in South Sudan and this is
welcome news. Studies show that foreign banks bring capital, technology, expertise in
banking, and independence from political elites (Beck, & Honohan, 2007; World Bank,

153

2008; see Chapter 3). Foreign banks are relatively large, however, and they generally
stick to financing of high-income persons and large enterprises. They can have a positive
side too, by forcing local banks to focus on lower- income groups, including SMEs.

4.1.2

Microfinance and Informal Finance in South Sudan

Microfinance institutions still depend on financial support from donors. Unlike the
neighboring countries such as Uganda with about 18 MFIs or Ethiopia with 27, South
Sudan microfinance sector came into being after the signing of the CPA in 2005. The
number of MFIs is now growing and it has a huge potential to grow if conditions prove
supportive. At the moment, MFIs depend on external technical and financial support from
bodies such as USAID, UNDP, and UNCDF, among others.

South Sudan has a thin financial sector. At the end of 2010, South Sudan had only eight
microfinance institutions, five insurance companies and eight commercial banks, three of
which are foreign-owned.

There is a growing recognition in the economics discipline of importance of the financial
sector for expanding access to finance for all, with far-reaching implications for poverty
reduction (Andrianaivo & Kpodar, 2010; Singh & Tandon, 2012). A financial system
geared solely toward money-making schemes may drag the whole economy into chaos,
due to lax supervision and a culture of excessive financial deregulation, as demonstrated
by the recent world financial and economic crisis.

To assess the financial sector development needs in South Sudan, an environment where
no relevant data exist, I found survey methods appropriate. Examples of data I collected
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include SME employment, sales, amount of credit owed to the banks, obstacles to
obtaining finance, terms of loans, location of banks, regional distribution of lending, and
extent of mobile phone use in financial services, among others.

Additionally, use has been made of the 2009 Republic of Sudan National Poverty Survey
Questionnaire, the 2010 Business Survey, and 5th Population and Housing Census 2008
which provide some data on household access to finance. Through interviews, I also
investigated how businessmen get finance, what sort of formulae are used for loanmaking, the extent of funding gaps, and the presence of credit-rationing.

4.1.3 Difficulties in Measuring Financial Access
One difficult thing about measuring financial access is to differentiate between access to
and use of financial services (CGAP, 2009). The amount of loans, from and to whom,
does not tell us who chooses not to borrow or who was denied. For these reasons, we
should not take observed demand for credit as equal to need for credit (Meyer & Zeller,
2002). The findings from the World Bank Investment Climate Assessment Survey
(whose calculations were based on surveys from Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal and
Uganda) for Africa are telling. African enterprises cite lack of access to finance as the
most serious handicap to their growth (Nkurunziza, 2008). Another study finds that
“more African entrepreneurs report that access to and cost of finance is the major
constraint on the operations and growth of the firms than do entrepreneurs in other
regions” (Beck & Honohan, 2007, p. 62).

The finance constrained category includes firms that applied for loans and were rejected,
and firms that did not apply at all because they do not have sufficient collateral, find
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application process too exacting, regard the interest rates too high, or fear rejection (Beck
& Honohan, 2007). This could explain a paradox of excess liquidity in the banks and
limited investable funds in the economy. SMEs are sometimes called the ‘missing link’ in
access to finance. Large firms can access formal finance, while micro-firms and poor
households can turn to MFIs. SMEs fall in between: they may be too big to qualify for
microfinance loans, and too small to qualify for formal bank loans.

4.2

Banking Sector in Post-independence South Sudan

South Sudan’s banking sector is at an early stage of development. The financial service
providers are commercial banks, insurance companies and microfinance institutions.
There are no securities markets to talk of, nor are there public registries or credit bureaus
(World Bank, 2011). South Sudan’s banking sector is poised to grow quickly, however 25.
With 20 commercial banks, South Sudan ranks third out of six countries in the region by
this measure, and first in the number of banks relative to population.

While South Sudan’s financial sector development is at its early phase, there is a positive
prospect as evidence by entry of regional banks. This new frontier could prove potentially
a growing market. There is free entry (and exit possibly despite lower ranking according
to Doing Business in Juba 2011) from regional financial markets, as evident with Kenyan
and Ethiopian commercial banks. While the financial sector is still very thin, the fact that
foreign banks have opened up branches in South Sudan shows that they are a financing

25

All the same, the ongoing crisis in South Sudan, which starts on 15 December 2013,
presents significant uncertainty over the future financial sector development if it last
long.
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potential for SMEs which could be the engine of growth across the board. A higher
number of banks per population can be a positive thing by increasing competition for
resource deposit mobilization, and savings, and by bringing down lending rates to
competitive levels.

4.3

SME Sector in Post-independence South Sudan

An analysis of the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2010 Business
Survey provides a broad picture into South Sudan SME Sector. Of the 7333 businesses
surveyed by South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2010), 6,587 of the
businesses fall under the category “Microenterprises.” Of the remainder, 662 falls under
Small enterprises; 78 under medium and only 6 are considered larger enterprises (equally
to or greater than 100 employees). In terms of percentages the distributions are 89.83%,
9.03%, 1.06% and 0.08%. Hence, according to this survey, over 99% of the firms in
South Sudan fall under the SME.

Furthermore, of the ten states, Central Equatoria has the largest number of the businesses
surveyed. About 37% of the sample comprised firms located in Central Equatoria State.
Again, of the six largest firms, four of them come from Central Equatoria State. It is
logical to conclude that about 70% of the larger firms are located in Central Equatoria,
mostly in Juba were the center of the government is located. While 84% of the firms were
listed as restaurants or shops, Juba had 2,683 enterprises out of total 7333 firms surveyed
(NBS, 2010).

In addition, all 7333 firms had combined number of employees totaling to 22,193. It is
not surprising that about 10,546 or 48% of all employees from these businesses come
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from Central Equatoria. This is because majority of firms come from Juba and they also
happen to be largest firms compared to ones we find in other surveyed cities. Not only do
more firms operate in Central Equatoria but also those enterprises create more
employment opportunities than in any other states.

About14% (1,029) of the business operating in South Sudan was created between 1923
and 2004. The remaining 86% (6,304) of the firms were established between 2005 and
2010. In other words, more businesses in South Sudan came into being after the CPA. We
now turn to the analysis of the detailed survey undertaken for this study.

4.4

Analysis of the Survey Results

The data on SMEs and commercial banks for this essay come from fieldwork conducted
in three of the ten states in South Sudan between July 2011 and February 2012. Survey
questionnaires and interviews were used to obtain the data from individual SMEs, as well
as from commercial banks, and selected institutions, such as the Central Bank of South
Sudan, Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Investment and the Ministry of
Commerce, Investment and Industry.

Juba, Wau and Aweil, which are the capitals of Central Equatorial, Western Bahr el
Ghazal and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states, respectively, were chosen as sites for
investigation. Based on ease of mobility or proximity, two more cities (Yei and Mayom
Angok) were added. Within these locations, every business or firm in the city selected
stood an equal chance of being sampled, because each street was identified and every kth
element was sampled (kth refers to a systematic sampling in which every other element is
included in the sample through random walk- skip method).
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4.4.1

Survey of South Sudan Commercial Banks

While there are currently 25 commercial banks operating in South Sudan, this analysis
focuses only on eight banks present at the time of this research. I set up interviews and
administered questionnaires to all eight banks operating in South Sudan in July 2011
through February 2012. I have also supplemented this with data from other sources such
as the central bank.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the commercial banks operating in South Sudan in
2011. At the time of this survey, all lent less than 50% of their deposits as loans. Kenya
Commercial Bank (KCB) leads the pack in terms of both branches and total employment.
Altogether, foreign banks (KCB, Equity, and CBE) have more employees than the local
banks (Agriculture Bank, Buffalo, Ivory, MTDB and Nile Commercial Bank).

We theorize that more South Sudanese will open up bank accounts as they earn incomes
from jobs following peace. Even with little individual deposits, oil transfers to the state
coffers have been significant source of bank deposits until the shutdown in January 2012.

To assess how banks are working to promote financial inclusion, the survey asked all
eight banks to record their account holders in two successive months: July and August
2011. As Table 4.2 shows, the number of bank accounts was growing rapidly at this time.
Notwithstanding this growth, the fact remains that the bankable population in South
Sudan is still insignificant. As this survey shows, those holding accounts as of August
2011 are approximately 2% of the country’s population. Compared to her neighbors,
South Sudan has fewer adult populations with bank accounts at formal financial
institutions.

159

Table 4.3 reports data on the extent of bank lending to SMEs and other borrowers in
South Sudan. At the time of assessment, five out of the eight banks issued loans. The
other three indicated that they were not lending yet as business environment was
uncertain due to impending referendum and lack of acceptable collateral and property
rights laws. There is a wide range in the size of loans approved from a minimum of
$3,704 to a maximum of $1,851,852.

The survey asked banks to rate what they consider the major barrier to extending credit to
SMEs. The barriers listed included lack of collateral, lack of profitability, limited
information, illiteracy, and distance from the bank premises. When banks were asked to
state one obstacle that they thought was hindering them to extend credit to all, all eight
banks chose lack of collateral.

Table 4.4 reports data on how much banks lent over the years and the number of loans to
SMEs. We find here that Agriculture Bank of Sudan had issued more loans to qualified
farmers and small-scale producers. Ivory Bank had made the least loans, while Equity
Bank is second to Agriculture Bank of Sudan in terms of number of customers served so
far.

Table 4.5 presents information on how four banks described their lending to SMEs. That
the remaining four banks were silent or muted about lending to SMEs underscores the
limited access to finance in the new nation.

Table 4.6 lists responses when the banks were asked to rate borrower characteristics from
major to never an obstacle. All banks considered the characteristics of the owners and
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collateral as important when lending to SMEs. Only three banks considered any of the
five-Cs—(1) characters of the firm owners, (2) capacity of the firm, (3) collateral
requirement, (4) firm initial capital, and finally (5) macroeconomic conditions not to be a
problem.

Table 4.7 shows the customized products that each bank provided, and the names of
development institutions partnering with them to pool resources and lend to SMEs. Banks
also described what they considered to be role of mobile technology, steps taken to
improve customer services, and steps they deemed necessary to expand the access
frontier. For example, Agriculture Bank of Sudan lends to small producers and small
farmers. It partners with NGOs, EU, IFEAD, IDA and World Bank as a way of securing
loans to small-scale famers.

The Agricultural Bank of Sudan made the case that mobile technology reduces
administration costs and provides real -time information to customers on loan rates,
payments, and other exchanges. A number of banks see application of IT as a means to
improve services and flexibility in collateral requirements as innovations to expand
access to borrowers.

To find out whether SMEs have a higher default rate compared to larger borrowers, the
survey asked each bank to give time series data on non-performing loans to SMEs and
large business. Table 4.8 presents that information for each bank. Of all the banks that
have responded, Agriculture Bank of Sudan gives the highest default rate (see for
example, the default rate was 41% in 2008). But in asking what the banks would like the
government or Central Bank of South Sudan to do to encourage them lend to SMEs, they
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stated that they would like the government to do more in providing a conducive policy
environment. Lack of legal framework affecting transactions and multiple taxations also
comes up frequently in the interviews (see Table 4.9).

At the time of independence, South Sudan had eight microfinance institutions with
women as the majority borrowers. An overview of their operations is reported in Table
4.10. SUMI has the largest client base and Frontier Finance has the smallest share.

To put everything in context, only 2% of South Sudan population holds accounts at
formal financial institutions (we hope that growth of banking sector will improve this
situation; see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). This pales in comparison to African average figures.
While only 24% all adults in Sub-Sahara Africa have bank accounts, adult population
with accounts at formal financial institutions in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Sudan
stand at 42%, 20%, 17% and 7% respectively (Word Bank, 2012; see Table 1.2).

Also these results on the banking sector shows one common phenomenon nowadays that
is commercial banks are partnering with international financial institutions to pool
resources to lend to SMEs. As an illustration, the World Bank has an active policy in
supporting SMEs across the globe. For instance, it approved $2.8 billion in 2004 and
provided $10 billion to promote SME sector between 2000 and 2005 (Ayyagari, Beck &
Demirguc-Kunt, 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005).

4.4.2

Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

This section provides a descriptive overview of the South Sudan SME data. In total, 334
SME firms were surveyed. As shown in Table 4.13, 72.5% of the sample comes from
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Central Equatoria State where capital, Juba, is situated. Two reasons accounted for the
high representation of this one state. First, Juba is the headquarters of the government and
as a previous Business Listing Survey 2010 indicates, many registered businesses operate
there.

Second, the concentration in Juba was in part due to logistics and difficulties of mobility
across ten states. The remainder of the sample comes from the states of Northern and
Western Bahr el Ghazal, accounting for 23% and 4.5%, respectively.

Table 4.14 provides a breakdown in terms of cities. Juba, Aweil and Wau are the capital
cities of their states, namely Central Equatoria, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal,
respectively. Two additional cities included in the sample, Yei and Mayom Angok, come
from Central Equatoria and Northern Bahr el Ghazal States, respectively.

As reported in Table 4.15, men make up over 80% of firm owners in the sample. With the
legacy of war and unyielding traditional values which still consider formal business a
male domain, it is not surprising that less than 20% of the population engaging in
commercial enterprises is female. Women in South Sudan remain concentrated in
subsistence agriculture and unpaid household production and are largely “missing” in the
markets. Overall, 1.5% of the sample declined to respond to the gender question.

Turning to the ethnicity and nationality of the firm owners, Table 4.16 shows that about
30% of the firms in South Sudan are owned by foreigners. This validates the long-held
public view that Kenyans, Ugandans, Ethiopians, and other Africans have flocked to Juba
to exploit business opportunities. Included in this category “foreigners” are Sudanese
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from the North, whether they are from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, Southern Kordofan
or Khartoum.

In collecting these data, I came to the conclusion that South Sudan’s government has
been friendly to countries and neighbors that gave a helping hand during the dark days of
the liberation struggle. In addition, the public was and remains tolerant toward foreign
businesses.
While the Dinka ethnic group is about 20% of the South Sudan population (5th Sudan
Population and Housing Census, 2008), they represent 33.2% of the sample. The main
investigator and four assistants were all Dinka; hence Dinka respondents may have been
oversampled or language barriers over English or Juba Arabic. About 9% of the
respondents declined to indicate their ethnic identity, reflecting the fact that some people
in social settings are uncomfortable disclosing this for fear of the unknown (unexpected
reprisal following disclosing certain personal information).

Table 4.17 reports the legal status of firms in the sample. Over 70% considered
themselves sole proprietors. Most SMEs in South Sudan are family or individual owned,
hence the prevalence of sole proprietorship. Next in prevalence, 13.2% are private limited
companies and 9.6% are partnerships. Some of these latter ones are business partnerships
between South Sudanese partners and foreign nationals, an arrangement which is
prevalent in fuel stations.

Table 4.18 reports firm size by current employment. The picture is consistent with the
finding in Table 4.17 that most SMEs in South Sudan are sole proprietorships. About
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70% of SMEs fall in the “microenterprise” category defined as a firm whose size ranges
between one and four employees (small, medium and large enterprises are defined
analogously, see Table 4.18). About 26% of the sampled SMEs are small enterprises, 4%
are medium enterprises and only one is a large enterprise (this was a bottling water
company). Assuming that this sample is reasonably representative of the population, it
follows then almost all firms in South Sudan are SMEs. An examination of Table 4.19
which reports firm size by gender of the owner shows no notable difference in this
respect between male-owned and female-owned firms.

Medium and large enterprises are located exclusively in Juba in Central Equatoria State,
as shown in Table 4.20. Microenterprises account for more than 85% of SMEs in
Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, whereas in Central Equatoria State they account
for 64%.

Table 4.21 shows the breakdown of the firms by sector. Retailing is the largest sector in
the sample. Business services (haircuts, salons, printing shops, etc), wholesalers, hotels
and restaurants are also sizable by accounting for 9.3%, 9%, 6.6% and, 6.9%,
respectively. While South Sudan had a comparative advantage in agriculture (abundant
water, and large arable lands), agriculture is not commercialized but mainly subsistence.
There was only one agribusiness firm in the sample.

Table 4.22 dissects the sample into sectors by gender of the firm owner. We find that
88.8% of all SMEs in retail are owned by men. Men dominate all other sectors except
restaurants, where 54.6% of SMEs are owned by women.
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Table 4.23 shows the sectoral distribution of firms by size. Microenterprises predominate
in the retail, business service, wholesale, restaurant and repair shop sectors. The hotel
sector has the largest share of medium enterprises.

4.4.3

SME Self-Appraisal on Technology and Managerial Competency

One of the objectives of this dissertation is to assess the role of technology in enabling
access to financial services. It is on this basis that the questionnaire asked firm owners to
indicate whether they frequently use ATM withdrawals, visits to the nearest bank branch,
or personal safekeeping for their routine cash needs. Because there are few ATMs in
Juba, many firms use banks. In our sample as reported in Table 4.24, about 7% of the
respondents use ATMs, whereas over 50% and 30% visit banks and keep cash in the shop
vaults, respectively (the remaining 10% of the sample did not respond). The banking
sector is still weakly developed with no known financial regulator like FDIC or consumer
watchdogs (see SSDP, 2011).

When asked whether the enterprise is doing well or not, 6.6% of all respondents think
that managerial incompetence and neglect to adopt technology were to blame for poor
performance, whereas 33% believe that they are doing well because of managerial
competency and technology (Table 4.25). Regrettably, more than half of the firms blame
an “unfavorable business environment” (such as multiple tax rates at point of entry,
irregular enforcement or confiscatory attitude among officials) as responsible for poor
performance (World Bank, 2011). Blaming outsiders for their woes has been established
as one typical bias when surveying firms because some firms exaggerate or underestimate
some obstacles (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2006).
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4.4.4

Credit Allocation

This survey confirms that financial access in South Sudan is limited. As Table 4.26
shows, only 46 SMEs— 13.8% of all firms in the sample—had ever applied for loans
from any source. Of these, roughly, 69.6% received loans while 30.4% did not; meaning
the odds of an SME applicant applying for a loan and being rejected are 30.4%.

Table 4.27 shows that about 68.8% of the loans received came from commercial banks
(see Chapter 3 for similar exposition). About 13% and 19%, respectively, came from
microfinance institutions and informal finance (money lenders and family members).
Based on the fieldwork observations, moneylenders are not really common in South
Sudan, at least as creditors for SMEs.

Of those who have received loans, 80% are men (Table 4.28). This is equivalent to 8.9%
of the SMEs that are headed by men. The women who received loans amount to only
10.3% of all women in the sample.

Turning to the sectoral distribution of the loans, retail business and hotels received more
than half the loans. We see that 7.5% of all firms in retail received loans, compared to
27.3% of firms in hotels (Table 4.29). Neither business service firms nor, rather
surprisingly, manufacturing firms had ever received a loan even though they have
applied.

As Table 4.30 shows, one-half of all approved loans were received by microenterprises,
43.8% went to small enterprise and medium enterprise category received 9.4%.
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Again, expressed as a percent of each size class totals, we see a different picture: 6.4%,
16.3% and 21.4% of the microenterprise, small enterprise and medium enterprises
received loans, respectively. This is not surprising because microenterprises are 70% of
the sample.

Table 4.31 presents all the firms that have never applied for loan. The table identifies a
category called “credit constrained” because they reported a desire for credit but have not
applied for one reason or another. This category accounted for 63% of the total number of
firms, of which 30% of the firms did not apply because they thought they would be
denied loans, 7% thought application process is too cumbersome, 20% feared not meeting
collateral requirements, and 5% considered interest rates too high. The other 37% of the
firms that did not apply were not credit constrained, reporting that they did not need a
loan.

Table 4.32 reports differences by gender. Similar percentages of men and women were
credit constrained. Table 4.33 takes a look at why firms did not apply for loans by sector.
In three sectors—business services, construction and restaurant— half or more of the
firms responded that they did not need loans. Among credit constrained firms, most did
not apply because they doubted approval in all sectors except retail, manufacturing and
repair shops, for which collateral requirements were reported as the main reasons.

Table 4.34 shows that 71.9% of all loans approved went to firms in Central Equatoria
state, the same state with the largest number of firms in the sample (see Table 4.1). The
percentage of SMEs receiving loans was highest in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, but this
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finding should be interpreted with caution due to the relatively small size of the sample
there.

Table 4.35 compares loans across states by lender. Of all loans in Central Equatoria,
78.3% come from commercial banks, 13% from microfinance institutions and 9% from
moneylenders and family members. Firms in Northern Bahr el Ghazal received smaller
percentage of loans from commercial banks. The survey asked the firms to rank how each
source of credit is a constraint on firm growth. As shown in Table 4.36, 35.9% rank lack
of access to formal finance as a major constraint; 29.3% rank lack of access to
microfinance as a major constraint, and 21.9% say the same thing for informal finance. In
this analysis, as typical of African economies (Nkurunziza, 2008; Chapter 3), SMEs thus
rank lack of access to formal finance as the most constraint.

Table 4.37 breaks down financing constrains by gender. It shows that 100% of all
women-owned firms consider lack of access to formal finance, microfinance and
informal finance as a constraint. For men, the figures for the same sources of credit are
82%, 82% and 83% respectively. The statistics in this table seem to imply that access to
credit is more binding barrier for women compared to men. Besides traditions, culture
and home-making/household production, it could be one reason why women are fewer in
businesses in the first place.

In terms of firm size, lack of access to finance tends to become perceived as a greater
constraint as size increases. This seems like an anomaly because as firm sizes increases,
theory predicts that firms turn to external source of financing (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, &

169

Levine, 2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005). Intuitively, large firm
exposure to external financing and fear for loan rejection could account for this anomaly.

Table 4.38 shows that 79.4%, 93% and 100% of microenterprises, small enterprises and
medium enterprises, respectively, cited lack of formal finance as a major or moderate
constraint, respectively. For microfinance and informal finance, the percentages were
more stable, meaning they remain constant.

Table 4.39 summarizes credit access by grouping the firms into four broad categories.
“Successful borrowers” are those that applied and received loans, while “denied” are
those that applied and were rejected. “Discouraged borrowers” are those who chose not to
apply for one reason or another, whereas non-borrowers are those who indicated no
desire for loans.

Table 4.40 summaries responses to whether the firm considers lack of access to market as
an additional constraint. Of the 280 firms that responded, the majority (64.3%) consider it
a major constraint, while only 5% consider it not an issue. This finding is not surprising
because much of South Sudan has no infrastructure and is cut off from main towns during
the rainy season. Lack of feeder roads and access to major commercial centres is a major
issue.

Table 4.41 dissects Table 4.40 into four categories by size. As firm size increases from
microenterprise to medium enterprise, the major weight put on access to market increases
from 50.2% to 71.4%. The one large firm, however, reported that it was not an issue.
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Again, this is consistent with the literature, in that, larger firms report lower financing
obstacles (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Laeven, 2006).

More than half male SME owners (55.7%) say lack of access to market is a major
constraint, compared to 44.8% of women owners, as shown in Table 4.42. It is said that
firms that use more external finance tend to report greater financing obstacles (Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2008). In this case, we can postulate that since firms
headed by men are likely to seek credit, they are more likely to express greater financing
obstacles.

Agribusiness, hotels and manufacturing are the top three sectors in terms of the
percentage that rank lack of access to market as a major constraint on firm performance,
as shown in Table 4.43.

4.4.5

Summary Statistics for Selected Variables

Table 4.44 presents summary statistics for other variables in the survey. On average, a
firm takes about one year to fully officially launch. The necessary paperwork, as well as
the savings process or raising seed capital to start a firm, takes time. Some firms have
spent three years preparing. The average firm has been in operation for three years, and
these were established following the 2005 CPA. Some firms have been in operation for
less than a year.

Since many firms in this survey are microenterprises, it is not surprising that the mean
firm size is five employees. The maximum is 100 employees (the same firm reported 120
employees in response to another question). The 2011 mean revenue of over $50,000 is
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quite high but this is because of some outliers. One firm, for instance, reported an annual
income of almost $4 million. Median firm income is $10,000. The minimum income is
$318, and this is consistent with poverty levels in the country. Some firms that won oil
contracts during the reconstruction era/interim period made very high annual income, and
these help to account for wide range.

The mean level of education for firm owners in the sample is quite high. The mean
sample level of education of the head of the enterprise is 11 years. The minimum level of
education is zero (never attended school) and the maximum (up to the university level)
numbers of years spent in school is 19 years. This is lower, however, than the average
education level of firm owner in Kenya (14.5 years; see Essay on Kenya, Chapter 3).

While most firms are in Juba, the average firm is 140 miles away from the capital. We
will test the hypothesis that the further away from Juba the firm is, the slimmer the
chance of getting access to credit.

Finally, among firms that had access to credit, the minimum loan received is $100 and
the maximum is $60,000.

Table 4.45 presents simple correlations among the firm’s employment, revenue and the
amounts of the loan received. Employment level and revenue are strongly correlated (r =
.85). The loan amount is weakly correlated with employment (r = .15) and uncorrelated
with revenue (r = .002). As far as we expect larger firms to receive bigger loans, this
suggests that employment may serve as a better proxy for size than revenue.
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4.5

Econometric Analysis of Access to Credit by SMEs

4.5.1

Econometric Model

This section endeavors to assess SME loan approval. We test a relationship between loan
approved and a range of factors, including gender, size, distance, and sector. Loan
approved is a dummy variable indicating whether or not credit was obtained; size is
measured by the number of employees in a firm; distance is measured in miles between
Juba and the SME city; and the sector is a dummy representing whether firm considers
itself a retail or not (dummy = 1 for retail, 0 otherwise).

In addition to these core factors, we have a number of control variables including, the
interest rate, length of schooling in years, and dummies for SME nationality (foreign
owner = 1, 0= South Sudanese), ethnicity, complaints about judicial system, and
bureaucratic constraints, ICT use, wholesale activity and access to market. The list of
variables with their definition is provided in Table 4.52.

We hypothesize that SMEs in or closer to Juba are more likely to get credit; hence
distance should have a negative impact on loan approved. If there is a gender bias,
women will experience credit discrimination. The firm size or employment is expected to
enhance credit approval, insofar as size of the firm acts as an indicator of profitability or
signal to lenders that loan repayment will not be an issue (Beck et al., 2006; Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2008). We do not expect any sectoral bias a priori but we
hypothesize that foreign firms may have an advantage because of perceived expertise,
credit history and name recognition to secure loan approval. On ethnicity, the impact
could be ambiguous. Being the dominant tribe, Dinka SME-owners could have
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preferential treatment in Juba in the banking sector. On the other hand, they are mostly in
rural South Sudan or away from Juba which means that they have no knowledge about
availability or unable to access credit. On account of distance, they have slimmer
probability of accessing loan approval.

The dependent variable, loan approved, and the list of independent variables elaborated
above feeds into a regression whose results help to answer the following questions:

(i)

Does access to credit vary with distance from Juba?

(ii)

Does access to credit differ between SMEs headed by men and by women?

(iii)

Does access to credit differ between foreign-owned and South Sudanese
owned SMEs?

(iv)

Among South Sudanese entrepreneurs of different ethnic backgrounds, does
access to credit differ?

The general estimator equation can be formulated as follows:
𝒚𝒊= 𝜒′ 𝜷+ 𝜺і

(1)

𝑖

Where 𝑦𝑖 is the loan approved dummy for firm i, and 𝜒𝑖′ is a vector of determinants of

loan approved as discussed above and 𝜀𝑖 is a random error term. Given that the dependent
variable is a binary variable, the model above cannot be estimated with OLS because it
does not meet the necessary conditions ((Dyankin & Moffat, 2002). Specifically, we
cannot guarantee that estimates of 𝑦𝑖 lie within the interval {0, 1}. The binary response
model calls for probit regression. The probit estimate model is specified as follows:
𝐏𝐫(𝒚 = 𝟏 ∕ 𝒙) = 𝚽(𝒙′𝒊 𝜷 )

(2)
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Where ɸ (phi) is a cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution, 𝑥 ʹ

=(x1…xk), Pr signifies probability and і refers to individual firm. We use the z-score to
infer increase or decrease in probability (pr) by b unit. In other words, an increase in 𝑥
changes Z or probit index by b standard deviation units.

The above equation is estimated to test whether access to loan approved or access to
credit is influenced by firm characteristics, notably size, distance to Juba, gender of the
owner, and sector while controlling for time to launch company, years in operations,
education level, ethnicity, the interest rate, and access to market. Based on theory and
empirical evidence on credit access to finance, the base model will include four key
determinants (1) size, (2) distance, (3) gender, and (4) sector. Other factors of interest
will be tested case by case. With these variables for base equation, we would thus like to
fit this model:
Pr(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 1) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+𝛽2 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) (3)
4.5.2

Determinants of Loan Approval: Econometric Results

Table 4.46 presents the results of the probit regressions for determinants of loan approval.
A look at the base regression in model 1 is telling. Gender, distance and sector of the firm
seem not to be significant in explaining the variation in loan approval. However, in the
first column we see that only size does matter, its coefficient being statistically significant
at the 10% level and its sign in the expected direction. The likelihood of receiving a loan
increases by 0.014 with a one unit increase in employment. This confirms the finding that
larger firms are less financially constrained ((Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic,
2005, 2008).
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We see no significant gender bias. For distance from Juba, the coefficient is significant if
we include all relevant variables in the model (see models 2 through 3) and it has the
expected sign: as distance increases, the likelihood of getting approved diminishes.

The coefficient on ethnicity is positive and significant, suggesting that access to market
interact with ethnicity to determine loan approval (see column 3). Foreign firms seem to
have some advantage in getting loans when we assess the full model.

4.5.3

Obstacles to Access to Finance by SMEs: Econometric Results

The previous section discussed the factors that affect the actual loan received. In this
section, we examine how individual SMEs rate access to formal finance, informal finance
and microfinance. The questionnaire asks whether a given firm considers access to
formal finance, microfinance and informal finance (money lenders, out of pocket
contributions, family or friends,) as a major, moderate or minor obstacle or never an
obstacle. These ordinal responses range from one to four, in that order. We collapsed
financing constraint into a binary variable, whereby major and moderate were coded as 1
and minor and never as 0. Then we ran regressions using the probit model, taking this as
the dependent variable. Regressions for microfinance yielded no significant results, and
so they are not reported here. Tables 4.47 and 4.48 report estimation results for formal
and informal finance constraints.

Table 4.47 reports regression results for whether firms considered access to formal
finance as an obstacle or not. While only three of the six model specifications are
reported here, the results show that women are more likely to indicate that they face
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obstacle in access to formal finance. The coefficients on the gender dummy variable are
positive and statistically significant.

The coefficient on distance from Juba is also statistically significant but in the opposite
direction than expected. This is surprising, because we expected that firms would express
more hardship as they move away from Juba. Nonetheless, the results would still make
sense if rural firms have relied on informal sources of finance such that they do not even
bother about formal finance in town. Alternatively, it may be that the majority of them
have no idea of what is (or is not) available. This could explain why the further away
from Juba, the more firms would indicate access to formal finance as a minor or never an
obstacle.

Furthermore, wholesalers are more likely to indicate lack of access to formal finance as a
constraint. This makes sense because these categories of firms, located in urban centers,
may have greater need for financing. None of the other variables were statistically
significant.

Table 4.48 reports comparable results regarding access to informal finance. While the
signs are in the right direction, the coefficient on gender is statistically insignificant.
Personal contributions, families and friends are the main sources of informal finance as
there are no known moneylenders. Distance is again significant, with SMEs further away
from Juba showing fewer tendencies to report this as a constraint. While this seems to
contradict explanation in Table 4.47, it would still make sense because firms in rural
areas do not regard both distance as a major constraint in informal finance. As for formal
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finance, the fact that they have no knowledge about what is available or not available
makes distance a less constraint.

These findings confirm what already exists in the literature. Studies have shown that
many firms consider financing and legal constraints as the most constraining factor and
mostly importantly, firms in least developed countries tend to report these financing
factors (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2005).

4.5.4

Credit Constrained and Unconstrained Firms: Econometric Results

For the firms that chose not to apply for credit, the questionnaire seeks the rationale
behind their actions. Some did not apply because they did not need a loan, others thought
they would be rejected, or reported that collateral requirements or interest rate is too high
or that applications are burdensome. Those that do not need loans are considered
unconstrained and those that chose not to apply for one reasons or another are considered
as constrained.

While core independent variables remain the same as above, the dependent variable,
credit constrained, is a binary variable taking the value of zero for firms that need no loan
and one for those who chose not to apply for one reason or another. Table 4.49 reports
results for the credit constraint. From these results, distance does matter. Firms away
from Juba are more constrained on average. There is no significant gender bias. But more
literate SMEs, wholesales and business services are more likely to be constrained due to
self-selection out. Normally, we would expect SMEs owned by more literate to be less
constrained because of wider networks, past credit history, higher profitability or ability
to place collateral if demanded. However, there are two reasons that could account for
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this anomaly. First, the initial conditions or business environment in the early days of the
CPA were unfavorable to all businesses. Second, those who are more literate live in
towns, near services, tend to be more vocal regarding their needs.

The category “business services” includes haircut shops, beauty salons, repair shops, and
printing booths. Some of these business services are run by few individuals, mostly the
owners, hence the size of such firms are small. While they have declined to apply for loan
for one reason or another, these regression results show that they are nevertheless credit
constrained. The retail sector is significantly constrained once we include all variables in
the model. On the other hand, level of education of the SME owner is positive and
statistically significant when we include all variables except collateral requirements,
suggesting that literate SMEs are likely to read the probability of loan rejection and
decide not to apply.

4.5.5

Determinants of Loan Application: Econometric Results

The survey asks the question: have you ever applied for loan before? The respondents
either say yes or no. We take this as a binary dependent variable. We wanted to explore
the factors that influence the decision to apply for a loan. Table 4.50 presents the results
from robust probit regressions. As the firm size increases, the probability of SME
applying for loan increases. The magnitude ranges from about 0.016 per additional
employee (column 1) to 0.08(column 5).These results confirm as expected, that as firm
size increases, it is more likely to apply for credit.

On the other hand, firms which cite high interest rate as an obstacle are more likely to
apply (columns 2 and 5). Access to market is also statistically significant, suggesting that
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firms without access to market are less likely to apply for loan (column 5). Other
variables including poor infrastructure, education, launch time, bureaucratic constraint
and years in business seem to have no significant effect on the likelihood to apply for
loans.

4.5.6

Robustness Test for Loan Approval Estimates

We examine whether loan approval estimates are robust. Robustness test is performed to
tease out selection bias in the estimates. The survey questionnaire asks a given firm if it
has applied for loan and if so, has it been approved or not. This question sequencing
introduces a selection dynamic in loan approval process but we get only to observe
outcomes from those who have self-selected first to apply before we know whether they
have been approved or not.

Therefore, following Heckman (1979) who first formulates selection bias as a form of
omitted variable and subsequent authors such as Berinsky (2004), the argument for
selection bias is motivated as follows: First, assume the outcome equation is as given in
equation (1). We make further assumption, that variable y is observed only and only if a
certain unobserved latent variable exceeds a given threshold.
Thus, let 𝑍𝑖∗ be a latent variable, indicating a propensity to be included in the sample, 𝜔𝑖′
is a vector of covariates, α is a vector of coefficients and 𝜇𝑖 is a random disturbance for

unit i for selection equation, respectively. Along these lines, we have selection equation:
𝑍𝑖∗ = 𝜔𝑖′ α + 𝜇𝑖
𝑍𝑖 = �

(4)

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑍𝑖∗ > 0;
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(5)
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Precisely, the selection equation is a probit:
Pr (𝑍𝑖 = 1) = Ф(α′𝜔𝑖 )

(6)

For this analysis, there are some factors that may cause selection bias, for instance, firms
closer to Juba, those whose owners are literate and foreigners are more likely to apply,
hence selecting themselves into the sample. On the other hands, firm away from Juba or
illiterates are more likely select out and we end up not observing them in the sample,
ceteris paribus.

We run several robustness tests and our results are presented in Table 4.51. We examine
the base equation against a number of likely candidates for selection dynamic. Reading
out Fisher’s Z transformation (/athrho) in column 1, we cannot rule out presence of some
selection bias. However, when we deselect robust standard errors and opt for a default,
we find different results; selection bias is no longer an issue (see column 2). None of
variables of interest explains a variation in the outcome equation. The same is true in
column 3; we see that athrho is not statistically significant and no variables in the
outcome equation are statistically significant as well. We could not include all four
variables in selection equation because of failure problem. In short, though, there is
selection bias it is not a big issue as the above discussion shows (Table 4.51).

4.6

What Have We Learned from the Econometric Results?

From the econometric results, we find that distance, gender and size are important factors
in explaining the variation in the probability to apply for loan, receive loan or get rejected
or rating lack of formal finance as a major constraint on firm performance. To some
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extent, the sector and the nationality appears to be also integral to access to finance under
some conditions. We highlight below some of these salient findings.

4.6.1

Radius of Finance

In terms of the actual loan received, firms away from Juba are less likely to receive credit
(Table 4.46). However, when you ask the firms whether they consider access to formal
and informal finance as a constraint, firms away from Juba are equally less likely to cite a
constraint (Tables 4.47 and 4.48). It is also evident from the econometric results that
firms away from Juba are less likely to apply. They are thus credit constrained (Table
4.49). These results are an eye opener in the sense that distance does matter. This is what
I call the radius of finance. Firms that are in close proximity to Juba are more likely to
receive loans.

At the same time, we find that firms away from Juba do not cite access to credit as a
major constraint. First, they have no idea about the existence of these services,
reaffirming the proverbial phrase “out of sight, out of mind”. Second, such firms rely on
informal finance. Therefore, in explaining or teasing out factors that affect access to
finance, it is important to consider distance.

4.6.2

Gender Bias in Access to Formal Credit

While gender seems not to be a significant determinant of the actual loan approved
(Table 4.46), there is a gender bias when it comes to financing obstacles. Women are
more likely to say that access to formal credit is a major constraint (Table 4.47). Of
course, it makes sense that they rate access to informal credit as a less constraint because
this is their main source of finance (4.48). Larger firms are more likely to apply for loan
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(Table 4.50). Clearly, there is a gender bias in whether firm considers lack of access to
formal credit as an obstacle. There is empirical evidence in the literature that women face
greater obstacle to accessing external finance (Asiedu, Freeman & Nti-Addae, 2012).

4.6.3

Firm Size and Access to Credit

In case of the actual loan approved, larger firms are more likely to receive a loan (Table
4.46) and are less likely to rate access to formal credit as minor or no obstacle at all
(Table 4.47). Gender matters. Women are more likely to indicate lack of access to credit
(Tables 4.47 and 4.48).

This could be both a reality and a perception since there is a typical regularity in literature
which argues that some firms are likely to shift blame to financing obstacles when in fact
they have some blames to carry (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005). Similarly,
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Laeven (2006) find that older, larger and foreign owned firms
tend to report less financing obstacles.

4.7

Conclusion

This essay has interesting findings with regard to access to finance in South Sudan. The
essay studied access to credit by SMEs and the factors that determine whether a firm
applies for loans, whether it receives credit or gets rejected, as well as how each firm
characterizes the impact of access to finance on their performance. Because this is a
discrete choice model, we employ probit model as appropriate tool to analyze and gauge
the impact of each factor on the probability of loan approval or rejection, and the firms’
perception of finance as a major or minor constraint.
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The essay validates the role of three important factors with respect to access to finance.
There is an urban bias in the sense that firms further away from the capital city Juba are
less likely to access credit. Such is the radius of finance which tends to cluster in the
center. The radius of finance also makes distant firms to be less likely to rate access to
credit as a major constraint, because they have no idea about the existence of formal
credit services or they resort to local informal sources for financing enterprise operations.

The solutions may lie in spreading out financial services to reach both the unbanked and
bottom of the pyramid in the rural areas. This strategy could go a long way to ameliorate
gender bias, since women on average are more likely to experience a constraint to access
for formal finance.

In terms of size, larger firms as opposed to smaller firms have an advantage in accessing
credit. This is the trend the world over, and it is one reason to devise ways for expanding
the access frontier for all enterprises, especially for SMEs which are financially
constrained.

In analyzing the current state of SME access to finance in South Sudan, five main
findings emerge:
•

First, about 70% of businesses fall in the “microenterprise” category, defined as a
firm whose size ranges between one and four employees (small, medium-sized
and large enterprises are defined analogously. About 26% of the sampled SMEs
are small enterprises, 4% are medium enterprises, and only one is a large
enterprise (this was a bottling water company). Assuming then that this sample is
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reasonably representative of the population, it follows then almost all firms in
South Sudan are SMEs.
•

Second, the access to finance is inversely related to the distance from Juba, hence
validating the hypothesis of rural-urban bias in resource allocation. Findings from
this field survey indicate that about 72% of all loans went to Juba. Nevertheless,
we find that firms away from Juba do not cite access to credit as a major
constraint. First, many of them have no idea about the existence of these services.
Second, such firms rely on informal finance from friends, family members or outof pockets, consistent with the evidence in literature. In addition, other
impediments such as collateral requirement, bank bureaucracies, need for special
connections or any other access issues tend to affect small firms the most. Such a
firm tends instead to choose to internally or informally finance, which is in line
with the pecking order hypothesis which states that firms tend to exhaust internal
financing before turning to outside financing sources.

•

Third, small size is a disadvantage. The study finds that larger firms have greater
chances of receiving loans than SMEs. This is consistent with the literature which
finds that the smallest firms face the most binding financial and legal constraints.
The authors state that any improvements in legal and financial sector
developments goes a great length to benefit the smallest firm the most and that
firms dependent on external finance grow faster or bigger.

•

Fourth, SMES are more likely to self-select out of the credit market if they
perceive that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit history.
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Based on this analysis, wholesalers and business services, for instance, are more
likely to indicate the lack of access to finance as a major constraint.
•

Fifth, while gender seems not to be a significant determinant in the actual loan
approvals, women are more likely to rate lack of formal finance as a major and
informal finance as minor constraint. This finding is similar to what Asiedu,
Freeman and Nti-Addae (2012) find that white women did not face discrimination
in access to credit and paid lower interest rate than white men in 1998 in the USA.
Of course, huge disparities exist in access to credit between black-owned,
Hispanic-owned and white-owned businesses: the first two groups face some
discrimination either due to pure prejudice or statistical discrimination. But for
Sub Sahara Africa in particular, other studies show that female-owned firms are
more financially constrained than male-owned firms.
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Name

Agriculture
Bank of Sudan
Buffalo
Commercial
Bank
Commercial
Bank of Ethiopia
Equity Bank
Ivory Bank

Table 4.1: Characteristics of Commercial Banks in South Sudan, 2011
Year of
No of
State's
Public
Total
Deposits
Loans
Loan
Total Current
creation
Branche share
share
assets
(million $) (million
/Deposits
Employment
s
(%)
(%)
(million
$)
(%)
$)
1959
4
30
11.5
38
100
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2008

3

-

100

71.4

26.5

13

49

40

2009

1

100

-
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65

-

-

21

2009

4

-

100

150

119

16

13

125

1994

9

-

100

111

104

12

12

150

100

100

1000

100

10

300

100

2

13

0

0

24

60

45

36

16

44

40

Kenya
2005
19
Commercial
Bank
Mountains Trade
2010
1
and
Development
Bank
Nile Commercial
2003
13
40
Bank
TOTAL
Source: Author’s compilation from Survey Data, 2011.
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Table 4.2: South Sudan Bankable Indicator, Growth in Customer Accounts, 2011
Customer Bank Accounts
Bank Name
July
August
% Change
1. Agriculture Bank of
11,000
13,000
19%
Sudan
2. Buffalo Commercial
1,200
1,800
50%
Bank
3. Commercial Bank of
437
466
6.6%
Ethiopia
4. Equity Bank
40,000
45,000
12.5%
5. Ivory Bank
16,00
17,000
6.3%
6. Kenya Commercial
52,144
55,407
6.3%
Bank
7. Mountain Trade and
781
896
14.7%
Development Bank
8. Nile Commercial Bank
10,000
10,300
3%
Total
131,562
143,869
9.4%
Source: Author’s compilation, 2011.

Table 4.3: South Sudan Commercial Bank Lending to Firms, 2011
Lending Size ( in US$ )
Minimum Loan
Maximum Loan
Bank Name
(Ever Approved
(Ever Approved)
1. Agricultural Bank
3,704
740,740
of Sudan
2. Buffalo Commercial
555,556
Bank
3. Commercial Bank
of Ethiopia
4. Equity Bank
5,556
1,300,000
5. Ivory Bank
3,704
962,963
6. Kenya Commercial
18,519
1,111,111
Bank
7. Mountain Trade and
development Bank
8. Nile Commercial
444
1,851,852
Bank
Total
6,522,222
31927
Exchange Rate 1 US$ =2.7 SSP at independence in South Sudan
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Table 4.4: South Sudan Banking Annual Lending and Number of SMEs Served,
2011
Bank Name
Variable/ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010 2011
Year
Ivory Bank
Loan in
0.2
0.3
0.3
‘000000$
# SMEs
40
75
120
Kenya
Loan in
7.4
14.8
18.5
2.2
Commercial ‘000000$
Bank
# SMEs
N/A
Buffalo
Loan in
0.2
1.3
2.8
0.5
Commercial 000000$
Bank
# SMEs
N/A
Agriculture
Loan in
2.6
3.7
4.8
5.6
5.9
6.7
5.6
Bank of
‘000000$
Sudan
# SMEs
500
500
800 1000 1100
12
1300
00
Equity Bank Loan in
0.7
2.9
4.4
'000000$
# SMEs
150
920
1,200

Table 4.5: How South Sudan Banks Describe Their Lending to SMEs
Bank Name
Individual Bank Assessment
Agriculture
Bank of Sudan
Commercial
Bank of
Ethiopia
Equity Bank
Kenya
Commercial
Bank

Lend to small producers and farmers.
We are not yet giving loans to customers, leave alone
SMEs. The bank has just opened its operations in South
Sudan.
Top SMEs include real estate, general trade, importers
and materials as well as commerce.
Some SMEs are doing very well and some fall behind;
others have fallen into delinquency in their loan
repayments.

189

Table 4.6: South Sudan Banks Ranking of 5 C’s in Appraising SME Projects, 2011
Major
Moderate Minor
Not
Total
Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle
Character of the
8
8
owners
Capacity of the firm
5
2
1
8
Collateral
3
5
8
Requirement
Firm initial capital
2
3
2
1
8
Macroeconomic
3
1
2
2
8
conditions
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Name

Agriculture
Bank of
Sudan
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Buffalo
Commercial
Bank

Commercial
Bank of
Ethiopia

Table 4.7: Indicators of Bank Services
Customized
Partnering
Role of Mobile
Products
Development
Technology
Agencies
Small Producers’ Most of NGOs, EU, Technology
Loan and
IFAD, IDA, and
reduces the
Small Farmers’
World Bank
administrative costs
Loan
and
Provides customers
with information
N/A
Attempts to
In negotiating
collaborate with
phase with mobile
other foreign
operators abroad to
institutions not
expand outreach
great; their
eagerness to work
with local banks is
minimal.

N/A

N/A

N/A

Steps Toward
Improving Customer
Service
Application of IT,
and Capacity
building for the
bank & customers

Ways to Expand
Access Frontier to
all ,specially SMEs
Flexibility in terms
of collateral
requirement and
Provisioning of
information

Offer additional
windows and add
cashiers,
open branches,
arrange services
according to
customers’ needs,
encourage check
usage instead of
cash,
current abnormal
queuing will die out
as soon as new
currency exchange
is over
Upgrading service
by introducing new
IT; implementing
BPR (business

Loan to poor
borrowers through
umbrella
organizations

Has not yet
introduced mobile
banking

Business loan;
development
loan;
asset finance and
working capital

Talking with IFC,
World Bank,
USAID, DFID,
Norway, KEWF,
and
Planning discussions
are on-going

It is a major role
and a way to go in
today’s banking
business

Ivory Bank

not specialized
bank but
commercial bank

Considering it in
future

Truly connected to
the internet and
throughout the
region

Kenya
Commercial
Bank

Water, biscuit,
ice
manufacturing in

World Bank;
Ministry of trade ;
Investment; and

Very important and
makes
communications
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Equity Bank

process
Reengineering);
Expanding branch
networks;
hiring additional
HR; and to
encourage the
culture of public
savings, we pay
interest on savings
Building capacity
for staff;
Branch network
expansion;
Financial literacy on
banking (trust,
confidence); and
Deployment of
technology
(e.g, ATMs)
We hope to improve
the technology;
currently connected
to Khartoum and
experiencing
technical problems
(immediately after
independence).
Good queue
management
system; cross selling

Financing in
housing sector and
Agriculture

We are doing this
through
Establishing bank
branches in local
areas

Training SMEs in
trade opportunities,
and bank

addition to other
specialized loans
Mountain
Trade and
Development
Bank
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Nile
Commercial
Bank

N/A

Salary earners
and skills for
deductions 40%
of salary (can be
done times 12)

business winners

N/A

easy and quick

N/A

IFC attempt/problem N/A
of standard; line
credit of $ 5 million
; and Loita Capital
partners = $ 10 m.

of products;
advantage banking
and E-banking.
Rolling out of
ATMs (24 hrs.)
services and
embarking on
training agents to
tap the usefulness of
technology in
facilitating bank
activities
Improving staff
capacity and
Giving quality
service (it is
measured against
the service we are
giving)

requirements

At present we are
not providing any
kind of borrowing
whether big or
small, but in the
future we are going
to provide the poor
ones against a
security.
Different products

Table 4.8: Nonperforming Loans among Businesses, 2005-2011
Year
Total NPL % of NPL Due
% of NPL Due to
(%)
to SMEs
Large Businesses
(1) Buffalo Commercial Bank
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
13
3
10
(2) Kenya Commercial Bank
2005
10
2006
10
2007
10
N/A
N/A
2008
10
2009
10
2010
10
2011
10
(3) Ivory Bank

2008
25
2009
20
2010
18
2011
15
(4) Agricultural Bank of Sudan
2005
15
2006
15
2007
15
2008
41
2009
30
2010
25
2011
20
(5) Equity Bank

18
12
11
10

7
8
7
5

7
7
7
11
14
10
10

8
8
8
30
16
15
10

2011
1.02
0.6
0.52
(6) CBE, MTDB and Nile Commercial bank all responded with
“ N/A”
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Table 4.9: Commercial Bank Expectations from Central Bank and SMEs
Name
Things Banks Wish to See Commercial bank
Happen in Order to
Expectations from Central
Expand Lending to SMES Bank of South Sudan
Agriculture
Enough capital;
Targeting balanced growth
Bank of
Good agricultural
in money supply;
Sudan
practices;
Provisioning of financing
to the productive sectors
Land registration;
Collateral, and
and provision of medium
of exchange
Market information
Provisioning of adequate
liquidity for the economy
Buffalo
The legal framework
Taxation issues be clear;
Commercial
concerning banks;
Service at government
Bank
mortgage and
officers (license, building
regulation that affect
permits, etc) should not be
the financial sector be
a subject of
revised and acted
procrastination, and
Actions to approve or
reject should be fast
Commercial
Establish business based
Check the fulfillment of
Bank of
on feasibility study;
the minimum capital
Ethiopia
Raise adequate capital
requirement for the
required for the
establishment of business;
establishment of business; Check before licensing, he
physical address of the
Build strong management
team and skilled HR;
business- to inspect
whether the business has
Establish proper financial
office and working
records (accounts)
premise;
Enforce the proper
maintenance
(establishment) of
accounting (financial
records);
Initiate legislature body to
introduce laws, such as
foreclosure laws, which
speed up loan collection
process and protect lending
banks;
Practice proper and
systematic registration of
fixed assets (properties) so
as to protect bankers
(lenders) when they hold
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Equity Bank

Record keeping;
Sound management
system;
Good succession plans
Relevant business plan;
with a good likelihood of
success;
Ability to offer some form
of collateral

Ivory Bank

Attract us/develop
business attitude,
Appreciate the value of
money;
Work hard and have no
place to gossips all day,
and work and create
wealth
Training of entrepreneurs
Banking of all SMEs;
Proper bookkeeping
system, and
Having permanently
located SMEs
Business must have
adequate accounting
records;
Demonstrate history of
profitability activity
through documentation;
Business must have
accounts with us;
Borrower must be
recommended and his
character approved, and
Must have a collateral
Needs for plan for
projects;
Quality of staff;

Kenya
Commercial
Bank

Mountain
Trade and
Development
Bank

Nile
Commercial
Bank
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the properties as collateral
Establish credit , and
information center
Formulate relevant legal
framework to guide
secured lending;
Incentives to encourage
commercial banks to invest
in rural areas;
Financial literacy programs
through mass media and
public meetings;
To run guarantee schemes
to help banks to mitigate
risk, and
To bring down cost of
establishment and set-up
Ensure “no eating of
people money”

Expedite process of
repossessing a collateral
(debt collection);
Establish a credit
referencing bureau, and
Establishment of unified
collateral registry

Upgrading legal
framework;

Economic conditions;
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Table 4.10: The State of Microfinance Sector in the Republic of South Sudan as At 30th September 2011
Institution
Type Total
% of
Total
Portfolio
Portfolio
PAR>30%
Clients Women Borrowers Size
Weight
BRAC South Sudan NGO 25,026
100
16,553
4,217.968
0.284
69.02
Sudan
CLG 10,225
36
10,247
3,933,222.9
0.264
25.00
Microfinance
Institution
Finance Sudan Ltd CLG
9,487
25
5,373
5,100,619
0.343
9.27
Rural Microfinance CLS
69
1,037
547,495.5
0.037
1.79
WOYE MEI
NGO
1450
71
1,106
1,047,759
0.070
19.64
Christian Agenda
NGO
0.000
0.00
for Development
Frontier
CLS
230
80
154
27,650
0.002
0.50
Microfinance
Financial
CLS
Operations have been suspended in process of
0.000
0.00
Development
restarting
Service
Total
47,444
34,470
14,874,714
1.000
Total Portfolio ($)
5,042,276.1
Average PAR >30
30.81
Source: Private Sector Development Department, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Investment, South Sudan.
Note: CLS= Company Ltd by Shares and CLG =Company Ltd by Guarantees.

Table 4.11: Commercial Bank Ownership in South Sudan 26, 2013
S/N Bank Name
Branches
Total
Ownership Operating
Branches
Since
1 African National Juba
1
N
Bank
2 Agriculture Bank Juba
N
3 Buffalo
Juba, Wau
3
N 2/21/2008
Commercial
and Aweil
Bank
4 Eden
Juba
1
N
8/8/2012
Commercial
Bank
5 Ivory Bank
Juba, Wau,
8
N
8/6/2006
Bentiu,
Aweil, Torit,
Renk and
Rumbek
6 Liberty
Juba
1
N 2/27/2012
Commercial
Bank
7 Nile Commercial Juba,
8
N 4/27/2006
Bank
Rumbek, ,
Wau, Aweil,
Yei, Yambio,
Torit, and
Malakal
8 Mountains Trade Juba
1
N 1/25/2010
and
Development
Bank
9 National
Juba
1
N 11/22/201
Commercial
2
Bank
10 People Bank
Juba
1
N 1/24/2013
11 Kenya
Juba, Yambio,
12
F
3/6/2006
Commercial
Yei, Wau,
Bank
Malakal,
Numule,
Torit, Kuajok,
Rumbek,

26

South Sudan Central Bank Branches are in Wau, Yei and Malakal with headquarter in
Juba.
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12 Charter One
Bank
13 Commercial
Bank of Ethiopia
14 Equity Bank

Aweil, Bentiu
and Bor
Juba

1

F

6/21/2011

Juba, Malakal

2

F

6/18/2009

Juba,
Malakal,
Kajokeji,
Yambio,
Wau, Nimule,
Torit, Aweil,
Yei, and
Bentiu

10

F

4/29/2009

15 National Bank
1
F
Abu Dhabi
16 Qatar National
Juba
1
F 11/1/2011
Bank
17 Stanbic Bank
Juba
1
F 3/29/2012
(CFC)
18 Afriland First
Juba
1
P
5/4/2012
Bank
19 International
Juba
1
P 1/25/2012
Commercial
Bank
20 South Sudan
Juba
1
P
2011
Commercial
Bank
Source: Banking Supervision Unit, Bank of South Sudan, 2013 (Note: N = national bank;
F = foreign Bank and P = partly, meaning it is both foreign and locally owned).
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Table 4.12: South Sudan Banking Sector Relative to East Africa, January 2013
Name of
Number
Population
Banks per 10
Country
of Banks
(July 2013 Estimate)
million people
Burundi
10
10,888,321
9.18
Rwanda
14
12,012,589
11.65
South Sudan
20
11,090,104
18.03
Uganda
26
34,758,809
7.48
Tanzania
40
48,261,942
8.29
Kenya
43
44,037,656
9.76
Source: Author’s compilation from various publications, Central Intelligence Agency,
2013

Table 4.13: SME Questionnaire Respondents by State
State
Number
%
72.5
Central Equatoria
242
23.0
Northern Bahr el Ghazal
77
4.5
Western Bahr el Ghazal
15
100
334
Total

Table 4.14: SME Questionnaire Respondents by City
State
Number
%
Juba
218
65.27
Aweil
74
22.16
Mayom Angok
3
0.90
Wau
15
4.49
Yei
24
7.19
334
100
Total

Table 4.15: Classification of SMEs by Gender
Gender
Number
Female
58
Male
271
Non-respondents
5
Total
334
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%
17.4
81.1

1.5
100

Table 4.16: Classification of SMEs by Ethnicity
Ethnic Group
Number
Dinka
111
Bari
24
Acholi
10
Kakwa
10
Pojulu
10
Other South Sudanese
40
Foreigners
101
Non-respondents
29
Total
334

%
33.2
7.2
3.0
3.0
3.0
12.0
30.2
8.7
100

Table 4.17: Firm Classification by Legal Status
Firm Legal Status
Number
Sole proprietor
239
Private limited company
44
Public limited company
4
Partnership
32
Co-operative
8
Other Form
1
Non-respondents
6
334
Total

71.6
13.2
1.2
9.6
2.4
0.30
1.8
100.0

Table 4.18 A: Firm Size by Current Employment
Classification
Firm Size
Number
Microenterprise
1-4
233
Small Enterprise
5-19
86
Medium Enterprise
20-99
14
Large Enterprise
≥ 100
1
Total
334

%
69.8
25.7
4.2
0.3
100
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%

Table 4.18 B: Firm Size by Current Employment
Classification
Firm Size
Number
%
89.83
Microenterprise
1-4
6,587
Small Enterprise
5-19
662
9.03
Medium
20-99
1.06
Enterprise
78
Large Enterprise
≥ 100
0.08
6
100
Total
7333
Source: Author’s construction based on South Sudan Business Survey, 2010

Table 4.18 C: Firm Distribution by State
State
Number
%
Central Equatoria
2,683
36.6
Eastern Equatoria State
259
3.5
Western Equatoria State
339
4.6
Northern Bahr el Ghazal
525
7.2
Lakes Sate
489
6.7
Warrap State
457
6.2
Western Bahr el Ghazal
1113
15.2
Jonglei State
269
3.7
Upper Nile State
894
12.2
Unity State
305
4.2
Total
7333
100.0

Table 4.19: SME Current Employment by Gender and Firm Size
Classification
Firm Men Women Total As % As %
As %
Size
of all of all
of all
Men
women
Microenterprise
1-4
191
41
232
70.5
70.7
70.5
Small Enterprise
5-19
70
14
84
25.8
24.1
25.5
Medium Enterprise 20-99
9
3
12
3.3
5.2
3.6
Large Enterprise
≥100
1
1
0.4
0.3
Total
271
58
329
100
100
100
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Table 4.20: SME Current Employment by State/Geographical Location
Classification
Firm Central
Northern Western Total
Size
Equatoria Bahr el
Bahr el
Ghazal
Ghazal
Microenterprise
1-4
154
66
13
69.
8
(63.6)
(85.7) (86.7)
Small Enterprise
5-19
73
11
2
(30.2)
(4.3) (13.3)
25.7
Medium Enterprise 27 20-99
14
4.2
(5.8)
Large Enterprises
≥100
1
0.3
(0.4)
100
Total
100
100
100

Sector
1. Retail

Table 4.21: SME Classification by Sector
Number
%
161
48.2

2. Business Service
3. Wholesale
4. Restaurants/Catering
5. Hotel
6. Repair Shop
7. Manufacturing
8. Construction
9. Agribusiness
10. Other Sector (e.g gas)
Non-respondents
Total

31

9.3

30
23
22
14
8
6
1
35
3
334

9
6.9
6.6
4.2
2.4
1.8
0.3
10.5
0.9
100.0

27

According to this classification, medium and large enterprises are based in Central
Equatoria state, South Sudan.
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Table 4.22: SME Classification by Sector and Gender
Distribution by
Distribution by
Number Gender
Gender as %
Sector
Men
Women men
Women
1. Retail
160
142
18
88.75
11.25
2. Business Service

31

21

10

67.75

32.26

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

8
30
1
6
19
22

5
25
1
6
15
10

3
5
4
12

62.5
83.33
100
100
78.95
45.45

37.5
16.67
21.05
54.55

14
35

13
30

1
5

92.86
85.71

7.14
14.29

326

268

58

82.21

17.79

Manufacturing
Wholesale
Agribusiness
Construction
Hotels
Restaurants/Cate
ring
9. Repair Shops
10. Other Sector (e.g
gas)
Total
Note: Missing = 8
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Table 4.23: SME Classification by Sector and Firm Size
Sector
Number of Employees (% in
Parentheses)
1- 4
5-19
20-99
1. Retail
135
24
2
(83.9)
(14.9)
(1.2)
2. Business Service
26
5
(83.9)
(16.1)
3. Manufacturing
3
5
(37.5)
(62.5)
4. Wholesale
21
8
1
(70.0)
26.7)
(3.3)
5. Agribusiness
1
(100)
6. Construction
6
(100)
7. Hotels
2
14
6
(9.1)
(63.6)
(27.3)
8. Restaurants/Catering
13
10
(56.5)
(43.5)
9. Repair Shops
14
(100)
10. Other Sector (e.g gas)
16
16
2
(45.7)
(45.7)
(5.7)
Total( as % of 331)
230
89
11
(69.5)
(26.9)
(3.3)
Note: missing = 3

≥ 100
1
(2.9)
1
(0.3)

Table 4.24: Usage of ATMs, Bank Visits and Under Mattress Facilities
Facility
Number
%
ATM Withdrawals
24
7.19
Bank Visits
173
51.80
Store Safekeeping Vault
106
31.74
Non-respondents
31
9.28
Total
334
100.0
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Table 4.25: Firm Self-Appraisal on Technology and Management Experience
Overall Assessment
Number
%
32.93
Technology Adoption and Managerial Competence
110
Managerial Incompetence and technology Neglect
22
6.59
56.59
Unfavorable Business Environment
189
3.89
Non-respondents
13
100.0
Total
334

Table 4.26: Loan Characteristics
Status
Received Approvals (success Rate)
Denied Applications (rejection rate)
Total Loan Applications
Memorandum: Loan Application % of Total # of
SMEs
Acceptance rate(Loan Approval As % of total # of
SMEs)
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Number
32
14
46
46/334

69.57
30.43
100
13.77

%

32/334

9.58

Table 4.27: Loan Approval by Lender
Lender Type
Number
Commercial Banks
22
Microfinance Institutions
4
Informal Finance /Money Lenders/Family Members
6
Total
32

%
68.75
12.5
18.75
100

Table 4.28: Loan Approval by Gender
Gender
Number
%
% ( of gender)
8.86
80
Male
24
10.34
20
Female
6
100
8.98
Total
30
(Note: Two Loan Applicants did not specify gender; missing = 2)

Sector

Table 4.29: Loan Approval by Sector
Quantity % of the total Loans Approved as
Approved
% of Sectoral Totals

1. Retail
12

37.5

7.45

4
1
2
6

12.5
3.13
6.25
18.75

13.33
100.0
33.33
27.27

3
1

9.38
3.13

13.04
7.14

3
32

9.38
100

8.57
9.67

2. Business Service
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Manufacturing
Wholesale
Agribusiness
Construction
Hotels
Restaurants/Cate
ring
9. Repair Shops
10. Other Sector (e.g
gas)
Total
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Table 4.30: Loan Approval by Firm Size
Size
Firm
Quantity % of the total As % of Firm
Classification
Employees
Approved
Size
Loans
Classification
Total
Microenterprise
1-4
15
46.875
6.44
Small
5-19
14
43.75
16.28
Enterprise
Medium
20-99
3
9.375
21.43
Enterprise
Large
Enterprises
≥ 100
Total

32

100

9.58

Table 4.31: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan
Reasons Firm self-Selection Out from
Number % of Total
% of All
Credit Market 28
Constraint
(272)
47.95
30.0
1. Firm does not think it will be
82
approved
19

11.11

7.0

3. Collateral requirements are strict
4. Interest rates are too high
Total Constrained Firms

57
13
171

33.33
7.60
100

20.9
5.1
62.9

5. The firm does not need loan
(unconstrained firms)

101

-

37.1

2. Application procedures are too
burdensome

28

This means that the firms had wanted to apply but chose to not because of the reasons
enumerated one through four.
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Table 4.32: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Gender
Reasons
Men
Women Total As % of As %
Total
all men
of all
women
15
82
29.8
31.9
30.1
1. It does not think it will
67
be approved
2. Application
procedures are too
burdensome

17

2

19

7.6

4.3

7.0

3. Collateral
requirements are strict
4. Interest rates are too
high
5. The firm does not
need loan
Total

47

10

57

20.9

21.3

21.0

14

2

16

6.2

4.3

5.9

80

18

98

35.6

38.3

36.0

225

47

272

82.7

17.3

100
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Table 4.33: Why Firm Did Not Apply for Loan by Sector (% in parentheses)
Doubted Burdensome Collat High
No
Category
Approval Application eral
Interest Need
1. Retail: quantity
35
10 38
8
48
(25.2)
(7.2) (27.3)
(5.8) (34.5)
2. Business
11
2
1
15
Service
(37.9)
(6.9) (3.4)
(51.7)
3. Manufacturing
4. Wholesale
5. Agribusiness
6. Construction
7. Hotels
8. Restaurants/Ca
tering
9. Repair Shops
10. Other Sector
(e.g gas)
Total as % of 334

1
(16.7)
11
(55)
1
(25)
6
(54.5)
-

1
2
(16.7) (33.3)
3
2
(15)
(10)
1
(5.3)
-

4
(33.3)
13
(41.9)
82
(24.6)

2
(6.5)
19
(5.7)

2
(18.2)
6
(31.6)
5
(41.7)
1
(3.2)
57
(17.1)

1
(25)
1
(5.3)

4
(12.9)
14
(4.2)

2
(33.3)
4
(20)
2
(50)
3
(27.3)
11
(57.9)
3
(25.0)
11
(35.5)
99
(29.6)

Table 4.34: State 29 and Number of Loans Received
State
Loans
As % of total
As % of SMEs in
received
loans received each State
71.875
9.95
Central Equatoria
23
21.875
9.09
Northern Bahr el
7
Ghazal
6.25
13.33
Western Bahr el
2
Ghazal
100
9.58
Total
32

29

Number of loans received according to cities: 1 in Wau, 2 in Aweil, 2 in Yei and 16 in
Juba.
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Table 4.35: Loan Received by State and Lender (percentages in parentheses)
State
Lender
Commercial Microfinance Moneylenders
Total
Banks
Institutions
and Family
Members
Central
18
3
2
23
Equatorial
(78.26)
(13.04)
(8.70)
(100)
(81.82)
(75)
(33.33)
(71.88)
Northern
3
4
7
Bahr el
(42.86)
(57.14)
(100)
Ghazal
(13.64
(66.67)
(21.88)
Western
1
1
2
Bahr el
(50.00)
(50.00)
(100)
Ghazal
(4.55)
(25)
(6.25)
22
4
6
32
Total
(68.75)
(12.50)
(18.75)
(100)
(100)
(100)
(100)
Note: The first figures in the cells are for row percentages; the second parentheses
present column values.
Table 4.36: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth
Source of
SMEs Identifying a Factor as a Constraint
Credit
(% in parentheses)
Never
Total
Major Moderate Minor
Respondents
Formal
120
66
75
19
280
Finance
(35.9)
(19.8) (22.5)
(5.7)
(83.8)
Microfinance
98
54
104
24
280
(29.3)
(16.2) (31.1)
(7.2)
(83.8)
Informal
73
103
89
18
283
Finance
(21.9)
(30.8) (26.6)
(5.4)
(84.7)

Table 4.37: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Gender
Source of Credit Number Identifying a
% Identifying a Factor
Factor as a Constraint
as a Constraint
Male Female Total
Male Female Total
Formal
222
58
280 81.9
100
85.1
Finance
Microfinance
222
58
280 81.9
100
85.1
Informal
Finance
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58

283
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83.0

100

86.0

Table 4.38: Financing Constraint to Firm Growth by SME Size
Source of
Firm Identifying a Credit Source as a Major Constraint
Credit
(% in parenthesis)
Microenterpr Small
Medium
Large
ise
Enterprise
Enterprise
Enterprise
Formal
185
80
14
1
Finance
(79.4)
(93.0)
(100)
(100)
Microfinance
196
70
13
1
(84.1)
(81.4)
(92.9)
(100)
Informal
199
71
12
1
Finance
(85.4)
(82.6)
(85.7)
(100)

Table 4.39: Credit Allocation and Types of Borrowers
Type of Borrowers
Number
Successful borrowers
32
Denied Borrowers
14
Discouraged Borrowers
171
Non-borrowers
101
Total
318

Table 4.40: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance
Firms Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint
(% Identifying a Factor as a Constraint in Parentheses)
Major
Moderate Minor
Never
Total
180
60
27
13
280
(64.3)
(21.4)
(9.6)
(4.6)
(100)
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Table 4.41: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Firm Size
Number Identifying Access to Market as a Constraint
(% in bracket of each size)
Firm Size

Major

Moderate

Minor

Never

1-4
117
(50.2)

42
(18.0)

18
(7.7)

8
(3.4)

53
(61.6)
10
(71.4)

16
(18.6)
2
(14.3)

7
(8.1)
2
(14.3)

4
(4.7)
-

180
(53.9)

60
(18.0)

5-19

20-99
≥ 100
Total
(% out of 334)
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27
(8.1)

1
(100)
13
(3.9)

Table 4.42: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Firm Performance by
Gender
Male (% in
Female (% in
Category
bracket)
bracket)
151
26
Major
(55.7)
(44.8)
42
18
Moderate
(15.5)
(31.0)
19
7
Minor
(7.0)
(12.1)
11
2
Never
(4.1)
(3.4)
48
5
Non-respondents
(17.7)
(8.6)
Total (as % of all
271
58
329 SMEs )
(82.4)
(17.6)

Table 4.43: Lack of Access to Market as a Constraint to Performance by Sector
Category
Major Moderate Minor Never
1. Retail
84
28
14
4
(64.6)
(21.5) (10.8) (3.1)
2. Business Service
16
6
1
3
(61.5)
(23.1) (3.8)
(11.5)
3. Manufacturing
6
1
(84.7)
(14.3)
4. Wholesale
15
5
3
3
(57.7)
(19.2) (11.5) (11.5)
5. Agribusiness
1
(100)
6. Construction
4
2
(66.7)
(33.3)
7. Hotels
17
2
1
(85)
(10)
(5)
8. Restaurants/Catering
10
8
2
(50)
(40)
(10)
9. Repair Shops
5
2
(71.4)
(28.6)
10. Other Sector (e.g gas)
21
7
3
3
(61.8)
(20.6) (8.8)
(8.8)
Total
179
59
26
12
(64.9)
(21.4) (9.4)
(4.3)
Missing = 3
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Variable Name
/Description
Time to Start SME
Years in business
Current Number of
Employees
Employment
History
Revenue in 2011
(in’000$)
Years of Schooling
of the Firm Head
Average Distance
from Juba in Miles
Number of
Employees in year
when firm
received loan
Revenue in year
when loan was
received (‘000 $)
Loan received in
latest year (‘000$)

Table 4.44: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Stdev Max
Min

observations

0.72
3.43
5.22

0.5
3
3

0.64
2.09
9.97

3
15
100

0.01
0.17
1

327
333
334

5.24

2

10.64

120

1

329

50.5

10.0

249.6

3,800.0

0.3

0.251

11.25

12

4.36

19

0

319

141

0

215

560

0

334

5

2

10.

120

1

329

49.4

10.0

249.7

3,800.0

0.3

0.251

0.8

0

5.0

59.6

0

0.329

Table 4.45: Correlation between Employment, Revenue and Loan Received
Employment Revenue
Loan Amount
Employment
1
Revenue
0.849
1
Loan Amount
0.147
0.002
1
N = 334

216

Table 4.46: Probit Estimates of Loan Approvals
Model (Base Equation) Model
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
Gender
0.046
0.266
-0.725
(0.251)
(0.466)
(0.812)
Employment
0.014*
0.116**
0.148*
(0.008)
(0.051)
(0.076)
Distance
0.0003 -0.003** -0.008**
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Retail Sector
- 0.111
1.107**
1.125
(0.202)
(0.564)
(0.926)
Wholesale Sector
2.093*
1.383
(1.181)
(1.043)
Foreign
3.361*** 6.392***
(1.082)
(2.245)
Ethnicity
2.463**
(1.243)
Education
0.081
(0.087)
Poor Judicial
0.250
0.029
system
(0.221)
(0.430)
Bureaucratic
0.409*
-0.160
Constraint
(0.216)
(0.312)
Technology
1.398
Constraint
(0.609)
Access to Market
-1.010**
(0.489)
constant
-1.423***
(0.167) 5.276*** 6.843***
(1.622)
(2.106)
Probability > chi2
0.411
0.016
0.17
Wald chi2
3.96
20.37
18.31
No. observations
329
68
60
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for loan approval (= 1 if approved, 0
otherwise); ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.47: Probit Estimates of Formal Financing Constraints
Base Model
Model
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
Gender
0.547*** 0.548*** 0.546***
(0.202)
(0.203)
(0.209)
Employment
0.016
0.017
0.019
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.015)
Distance
-0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Retail Sector
-0.003
0.053
0.206
(0.147)
(0.149)
(0.173)
Foreign
0.263*
0.244
(0.158)
(0.187)
Credit
0.290
History
(0.257)
Wholesale
0.543*
Sector
(0.288)
Ethnicity
-0.065
(0.186)
Business
0.251
Sector
(0.294)
constant
0.099
-0.024
-0.175
(0.144)
(0.162)
(0.194)
Probability >
0.003
0.003
0.004
chi2
Wald chi2
16.10
18.30
24.23
No.
329
329
328
observations
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers
access to formal finance as major and moderate, 0 if they consider it minor or never an
obstacle), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, an standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.48: Probit Estimates of Informal Financing Constraints
Base Model
Model
Model
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Gender
0.199
0.198
0.222
0.221
(0.191)
(0.194)
(0.206)
(0.207)
Employment
0.004
0.006
0.009
0.009
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.013)
Distance
-0.001*** -0.001***
-0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0003)
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
Retail Sector
-0.045
0.150
0.279
0.281
(0.147)
(0.173)
(0.182)
(0.182)
Business Sector
0.319
0.294
0.302
(0.288)
(0.299)
(0.301)
Credit History
0.126
0.060
(0.246)
(0.248)
Wholesale
0.503*
0.616**
0.613**
Sector
(0.277)
(0.289)
(0.289)
Ethnicity
-0.015
-0.057
-0.057
(0.186)
(0.189)
(0.189)
Foreign
0.231
0.105
0.102
(0.187)
(0.196)
(0.196)
Education
0.064***
0.064***
(0.019)
(0.019)
constant
0.219*
-0.041
-0.814*** -0.816***
(0.134)
(0.187)
(0.291)
(0.291)
Prob > chi2
0.002
0.005
0.0001
0.0001
Wald chi2
17.23
23.37
33.17
33.15
No.
329
328
317
317
observations
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for financing constraint (= 1 if firm considers
access to informal finance as a major and moderate constraint, 0 if they consider it minor
or never an obstacle), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively,
and standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.49: Probit Estimates of Credit Constraints
Why the firm chooses not to apply for loan
Base Model
Model
Model
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Gender
-0.84
-0.044
-0.109
-0.07
(0.195)
(0.215)
(0.034)
(0.347)
Employment 0.009
0.004
0.080**
0.072**
(0.11)
(0.123)
(0.034)
(0.035)
Distance
0.001**
0.001** 0.003***
0.003***
(0.0004)
*
(0.0005)
(0.001)
(0.0004)
Retail Sector 0.053
0.231
1.039***
1.400***
(0.152)
(0.183)
(0.281)
(0.431)
Business
-0.572*
-0.464
(0.308)
(0.613)
Ethnicity
-0.130
-0.624
(0.201)
(0.397)
Foreign
0.277
0.002
(0.206)
(0.455)
Education
0.050**
0.021
*
(0.030)
(0.019)
Wholesale
0.726**
0.937*
Sector
(0.331)
(0.538)
Collateral
-0.012
0.024
requirement
(0.123)
(0.126)
Constant
0.375***
-0.323
-1.176***
-1,428**
(0.140)
(0.288)
(0.351)
(0.583)
Prob > chi2
0.241
0.009
0.000
0.0002
Wald chi2
5.48
21.93
34.38
33.37
No.
329
317
114
111
observations
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit constraint (= 1 if firm chooses not to
apply for credit for one reason or another, 0 if firm needs no loan), ***, ***, * indicate
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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Table 4.50: Probit Estimates of Loan Application
Whether the firm chooses not to apply for loan or not
Base Model
Model
Model
Model
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Gender
0.076
0.400
0.492
0.075
0.758
(0.225)
(0.404)
(0.312)
(0.437)
(0.543)
Employment
0.016*
0.100**
0.016
0.127***
0.082
(0.010)
(0.040)
(0.012)
(0.043)
(0.052)
Distance
0.00002
-0.003**
-0.0005
0.00004 -0.005***
(0.0004)
(0.002)
(0.0006)
(0.001)
(0.002)
Retail Sector
-0.185
0.500
-0.599*
0.187
2.194***
(0.190)
(0.374)
(0.308)
(0.448)
(0.644)
Ethnicity
-0.042
0.439
0.918
0.706
(0.216)
(0.313)
(0.587)
(0.486)
Collateral
0.154
0.177
0.428*
requirement
(0.197)
(0.173)
(0.252)
Interest rate
0.623**
0.667**
constraint
(0.261)
(0.283)
Years in
0.055
0.247
Business
(0.066)
(0.218)
Education
0.066*
0.067
0.138
(0.036)
(0.047)
(0.108)
Foreign
0.024
1.480**
3.177***
(0.380)
(0.641)
(1.105)
Launch Time
-0.305
(0.641)
Poor
0.248
0.485
infrastructure
(0.172)
(0.378)
Market
-.790*
access
(0.435)
Constant
-1.138*** -3.381*** -2.550*** -4.126*** -7.611***
(0.154)
(0.759)
(0.706)
(0.938)
(1.793)
Probe > chi2
0.300
0.015
0.027
0.004
0.000
Wald chi2
6.07
15.75
18.83
22.35
42.95
No.
328
79
160
111
59
observations
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy for credit application (= 1 if firm applies, 0
otherwise), ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, and
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.51: Robustness Test for Loan Applications and Approvals
Probit Model with sample Selection
Outcome Equation:
Base Equation Model (2) Model
Loan Approval
(1)
(3)
Gender
0.121
0.099
-0.120
(0.106)
(0.340)
(0.345)
Employment
-0.001
-0.004
-0.002
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.010)
Distance
0.0005
0.00005
0.001
(0.0004)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Retail Sector
0.073
0.074
0.334
(0.111)
(0.253)
(0.367)
Wholesale
-0.027
(0.500)
Foreign
0.118
0.970
(0.242)
(0.594)
Ethnicity
0.313
0.317
(0.208)
(0.579)
Access to Market
0.201
(0.307)
Constant
-1.423***
-1.471***
0.936
(0.029)
(0.224)
(0.925)
Probability Chi2
0.000
0.124
0.436
Wald Chi2
1.56e+07
10.01
7.98
No Observations
314
314
314
Education
-0.008
-0.010
0.034
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.026)
Distance
-0.0002
-0.0001
-0.0002
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
Owning Mobile
0.156***
0.198**
phone
(0.055)
(0.087)
Foreign
-0.216**
-0.154
-0.154
(0.098)
(0.177)
(0.211)
Constant
-1.095***
-1.130***
-1.470***
(0.137)
(0.234)
(0.332)
/athrho
14.035***
12.686
-1.469
(1.694)
(26.261)
(1.675)
Prob>chi2
0.000
0.629
0.381
Chi2(1)
68.61
0.23
0.77
Note: loan approval and loan applications are outcome equation and loan application are
selection equation, respectively. Also, ***, ***, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.52: Definitions of Variables in Tables 4.46 - 4.50
Variable
Explanation
approved
A dummy for whether a loan is received
Employment
Current number of employees in a firm; a proxy for firm
size
Distance
Distance from Juba in miles
Foreign
A dummy for a foreign owned firm; SME nationality
Retail Sector
A dummy for retail firm; proxy for sectoral bias test
Wholesale Sector
A dummy for whether a firm is a wholesale
Gender
A dummy for gender. Female = 1 ; male = 0
Ethnicity
Whether a firm is owned by an ethnic group Dinka
Education
Years of school of the head of the firm owner
Technology Constraint
Whether firm considers implementation of new technology
as a constraint on firm growth
Competition
Whether firm considers its existence as reasons for downfall
Access to market
Whether a firm considers access to market as binding on
growth
Credit History
Constructed from whether firm has received loan or not
Collateral Requirement
Whether a firm considers collateral requirement as an
obstacle to growth or not
Bureaucratic Constraint
Whether firm cites bureaucracy as an obstacle to growth
Poor Judicial System
Whether SME cites poor Judicial system as harming them
Business Service
Whether a firm is a business service such as haircuts, repair
shops, salon, printing shops, or not
Interest Rate Constraint
Does the firm consider interest as a constraint on growth?
Years in Business
Years firm has been in operation
Launch Time
Times to start a company
Poor Infrastructure
If the firm considers poor infrastructure as obstacle
Market Access
A dummy indicating whether a firm considers lack of access
to market as a constraint to growth or performance
ICT Use
If the firm uses mobile phone for communications
Source: Author’s Compilation

Table 4.53: Credit Demand and Constraints across African Enterprises
Small
Medium
Large
Received Loan (%)
24.8
32.0
55.6
No Credit Demand (%)
34.0
39.8
32.5
Credit Constrained (%)
41.2
28.2
11.9
Source: Beck, and Honohan (2007), World Bank Investment Climate Assessment
Survey.
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CHAPTER 5
ENHANCING FINANCIAL INCLUSION FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES IN SOUTH SUDAN
5.1

Introduction

In the review of the literature on SME development in Chapter 2, we learned that
financial inclusion is a requisite for economic development and poverty reduction (UN,
2005; King & Levine, 1993; Government of Kenya, 2007; Classens, 2006; Beck &
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008 ), and that SMEs face a significant number of financial access
constraints, including cost of funding, poor recordkeeping, lack of credit histories and
access to market, and managerial problems, among others (Mwangi & Sichei, 2011;
Larossi, 2009; Mendoza & Thelen, 2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2005,
2006; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2006; Love, 2003).The severity of these
constraints varies from country to country. For example, more manufacturing firms in
Kenya than in South Africa or China report lack of access to finance as severe or major
impediment to firm operation (Larossi, 2009). They can also vary from region to region
within a given country, as seen in Kenya’s bank branch distribution (Table 5.1).

Despite these variations, the improvements that have been made in Kenya with respect to
access to finance can provide important lessons for financial sector development in South
Sudan. The recent FinAcess National Survey shows that usage and regional coverage of
financial services has been increasing in Kenya (FSD, 2013). Use of mobile financial
services more than doubled to 62% in 2013 from 28% in 2006. Bank use has increased in
all regions and so did the use of MFIs. The number of Kenyans using ATM or debit cards
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increased from 6% in 2006 to 20% in 2013. The majority of rural population—76%—
relies on mobile financial service agents as their closest service providers. 30

The concerted efforts by the Government of Kenya, CBK and other financial sector
players are bearing fruits in Kenya. Larossi (2009) finds improvements in firm external
financing from 2003 through 2007, partly due to improved fiscal management, better
banking sector performance, and increased competition bringing down annual cost of
borrowing in Kenya.

The analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4 confirms some of the difficulties that face
typical SMEs in developing countries such as South Sudan and Kenya. We find that size
does matter, that is, larger firms have higher probabilities of acquiring loans and are least
likely to rate lack of access to formal finance as a major obstacle. As discussed elsewhere
in the literature (see Larossi, 2009) and confirmed by these findings, if a firm thinks that
it will not receive credit, it is more likely to self-select out of the credit market. Some
firms that need credit will not apply if they perceive interest rate or collateral requirement
to be too high or if they doubt loan approval (see Chapters 3 and 4). In South Sudan our
econometric analysis of the radius of finance also found an inverse relationship between
the distance from Juba and the probability of a SME receiving credit.

30

This latter development meant that use of post offices; buses and matatus for domestic
remittances have declined. This meant some people who used to work in bus remittances
companies lost jobs or relocated or became agents of a Safaricom or bank.
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This chapter endeavors to identify ways to enhance SME financing in South Sudan in the
post- conflict, post-referendum environment. Emphasis is placed on replicating best
practices, investing in new technologies, and taking a policy stance on financial
inclusion, as other countries have done (AfDB, 2013; AFI, 2010). The chapter proceeds
as follows: Section 5.2 examines lessons to be learned from Kenya on the financial sector
and inclusive development. Section 5.3 identifies and discusses gaps in regulatory and
institutional framework in South Sudan. Section 5.4 discusses strategies to enhance SME
financing, including investing in ICT, leveraging oil resources for broad-based
development, and embracing the financial inclusion agenda. Section 5.5 concludes the
chapter.

5.2

Lessons from Kenya on the Financial Sector and Inclusive Development

South Sudan has already drawn many lessons from Kenya in other policy areas, including
the mechanics and applications of constituency development funds (CDF) to address
regional inequalities (see Kenya’s CDF Act, 2003), Kenya’s contributions to the AU
initiative in training civil servants in South Sudan, the adoption of Kenyan primary and
secondary school curriculums in some South Sudanese schools, the continued role of the
Kenya School of Government/Kenya Institute of Public Administration in providing
training to cadres of civil servants from South Sudan 31, and Kenyan manufacturers

31

According to FSR (2012) report, Kenya has a regional footprint. Whereas South
Africa’s banks opened 16 subsidiaries in Sub-Sahara Africa and Nigerian banks had 44
subsidiaries in 21 SSA countries, Kenya had 11 subsidiaries at the EAC regional level,
totaling to 282 branches and 31 branches happened to be in South Sudan.
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supplying South Sudan with crucial good such as cement (African Business Initiative,
2011).

In addition, a good number of foreign banks in South Sudan as well as significant
segment of business community come from Kenya. From the current regulatory
perspective, there is non-discrimination against Kenyan commercial interests, and if
anything, South Sudanese leaders seem to appreciate Kenyan’s contributions in the
country. Just as there is mutual accommodation and regulatory cooperation between the
US and European Union (Posner, 2009), South Sudan’s government looks upon Kenyan
banking subsidiaries in a positive light. Building upon these foundations, we argue that
South Sudan should continue to learn from Kenya’s experience in promoting financial
inclusion with regard to best practices that are currently lacking in the nation.

5.2.1

Transferability of “Best Practices”

While problems of access to finance also exist in Kenya (Atieno, 2009; Nino-Zarazua &
Johnson, 2011; AFI, 2010; Aduda & Kalunda, 2012), the financial sector in Kenya has
shown that access can be expanded through solving what I call the “distance dilemma” by
leveraging new technologies. We know that expanding access over long distances is a big
problem because of sparse populations and remoteness of the rural areas from financial
centers. Continued refinement and clarity on regulations (CBK, 2007), lessening
restrictions on bank branching and licensing to allow more dispersed ATM installation,
can help by cutting down on the need for bank visits. Where the cost of installing an
ATM is high, relative to person-to-person or government-to-person payments (Pickens,
Porteous, & Rotman, 2009), banks should be allowed to collaborate with telephone
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providers to develop applications such as M-Pesa and M-Kesho, as Kenya did. These
services have made it easy to access financial services in even distant locations. Sitting in
his remote village, say in Narok, a Masai person can with a click send money to relatives
in Masai Mara for a bus fare back to the town. H/she can do the same thing to pay
electricity bills, school fees, and for many other services which used to demand travel and
the attendant transport costs (AFI, 2010; Jack, Suri, & Townsend, 2010). Services like
these will fill important needs if they are introduced in South Sudan.

When the internet or phone services are not available, as in many places today in South
Sudan, mobile van banking is another smart way to expand access to local remote areas.
Mobile vans do not have to make visits seven days a week, but they can make frequent
scheduled visits in designated areas. Some banks have done this in Kenya with great
success.

Investing in appropriate best practice technologies, both by the businesses and by
concerned government agencies is smart policy, too. Technology has a public-good
dimension that comes with positive externalities in forms of network effects or
complementarities. As in complementary investments in education and health,
technology investments are plagued with free-rider problems, agency or coordination
failures. Private agents undersupply such goods. Quasi-government involvement is
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therefore warranted. This being said, we must not forget that sometimes government
failure can exacerbate market failure (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008). 32

Another best practice is establishment of agency banking, where agents facilitate
transactions on behalf of commercial banks, or telephone service providers such as
Safaricom to undertake services including deposit, withdrawal, balance inquires and
mini-statements, among others (CBK, 2010; FSD, 2013).

5.2.2

Reducing Information Asymmetries

Leveraging soft networks (ICT networks such as WIZZIT, G-Cash, and M-Pesa and
community networks as in Grameen Bank) using commitment mechanisms as Equity
Bank does with its jijenge accounts (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008), and increasing the
sharing of information are ways to enhance and deepen access to credit (Mwangi &
Sichei, 2011). In order to expand the access frontier, countries have resorted to a variety
of tools to address information needs. Kenya is using the following strategies:

32

The question of coordination failure is best illustrated by the where-to-meet- dilemma.
That is, let us suppose two friends decide to meet in New York on January 3, 2011 at
2pm. However, they have not decided on the venue to meet. Suppose they all come to
New York, start looking around in the hope they will meet in one venue by chance. In the
age of technology, they can call each other on cell phones or send emails. However those
means of communications are subject to failure and that may result in cancellation of the
meeting. Unless by fluke, they cannot possibly choose Time Square as their chosen place
to meet. In other words, even if activities with complementary benefits are well planned,
they are subject to coordination failures.
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(i)

Adopting credit scoring to enable banks to calculate risks and compare and
agree on benchmarks. This provides a degree of objectivity. The establishment
of credit bureaus has gone a long way to helping Kenya in this area.

(ii)

Banks providing support services in addition to credit. Loans sometimes
perform poorly due to lack of knowledge about business realities.

(iii)

Financial literacy has also been advocated and advanced by banks and
financial service providers (Cohen & Nelson, 2011). This can help SME
owners to learn basics for running an enterprise and how to enter into a
relationship with a bank through credit-taking. A number of banks, including
Family Bank, Faulu Kenya and Equity Bank, are now imparting financial
literacy education to their current and prospective customers in Kenya.

India is also seeking for strategies to assist SMEs. The Government of India has created
a Small Industry Development Institute (SIDI) in addition to its Industrial Development
Bank (IDB). SIDI introduces a range of ITC services, including internet café and mobile
telecommunications, and having developed this infrastructure it lets the market innovate.
The IFC and other donors have committed $9 million to develop infrastructure to enable
SME sector in South Sudan.

5.2.3

Development Banks

Development banks, which can be either private or publicly owned, provide medium to
long-term finance and expertise to specialized sectors, for example, agriculture. Kenya
has one such bank, the Development Bank of Kenya Ltd (DBK) with established
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credibility in the region and providing long-term finance for “sustainable investment.”
None exists currently in South Sudan.

Usually, development banks have received their funding from their own governments or
from bilateral and multilateral aid agencies such as USAID. They also provide technical
support and expertise to their customers. Criticisms have been directed at them, however.
Sometimes development banks refuse to lend to SMEs, on the grounds that administering
small loans to small-scale borrowers is costly to them. Partly for this reason, as
Ndikumana (2009) indicates in his survey of literature on African development finance
institutions, they have fallen short in delivering the needed services. The old approach
often did not integrate development finance into the national development agenda, and
like other government enterprises, development banks can fall prey to rent-seeking.

Nevertheless, development banks are important in satisfying demand in certain niches.
Hence, it is vital that governments create conducive environments and mandate not only
financial viability but also the social mandate of expanding access and contributing to
national development agenda in terms of job creation and poverty reduction.

5.2.4

Sequencing Innovation and Regulation

Over the years, the financial system in Kenya has benefitted from the responsible role
that CBK has come to play in monetary policy issues, such as regulations and guidelines
for the Microfinance Act (2006) and Money Remittance Regulations (2013). 33

33

CBK is one of the five main financial sector regulators—Capital Market Authority,
Insurance Regulatory Authority, Retirement Benefits Authority and Saccos Societies
Regulatory Authority. These are active players with the expressed aim because “
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Consistence, clarity and cooperation between regulators and market players have come to
be associated with the CBK policy stance. Based on the interviews I conducted in Kenya,
the policy stance and direction are regarded as being consistent with the bank’s aim of
maintaining a “stable and efficient banking and financial system” (CBK, 2010).

Many have argued that M-Pesa succeeded in Kenya because the regulators first gave it
breathing space. In treating it like an infant, and refraining from choking it with
regulations, including know-your-customer requirements (KYC), and taxation at the early
stages, CBK seemed to have heeded the classic infant argument. The lesson for South
Sudan is that entrepreneurial innovations and creativity ought to precede stiff regulation
as long as there are no system-wide negative externalities.

5.2.5

Post Office Savings Bank as a Vector of Financial Inclusion

Kenya’s Post Office Savings Bank (Postbank) was established in 1910. Its colonial
mandate to mobilize savings remains in line with the current government’s 2030 Vision.
In recent years, Postbank has come to face stiffer competition from deposit-taking
microfinance institutions. It has also lost some customers in the age of M-Pesa (FSD,
2013). But in an interview, one of the bank officers indicated that its advantages include
reasonable and stable interest rates.

Today Kenya’ Postbank boasts about 97 branches throughout the country, and it
endeavors to expand the access frontiers. It does this by relying on instruments of

achieving and sustaining macro-financial stability forms the base for sustainable, broad
based economic growth and employment creation, vital for realizing the country’s
development agenda as outlined in the Vision 2030” (FSR, 2012, p. 10).
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financial inclusion such as branch networking, ATM penetration, mobile phone
deployments, agency banking, internet banking and educating the public about products it
offers.

South Sudan does not currently have a functioning postal service or anything like
Kenya’s Postbank. South Sudan may take a leaf from Kenya’s experience in the post
office business. Other countries that have done well in this respect are the BRIC nations
via the Postal Savings Bank of China, Brazilian model of agency banking, India’s
multiple partners model and Russian payment model (see Anson & Toledano, 2010).

Replicating best practices is not a new idea. In the early Meiji period, for example, Japan
imported a lot from abroad. Its commercial system came from France, its criminal law
from Germany, its central banking system from Belgium, and its education from America
(Chang, 2003). Of course, these institutions were adapted to suit local conditions, and
important new institutions were created. But best practice institutions were an important
ingredient in the country’s development.

Another important lesson to be drawn from East Asia is that any public policy must be
characterized by flexibility, realism, and autonomy (Chang, 2003). Flexibility recognizes
that mistakes do happen, and when they do, it is best to recognize and seek ways to
correct them. Realism calls for avoidance of utopian prescriptions. Autonomy can be
understood as independence of industry from governmental control and vice versa. These
three values represent departures from what Chang (2003) calls the “market supremacy
assumption” or in the words of Oliver Williamson (1975) “in the beginning, there were
markets.” Markets are man-made like other institutions and are therefore malleable.
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Inclusive financial sector development in South Sudan will not arise spontaneously—it
will require an enabling policy environment where private sector innovates and regulators
prudently guide it.

5.3

Financial Regulatory and Institutional Framework in South Sudan

That South Sudan is one of the least developed nations on the face of the earth is no
accident. The legacy of war (Hutchinson, 2001; Arnold, 2007; Salman, 2011) has meant
that South Sudan attained statehood with dismal development indicators across the board
from the financial sector to law-making to the regulatory framework to the enforcement
of property rights. The economy of South Sudan is best described as “undeveloped, thin
and fragile”, characterized by incoherent government policy, insufficient labor demand
and unskilled labor supply, making “it difficult to create conditions for diversified,
inclusive and sustainable economic growth” (AfDB et al., 2012, p. 2). Consistent with
this overall picture, the financial sector is beset by a weak regulatory framework. Unless
the regulatory framework is strengthened and coverage of the financial system is scaled
up to reach rural areas, broad access to financial services will remain limited, with little
more than Juba basking in the radius of finance.

This section aims to identify the main regulatory gaps and impediments to expansion of
financial frontiers and broad-based economic development by extension. We highlight
seven regulatory and credit market imperfections that stand in the way of financial
inclusion.
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5.3.1

Lack of Clear Policy Stance on Financial Inclusion Agenda

The banking and other laws of South Sudan have no mention of the need to be forceful in
pressing financial inclusion. The South Sudan Development Plan (2011) does hint at the
2040 Vision (a government blueprint for transforming South Sudan and make it a middle
income by 2040) and includes a call to return to agriculture as well as to make South
Sudan business friendly (African Business Initiative, 2011). But there is no explicit
financial inclusion policy. Neither the CBSS nor other branches of government have
publicly taken a position to advise banks to spread geographically in an efficient and
equitable manner.

Once the policy stance of the government is clearly delineated, it can take appropriate
measures to pass appropriate regulations and issue relevant guidelines, such as the
conversion of MFIs into deposit-taking institutions as was the case in Kenya. Unless
financial inclusion is stipulated as a goal to be achieved and not just regarded as a
byproduct of development, one will not find much incentive on the part of the
government, central bank or telecommunications industry to innovate, for example by
instituting something like a post office savings bank advocating financial education.

The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (2009 [CGAP]) finds that financial inclusion
using branchless services means that traditional methods of payments, say from
governments to person (G2P) becomes cheaper, through providing low-cost delivery
channels. A number of developing countries, including Kenya, have made use of the
geographical spread of the post office service to expand the access frontier, furthering
along the financial inclusion agenda (d’Alcantara & Gautier, 2013). In order to advance

235

such policies, a quasi-government agency, perhaps called “National Commission for
Financial Inclusion in South Sudan,” could be set up to do the job.

5.3.2

Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities

The macroeconomic environment remains unstable in South Sudan due to a number of
factors. First, inflation remains high. The currency, the South Sudan pound, continues to
fluctuate erratically against the dollar. Unless the CBSS works hard to stabilize prices,
uncertainty will continue to impact investor confidence in the economy and lead to
currency flight. Absent clear management of the economy, self-inflicted crises such as
the bungled currency devaluation of 2013 will continue to lead to more price instability.
Such an environment is unsuitable for loan-making because credit supply tends to be
adversely impacted by inflation, especially when it is unanticipated (Omran & Naceur,
2011). To lend to general public, banks have to be assured of their real rate of return to
money. They cannot do that if they are in the fear of inflation erasing gains from loan
portfolios or operating in a parallel markets where policymakers take black market
exchange rate as charting the path (NBS, 2013). The last point is a reality in South Sudan.
South Sudan officials keep track of black market data or trends because those are the
ones that really matter or reflect the market conditions. For example, in October 2013,
one dollar fetched 4.5SSP in the black market and 2.9SSP in the official markets.

Second, relations between Juba and Khartoum continue to create uncertainty over oil,
making South Sudan’s economic growth volatile (see figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). As Figure
5.1 shows, South Sudan economic growth fell by 55% in 2012 when oil was shut down
and bounced back to about 70% when the tap was turned back on in 2013. The same
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volatility is also shown by the external trade balance, falling to -82% in 2012 and up to
346% in 2013 (Figure 5.2). The converse is equally true for current account balance and
government net borrowing/lending in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 5.3). The passage of South
Sudan’s oil to the international market through Khartoum’s territory has been and can
continue to be sabotaged any time there is a disagreement between the two countries. The
connection between the financial system and the oil sector is strong, since oil revenues
fuel credit as well as growth.

The above two factors are compounded by unnecessary regulatory burdens arising from
tax multiplicity and delays in import clearance at ports of entry. The resulting costs pass
through to the consumer and currency markets. By South Sudanese authorities charging
prohibitively or delaying goods entering from East Africa, they impair the cogs of trade.
This fuels inflation and macroeconomic instability that can get transmitted to foreign
exchange markets, again limiting credit supply. Better regulation of the imports market
may go along away to stabilizing prices and creating more conducive environment for
lending.

5.3.3

Poor Institutions and Lack of Land Titling

Whereas close to 90% of South Sudan is suitable for farming, only 4.5% of arable land is
currently under farming (African Business Initiative, 2011). While there is a vast tract of
lands in the countryside, land rights issues frequently arise in urban areas. Since there are
no established proper institutions or policy frameworks that manage the land use,
acquisition and transfer of ownership, there are conflictual claims to a given piece of land
by many people, for instance in Juba. These conflicting claims due to institutional
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vacuum usually pitted the earlier comers (war returnees) against the latecomers after the
CPA. Take for example, Mr. John who returned to Juba after war in 2005 and acquired
some piece of land from corrupt land dealer. However, in 2009, another man named Peter
returned to Juba, and after some time he claimed that the piece of land acquired by John
belonged to him. The reason is that he was the original occupant of the land before being
displaced by the war. In other words, some people who returned first acquired pieces of
land illegally and those who would come later would lay claim to the same pieces of
land.

Therefore, both in towns and countryside, there is low utility of land for commercial
purpose because a person may have his or her land, but if they cannot provide legal titles
or documents to verify ownership, others may doubt what they claim. When land titles
are missing, certain markets such as insurance and credit (Mendoza & Thelen, 2008) are
not inclusive enough to reach all actors. Just as snake can bite a person who has no stick
at hand in the moment of attack, a firm-owner or entrepreneur without evidence of
owning collateral may not qualify for a loan. Even though the domain of collateral
requirements and other kinds of acceptable security guarantees has expanded, land titles
are still central to many loan appraisals. And collateral requirements remain significant
determinant of external financing (Larossi, 2009).

After decades of displacement and destruction by wars, the majority of South Sudanese
have resettled back to their ancestral lands. Some of these parcels of land are not
officially recorded, although customary laws and traditions back these ownership claims.
The laws of South Sudan state clearly that lands belong to the people. Chapter II, article
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170 (1) of the Constitution states that “All land in South Sudan is owned by the people of
South Sudan and its usage shall be regulated by the government in accordance with the
provisions of this Constitution and the law” (GoSS, 2011, p. 45). Many people own
parcels of lands verbally but have no title deeds, as a result of which their land cannot be
viably used as collateral.

While I was doing fieldwork in connection with this research, a number of commercial
bank officials complained to me that land policies are fragmentary and selectively
enforced. The lack of land titles and poor land rights administration has meant that
disputes arise frequently. There have been cases where land is sold to an investor, and
within a short time another person comes forward to claim that the land belongs to him or
her. Sometime, these cases go to courts where delays and inefficiencies are rampant. It is
logical to conclude that such cases affect credit supply.

5.3.4 Lack of Clear Enforcement Mechanisms to Protect Lenders and Borrowers
from Bad Deals
In the market, there must be rules to protect different parties, such as sellers and buyers,
principals and agents, consumers and producers, suppliers and demanders (Dittus &
Klein, 2011). Markets work best when the rules of games are laid out and there is trust
among different parties (McCreevy, 2006). Rules ensure predictability and stability.
In South Sudan, however, rules are often arbitrary if they exist at all. For example, there
are no clear policies on bankruptcy laws to protect lenders in the event of default, nor
rules to protect borrowers in the event of harassment by a predatory lending party. At the
time I was collecting data, only three banks had made loans. This vacuum in bankruptcy
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law and enforcement mechanisms could be one of the weakest links in expanding
financial access frontiers in South Sudan.

5.3.5

Policy on Bank Branching

At the moment, there is no clear policy on the manner and extent to which banks are
advised to branch out geographically throughout South Sudan. While the choice to build
a branch in one location as opposed to another is determined by business motive, it is
helpful and wise for governments to have a clear position. The USA, for example,
expanded bank branch networks in 1980s and 1990s by relaxing restrictions, including
security guarantees, capital requirements, distance to the nearest competitor, and
minimum population densities. This is one way to increase geographical coverage and
bring about some equity in regional coverage. This is not likely to happen unless there is
a clear policy position pushing for it.

5.3.6

Lack of Industry Surveys

The quality and frequency of the information that firms or public entities produce has a
bearing on bank lending. Examples include audited accounts and surveys (Larossi, 2009).
Larossi (2009) finds that 88% of firms in Kenya reported audited accounts, compared to
58% and 44% in Uganda and Tanzania, respectively. Commercial banks and the central
bank in Kenya produce surveys on remittance inflows, financial sector stability, and
monetary policy (see Think Business Limited, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011,
2012; CBK, 2012, 2013; FRS, 2012) on frequent basis and provide focused press releases
to media, the financial sector, and others on a range of issues, including monetary and
financial matters, banking sector performance and accomplishments. Fina Bank, for
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instance, reports that it is re-strategizing its SME approach (Think Business Limited,
2010, p. 80). CBK Governor Njuguna Ndung’u declares that “Banking Industry is
thriving” in an interview that provided an overview of the banking system, including data
on the number of banks in the country, branches, total employees, deposits, and number
of ATMs (Think Business Limited, p. 8-16).

There are no widely distributed industry publications in South Sudan that deal with the
banking system, hence no public information on what, if anything, the banking system is
doing to expand the access frontier. On market prices, NBS is succeeding under hard
circumstances to produce frequent CPI indices, as well as GDP data and other limited
data. But owing to lack of openness and transparency, the results of onsite inspections of
commercial banks are only available to the CBSS and not to the general public.
Moreover, given the constraints that CBSS faces, inspection is generally limited. This
feeds into the larger theme of “no clarity in the monetary policy management” in South
Sudan.

5.3.7

Central Bank Independence and Political Interference

The Bank Act (2011, p. 7) grants independence to CBSS, stating that:
When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties
conferred upon them by this Act, neither the Bank nor any member of the
Board, or other Bank officials shall seek or take instructions from any
ministry, public institutions, office, agency, or other entity or their
members or officials. Government of South Sudan ministries, public
institutions, agencies, offices, and other entities operating in South Sudan,
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their members and officials must not improperly seek to influence the
Bank or any member of the Board or other Bank officials in the
performance of their tasks, or interfere with the proper execution of such
tasks.

While the central bank can be as independent, like its counterparts in the West, it should
not be absolved from accountability, including but not limited to testifying before the
Legislative Assembly or other oversight body (GoSS, 2011). CBSS independence,
including its ability to set the target level of inflation, is restrained by commonsense,
because when and how the bank achieves its goals can have political consequences.

Central bank independence in South Sudan is undercut by the existence of number
foreign exchange bureaus that are “zombies”, displaying classical rent seeking behavior
because they remain functioning due to political support. The relations between the
central bank and the foreign exchange bureaus are very explicit in South Sudan. Like
commercial banks, these foreign exchange bureaus receive allocation of dollars from
CBSS on weekly basis at designated official target (about 2.95SSP/$1). Instead of selling
these hard currencies to the public at value slightly above official rates to make normal
return, they dump them in the black market where the difference or arbitrage is usually
manifolds. The conventional opinion is that these foreign exchange bureaus cannot exist
without this life support from CBSS. The public believes that some officials own foreign
exchange bureaus and this diminishes the credibility of the central bank and raises
questions as to the extent of its independence. They can easily generate public backlash
with the slightest provocation.
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While cooperation between agencies is permitted, and the Bank is expected to report to
the Finance Minister as applicable law dictates (GoSS, Chapter 9, Section 64, 2011) there
has been some cloudiness in the relationships between the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning (MoFEP) and CBSS. This precedes independence of South Sudan in
2011. For instance, the MoFEP was responsible for designing, contracting out and
executing the plan to have South Sudan Pound (SSP) printed. Critics thought the Bank of
Southern Sudan (BoSS) should have been in the forefront, but the assignment was
dictated by the government. Similarly, in November 2013 when CBSS devalued the
currency, the National Assembly summoned both the CBSS Governor and the MoFEP
Minister to testify before the assembly (the minister did not appear because he was
overseas on an official trip). The message to an average person is clear: that CBSS and
MoFEP are co-managers of the economy. This is a dangerous precedent because it does
not acknowledge the autonomy of CBSS as the regulatory authority in monetary policy
issues, including maintenance of “monetary and domestic price stability” (GoSS, 2011, p.
5).

5.4

How to Increase Financing for SMEs in South Sudan

The fact that most SMEs in South Sudan are not accessing credit is owing to both the
underdeveloped nature of the financial system and the lack of concerted efforts on the
part of the government and financial system to expand the access frontier. While many
firms across Sub-Saharan Africa are financially constrained (Larossi, 2009; Asiedu,
Kalonda-Kenyama, Ndikumana & Nti-Addae, 2013), some countries have tried to
improved access by taking a number of aggressive policies. If South Sudan follows suits,
its financial system can be expanded and improved.
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5.4.1

Embracing the Financial Inclusion Agenda

Intentions are powerful agents of change. If the government adopts a policy stance and
encourages the financial sector to work toward that goal, it can expand the access frontier
and SMEs could benefit broadly (see FSD, 2013). A number of African countries have
joined the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) 34. In addition to their membership in the
AFI, African central bankers met on 14-15 February 2013 in Tanzania to form Africa
Mobile Phone Financial Services Policy Initiative (AMPI) to “extend financial inclusion
to the continent’s large unbanked populace,” according to Governor Njuguna Ndung’u of
Kenya Central Bank. These policymakers see AMPI as a subset or sub-network of AFI.
Thus, relying on principles such as Maya Declaration and regional cooperation and
networking in information sharing, AFI AMPI members will be able to share experiences
and address common policy issues. 35

Other global initiatives for financial inclusion include the Financial Access Initiative in
New York, the Centre for Financial Regulation and Inclusion in Cape Town, and the G20 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion Principles (Dittus & Klein, 2010). Some
countries have empowered their central banks to lead the charge, facilitating rolling out

34

African AFI Members include Tunisia, Mozambique, Angola, Morocco, Ghana,
Namibia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Congo (DR),
Burundi, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Niger, Mali, Guinean
Bissau, Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial
Guinea, Chad, South Africa, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Central Africa Republic.
35
The AFI global policy Forum met at Riviera Maya in Mexico in 2011 to discus and
agree on a common set of principles that will help develop financial inclusion policy by
developing country regulatory institutions; these common principles came to be known as
the Maya Declaration.
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of mobile deployments (mobile phone financial services), partnerships between the banks
and development institutions, and setting up community banks, for examples.

This policy stance enables government to regulate prudently and encourages other
players in the private sector to innovate and invest in strategic growth areas such as
finance, communications and energy. We see in Kenya, for example, what it means to
invest in the ICT industry. Doing so increases the access frontier, empowers the society
and improves the economy in the process. For businesses, ICT reduces information
asymmetries, improves credit scoring, and helps to improve the management of debt.

5.4.2

Leveraging Oil Wealth for Financial Sector Development

Baruch Spinoza famously said, “If you want the present to be different from the past,
study the past” (Krieger, 2002, p. 40). This advice is relevant for South Sudanese who
have not yet realized the impact of the country’s oil resources. Metaphorically speaking,
Spinoza is calling upon them to study what has been done with oil revenue in the years
past, and what can be done to channel it to fuel broad-based economic development. It
behooves the country and development economists to rethink how oil wealth has been
distributed to draw lessons for the future.

South Sudan’s government, the Central Bank and financial institutions so far have not
enabled the channeling of oil revenues into credit, to the private sector and to the SMEs
in particular, thereby failing to harness oil wealth to fuel broad-based and inclusive
economic growth. Up until now, there has been no broad-based growth strategy. Instead,
it can be argued that the economy of South Sudan which is primal and cash-based, suffers
serious horizontal inequality—that is, economic inequality across regions and ethnic
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groups—, which is a source of political instability to guard against (Stewart, 2005). As
illustrated by neighboring Kenya in 2007, political and economic exclusion or the
calculated dominance of one ethnic group can be a source of grievances and a trigger for
political violence (Githinji & Holmquist, 2009) 36.

Despite the country’s oil wealth, commercial banks (which have enough reserves at the
time of field search for this dissertation) in South Sudan have not played a major role in
financial inclusion. This is typical of many commercial banks in African countries which
tend to hold excess reserves and safe assets such as government bonds and do not play as
large of a role as financial intermediaries as they could. Given the structure of bond
markets (and limited number of buyers), returns on government bonds tend to be high
and are therefore attractive.

While the oil lasts, the big question remains how the oil revenue will be managed to
contribute to the broad-based financial sector deepening and inclusive economic
development. Studies show that financial sector development is among the important
variables that determine whether the natural resources become a blessing or a curse
(Humphreys et al., 2007; Brown, 2009). If well managed, oil revenue can become a
blessing; if not, it can breed Dutch disease, rent-seeking behavior and corruption.

36

During this field research, I observed the paradox of Western Kenya (Nyanza and
Western Provinces), with a politically active and highly educated population but poor and
lacking financial services, underscoring the role of politics, culture and presence/lack of
inclusion in development outcomes.
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As it has been done in other countries such as Gulf States, though not with similar
political settings and analogous initial conditions, I believe it is possible to channel oil
resources to the productive sectors, especially through targeted lending to SMEs.

At the moment, oil revenue makes up close to 98% of the government budget, and has
been the single most important source of consumption expenditure for the national
government. As depicted in the Figure 5.4, oil revenue goes to pay salaries at the state
and national levels, and finances public goods such as roads, airways, and defense. But as
discussed in Chapter 2, South Sudan’s institutions are weak, leaving much of the oil
revenue to leak out, resulting in missed opportunities. Leakages include money diverted
to personal private accounts in the country or going to safe havens outside the country as
capital flight.

Evidence about oil having not made much difference in South Sudanese lives due to
large-scale leakages can be inferred from the infamous letter that President Salva Kiir
wrote to potential 75 government officials, past and present, imploring them to return
stolen funds supposedly amounting to $4 billion, according the Sudan Tribune on 2 June
2012. That corruption is commonplace is indisputable and the whole world knows it,
having placed South Sudan, the youngest nation, on the list of the most corrupt states,
ranking number 173 out of 177 countries (Transparency International, 2013). South
Sudan ranks 47 out of 53 African countries in the 2010 Mo Ibrahim Index of African
Governance.

What can be done differently if oil heretofore has not brought about improvements in the
daily lives of average South Sudanese (see SSCCSE, 2010)? We propose “thinking out
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of the box.” In particular, increasing the share of the oil revenue going to the financial
sector is a powerful strategy, for maximizing the rents from oil wealth in focus of
economic development. Three specific measures are proposed.

First, we propose that state put some reserves into the stabilization account, which was
created before the referendum (2005-2011) but seemed to have been depleted long ago,
and convince the country’s financial systems and the development community to chip in
if they can. This fund can then be tapped to finance lending to specific sectors including
SMEs at moderate rates to fuel broad-based development.

Second, while some capital flight is inevitable, the oil sector can be enticed to retain more
earnings in the home financial system. That is, the oil sector can channel resources to the
financial system through depositing company oil profits, as well as paying royalties to
governments in turn to pay salaries and other expenses, some of which could go into the
financial system through deposits in banks.

Third, the financial system in return provides loans to the oil sector to finance further
commercially viable exploration and production.

Fourth, from these bank deposits and the stabilization account, the financial system can
then lend to the general public and provide specific lending facilities to SMEs. Both the
general lending and focused lending to SMEs may help to bring about desirable
development outcomes, namely job creation, poverty reduction and equity-enhancement,
including horizontal equity across regions, ethnic groups and social classes (see Figure
5.4).
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At the macro level, the causality runs both ways, from the oil sector to the financial
system and the real sector, and then feeding back from the real sector to the financial
system and the oil sector. The result is a shared prosperity that will be good for all.

For a good number of countries in the region, oil resources could hold key to prosperity.
A number of Sub-Saharan African countries, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana
and Mozambique have recently discovered oil (World Bank, 2013). Thus South Sudan is
not alone in confronting the challenges of how to manage these resources so as to avoid
the “resource curse.” What may crucially matter for South Sudan and other entrants is
being transparent in oil management along the value chain (Alba, 2009; Barma et al.,
2012), including extraction, taxation and investment of rents (World Bank, 2013). The
value chain approach calls for transparency in contract negotiations, efficiency in tax
collection, and targeted public investment using those rents to achieve certain
development objectives. Being transparent will necessitate joining the league of “publish
what you earn, publish what you pay” and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI). The EITI is a global standard that promotes revenue transparency and
accountability in the extractive sector. As of this writing, only nineteen African countries
are members of the EITI, with only eight in compliance. South Sudan is not yet a
member.

5.4.3

Strengthening the Regulatory Framework

Good governance, especially good corporate governance, is vital for stability and the
functioning of the financial sector (Ramo, 2013). Because South Sudan is starting out
with a weak regulatory framework, the central bank and other actors must see to it that all
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appropriate regulations are enacted and enforced uniformly. The country’s circumstances
call for moderation in the financial regulatory environment, wherein regulations are not
too burdensome on financial providers and yet not too relaxed to risk a freefall as
recently seen in the West.

The CBK is moving toward a risk-based supervisory framework, which in its own words
(CBK, 2013, p. 4) “benefits institutions as regulatory effort is focused on high-risk areas
and provides for more efficient supervision.” A priority first is to ensure that financial
services are not too big to fail, and are kept at reasonable size as a guard against systemic
fraud backed by anti-money laundering schemes (CBK, 2010).

With regard to mobile financial services, both past and present experience shows
common themes: (i) they tend to exhibit shock and awe that comes with new financial
product, similar to the case of the derivative markets in the USA which amazed but later
was blamed for mortgage-backed securization process; (b) they are characterized by
complexity and multiplicity in application (c) they can yield rapid and high returns and
(d) they tend to lack robust supervision of risky financial services (Stephen, 2011). It is,
therefore, advisable to put consumer protection laws in place, albeit not too strict as to
stifle innovations. In Kenya, the CBK and Communications Commission of Kenya
(CCK) were instrumental in seeing to it that M-Pesa met certain basic requirements
before its launch (AFI, 2010). Among other things, the two bodies addressed the issues as
to whether M-Pesa was a banking entity or not. Because M-Pesa e-float (monetary value
or credits collected and deposited in M-Pesa customer account) does not earn interest and
not permitted to engage in commercial activities, it is not a bank. The CBK treaded
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carefully in regulating the mobile phone financial service sector, deploying prudential
regulation and supervision, consumer protection laws, and regulations to enhance
competition and networking among market players. The outcome satisfied both the
consumer advocates and investors in Kenya.

While the overall legal framework remains weak in South Sudan, development financial
institutions (IMF and the World Bank) are working to lay some foundations for the
country’s investment climate. These include publications such as Doing Business in Juba
(2011) and the passage of enabling frameworks, including the Investment Promotion Act,
and the South Sudan Investment Authority. The IFC Investment Climate Reform
Program is working with relevant institutions to advance broad-based development in
non-oil sector, and hopes to increase access to finance for SMEs (African Business
Initiative, 2011).

5.5

Conclusion

South Sudan achieved independence with dismal economic indicators and weak
institutional regulatory frameworks. The regulatory and institutional gaps in the financial
sector development in South Sudan include lack of policy clarity, lack of a government
policy stance in favor of financial inclusion, poor property rights enforcement,
macroeconomic vulnerabilities, and information and data problems. Building on “best
practices” that can be learned from Kenya, the country can make progress by reducing
information asymmetries, investing in ICT, establishing development banks, leveraging
postal service as a vector of financial inclusion, sequencing regulations, and declaring a
clear policy stance on financial inclusion. By channeling oil to productive sectors, as
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shown in the loop diagram in Figure 5.4, South Sudan has an opportunity to make inroads
in the financial inclusion agenda.

Priming the pump in the financial inclusion ecosystem can bring large dividends as
shown in the cases of India’s Self Help Group-linkage initiative, Bangladesh’s Grameen
Bank and M-Pesa in Kenya. Nonetheless, heterogeneity in approaches, models and
strategies means that there is no single silver bullet method when it comes to expanding
access to financial service. Even as South Sudan learns from these best practices, it must
adapt them to its own circumstances & capacities, and in line of its specific development
needs.

Table 5.1: Kenya’s Bank Branch Distribution per Region, 2008
Province
No. of
%
Adult
% below
%
branches branches Population
poverty line
banked
(Million)
Nairobi
353
40.00
1.88
34
38
Central
100
11.30
2.23
30
24
Coast
111
12.51
1.61
70
15
Eastern
75
8.50
2.75
51
15
North Eastern 10
0.01
0.59
74
0.1
Nyanza
61
6.90
2.45
48
12
Rift Valley
137
15.50
4.09
49
20
Western
40
4.60
1.81
52
11
Total
887
100
17.41
Source: Central Bank of Kenya and FinAcess Survey 2007.

252

Figure 5.1: Real GDP Growth in South Sudan (Annual %)
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Figure 5.2: External Trade
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-12.55

2017

Figure 5.3: Capital Account Balance and General Government Net
Lending/Borrowing (Unit is % of GDP)

30
20
10
0
-10
-20
2010

2011

2012

2013

Current account balance

2014

2015

2016

General government net lending/borrowing

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook 2012

254

2017

Figure 5.4: Analytical Framework of Potential Contribution of the Oil Sector to Financing SMEs
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1

Introduction

This dissertation set out to explore solutions to potential obstacles to SME growth,
probing to what extent SMEs have access to finance in South Sudan and Kenya as well as
how technology and financial sector development are expanding the access frontier in
Kenya. The overarching question throughout this study has been, “What can South Sudan
learn from Kenya’s experience in financial sector development?”

The aims of this study were three-fold. The first was to examine the literature to develop
an understanding of why SMEs in general, and especially in the least developed and postconflict settings, face problems in gaining access to finance. For this reason, expanding
the financial access frontier and placing more emphasis on financial inclusion seem to be
paying off, as seen in Kenya. The second aim was to explore the replicability of Kenyan
“best practices” in South Sudan. All evidence points to the fact that Kenya is relatively
developed compared to other countries in Great Lakes Region. Hence, we advanced the
argument that it can be a model from which South Sudan can learn best practices in
financial sector development. The third aim was to lay the groundwork for a financial
inclusion agenda for South Sudan, which has not been done before. The dissertation
aimed to contribute to knowledge in these regards.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the study is significant in light of the recognition in
contemporary development theory and practice that institutions do not arise from thin air,
in the absence of active policy. Hence the appropriateness of the financial inclusion
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agenda championed by central banks across the African continent. The second reason for
this study’s significance is the recognition that SMEs are dynamic and central to the
poverty agenda.

With regard to methodology, in an attempt to answer the research questions, we reviewed
the relevant literature and undertook 15-month field research in South Sudan and Kenya.
The data collected in Kenya come from three regions (Nairobi, Tala and Machakos),
while the data for South Sudan come from three states (Central Equatoria, Western Bahr
el Ghazal and Northern Bhar el Ghazal). We used Probit models to analyze the data from
the two countries in the first two essays of the dissertation. The third essay is a qualitative
analysis, identifying gaps in the financial sector regulatory and institutional framework,
drawing lessons from Kenya, and recommending a number of options to enhance SME
financing in South Sudan.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 recaps key results from
each essay, as well as caveats underscoring certain limitations. Section 6.3 discusses
lessons and policy implications. Finally, Section 6.4 considers possibilities for future
work.

6.2

Key Results

The first essay (Chapter 3), Financial Sector Development and Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises in Kenya, examined financial sector development and SMEs in Kenya. The
overall conclusion drawn from this essay is that the financial sector, in collaboration with
the telecommunications industry and the CBK, is doing a great deal to expand the
financial access frontier. The introduction of agency model (a corresponding banking
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arrangement whereby bank services are sold through third party or by non-bank financial
corporations on behalf of the bank), the M-Pesa (a mobile money services revolutionized
by Safaricom in Kenya) and the race to serve the bottom of the pyramid, as exemplified
by Equity Bank, have expanded access to financial services as shown by FinaAccess
Surveys in 2006, 2009 and 2013. From econometric analysis of the Kenyan data, four
key findings emerge.
•

First, small size is a disadvantage. We find that larger firms are more likely to
receive credit than smaller ones, which make up close to 95% of all sampled firms
in Kenya. Unlike the smaller firms, larger firms rate lack of access to formal
financial services as a minor or never an obstacle.

•

Second, we find that SMEs are more likely to self-select out of the credit market
if they perceive collateral requirements to be too strict, interest rates too high or
application procedures too cumbersome.

•

Third, there is an ICT impact on access to finance in Kenya. Firms that own a
website are more likely to apply for loans than those that do not. The same is true
for firms that enjoy business networks: firms that network with others are more
likely to indicate that they are less financially constrained with regard to formal
and informal finance. We argue that networks facilitate and enable information
flow between firms, facilitating trade, insurance, investment and credit.

•

Fourth, we find no gender bias in access to formal credit: our results show no
evidence that gender is a significant determinant in loan approval and in the
perception of credit constraints by SME owners.
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The second essay (Chapter 4), Lack of Access to Finance by Small and Medium-sized
Enterprise as a Constraint to Development in South Sudan, explored the role of financial
sector in financing SMEs in South Sudan. The essay noted that South Sudan came onto
the scene as an independent nation with dismal development indicators, after years of
neglect and warfare under Khartoum regimes. Analysis of the data and econometric
investigation yield in a number of key findings:
•

First, as in the Kenyan case, there is size bias in access to credit. That is, larger
firms are more likely to receive credit, and more likely to rate lack of access to
formal credit as a minor or no obstacle at all.

•

Second, there is also some gender bias in access to formal credit. Whereas gender
seems not to be a significant determinant in the actual loan approval, there is
gender bias in financing obstacles. Unlike men, women SME owners are more
likely to say that access to formal finance is a major constraint.

•

Third, there is an issue of the radius of finance, in the sense that access to finance
is inversely related to distance from Juba: firms away from Juba are more likely to
receive little or no credit, while those that are in close proximity to Juba are more
likely to receive loans. Although firms located out of Juba are less likely to
receive loans, when we ask whether they consider access to formal credit to be a
major obstacle, firms away from Juba are not more likely to consider it a major
constraint.

The third essay (Chapter 5), Enhancing Financial Inclusion for Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises for South Sudan, focused on the issues of regulatory and institutional gaps
and strategies to develop the financial sector in South Sudan. The essay drew a number of
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lessons to be learned from Kenya: to transfer “best practice” technologies, reduce
asymmetric information, establish and invest in a development bank, sequence
innovations and regulation, and use post office savings banks as a vector of financial
inclusion. In addition to identifying these lessons from Kenya, Chapter 5 discussed the
prevailing regulatory and institutional gaps in South Sudan, including the lack of clear
policy on a financial inclusion agenda, macroeconomic vulnerabilities, lack of land titles,
poorly defined and enforced property rights, lack of industry-wide data, and political
interference with the central bank’s independence. In order to address these challenges
and to enhance SME financing in South Sudan, the chapter advocated strategies to
expand the access frontier, including taking an explicit policy stance on the financial
inclusion agenda, leveraging oil wealth for the financial sector development,
strengthening the regulatory framework through good governance and credible
enforcement, ensuring that financial institutions are not too big to fail, and promoting
institutional cooperation among government agencies; the central bank, commercial
banks and telecommunications industry.

As discussed extensively in Chapter 1, analyzing access to finance in sub-Saharan Africa
is difficult due to the rudimentary nature of the data. In relying on my own data, three
biases could not be completely wished away. First, we could not rule out survivor bias.
Firms that went out of business before data collection could not have been included in the
sample. Second, I covered a few areas both in Kenya and South Sudan; hence the
representativeness of the sample is an open question. Third, I relied on the assistance of
nine research assistants in both countries, and their own biases as to where or which firm
to approach for selection into sample might have influenced the final representativeness
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of the sample. Fourth, I ended up with a smaller sample of banks in Kenya than in South
Sudan where the entire population of banks is fully covered. It is, therefore advisable to
interpret the findings in this dissertation with these caveats and limitations in mind.

6.3

Lessons and Policy Implications

Based on the results presented in this dissertation, a number of lessons can be drawn with
policy implications for South Sudan. Here we highlight six pertinent lessons and their
policy implications.

6.3.1

Firm Size as a Constraint to Access to Finance

As the extensive review of the literature indicates, and our econometric results confirm in
the essays on South Sudan and Kenya, firms continue to face differential degree of access
to finance. In both Kenya and South Sudan, small firms continue to face significant
hardships accessing finance. They also express greater awareness of financing obstacles.
These are important realities that authorities should acknowledge, while they work to
alleviate financing gaps and promote financial inclusion.

6.3.2

Institutional Cooperation

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, cooperation among agencies has been shown to work
elsewhere. We gave, as an example, the cooperation of the USA and EU in transatlantic
regulation. We specifically noted that M-Pesa succeeded in Kenya because of the
conducive policy environment in which it is operating, emphasizing that this policy
environment is a byproduct of cooperation between the CBK and other stakeholders in
Kenya. It is, therefore, prudent that South Sudan policy-makers orient institutions to be
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more cooperative -- independent and competitive, but not to the point of assured mutual
destruction.

6.3.3

Proper Sequencing of Innovation and Regulation

In addition to regulatory and institutional cooperation, the success of M-Pesa is a result of
conscious effort by the regulatory agencies to give innovation breathing space. The CBK
decided early on not to choke M-Pesa with prohibitive taxation but instead opted for
exemptions. Early subsidization of innovators and cautious taxation can be vital for the
successful development of any meaningful financial product. In developing financial
products at their initial stage, it is healthy to rethink about merits of the proverbial infant
industry argument.

6.3.4

Persistence of Differential Access to Finance

While the central bank, the banking sector, the telecommunication industry and other
players are working diligently in Kenya to expand the access frontier, as evident by the
results of the successive FinAccess Surveys from 2006 through 2013, SMEs continue to
face constraints in accessing financial services. This reflects the fact that there are no
silver bullets in resolving the question of access to finance for all. The relevant
institutions must continue to make efforts, both across the regions and within groups. It
is, therefore, imperative that South Sudanese authorities should not expect quick fixes,
even if financial inclusion were to be declared as the number one priority item for the
government tomorrow. Financial inclusion is a process and it cannot be mystically
achieved, as the saying goes, Rome was not built in a single day.
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6.3.5

The Radius of Finance

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, firms away from the capital city continue to face
difficulties in access to credit in South Sudan. This is a fact that cannot also be wished
away. It must be tackled through active policy interventions in the credit market,
including investments in infrastructure and energy. Through the central bank, the
government can advise commercial banks to make financial inclusion a priority and
encourage the establishment of community banks throughout the country, similar to the
agency model or Self-Help Group Initiatives in India.

6.3.6

Self-Exclusion from the Credit Market

The analysis in the first and the second essays confirms that firms will not bother to apply
for credit if they think that they will be rejected due to lack of collateral and credit
history. Firms which otherwise qualify could self-select out of credit markets, especially
if they perceive strict collateral requirements, cumbersome loan application processes, or
high interest rates. The implication is that simplification of collateral requirements,
know-your customer (KYC) 37, charging stable interest rates (price stability), streamlining
ID requirements, and eliminating minimum balances could reduce self-exclusion in the
credit market.

6.4

Future Work

The data for this analysis come from a fairly small sample in both countries. Future
works should increase the sample size and extend the sample to at least five, or better yet
all, states in South Sudan. For Kenya, too, it will be interesting to increase the sample

37

These requirements exert undue burdens on poor customers.
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size and to extend it to more counties and a larger number of commercial banks. Given
the importance of the issue of financial inclusion for broad-based economic development,
it is hoped that this dissertation will help to inspire such research.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT LETTER 38: SEEKING SME CONSENT TO
ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRE
I 39 deeply and sincerely appreciate your willingness to participate in this study.
The purpose of my research is to gather opinions and experiences about small businesses
so as to gauge the easiness or difficulty in accessing finance from formal commercial
banks, informal banks, non-bank financial and microfinance institutions operating in
South Sudan and Kenya today.
This study intends to document any obstacles to business growth. The study expects to
disseminate findings as a way to inspire policy and seek means to alleviate these
impediments to business growth through public policy or public- private partnerships.
This examination involves dealing with people and businesses and I must disclose that
there are no known risks associated with sharing vital information with this researcher,
who with all honesty, promises not to use your name or anything that will identify you as
an entity when writing up this research. Every bit of your information will be kept
confidential because I will be the only one having access to the data.
Therefore by voluntarily participating in this study, you will be contributing towards
improvements in existing literature on the access to finance for all. Should you have
questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. My phone number is (+ 1)
211/254-XXX-XXX.

38

I would like to speak to the general manager or owner of your enterprise. Proceed to
questions if interview is granted; if an appointment then: write down the name, date, and
time of appointment; if you get refusal: note the reason for refusal.
39
My name is James Alic Garang, a South Sudanese PhD student in the Department of
Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA. I am conducting a research on
“Access to Finance by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises” in South Sudan and Kenya.
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APPENDIX B
SME SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions
This survey is designed to allow you to register your opinions regarding your firm or
business and its external financing possibilities. Please review each of the following
statements and circle or register the response that best represents your opinion about your
organization and the overall financial sector in South Sudan or Kenya.
1. What is your position in the enterprise? (please circle one only)
(a) Sole owner
(b) Joint owner
(c) Member of management team
(d) Family member of owner(s)
2. What is the present legal status of the enterprise? please circle one only)
(a) Sole proprietor
(b) Private limited company
(c) Public limited company
(d) Partnership
(e) Co-operative
(f) Other
3. What is the gender of the head of this enterprise?
(A) Male
(b) Female
4. What is name of the ethnic group of the head of the enterprise?
5. How long did it take you to formally start the enterprise? (Just indicate only time
involved in obtaining licensing or necessary steps to launch the business)
(a) __________ Months (b) __________ Years
6. How long have this enterprise been in business or operational?
7. How many employees does this enterprise have as of to date?
8. List down the number of years of schooling of the head of this enterprise
9. What sector of the economy best describes your enterprise?
(a) Retail
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)

Business Service (such as haircuts, printing, fuel station, etc)
Manufacturing ( electronics, chemical industry, etc)
Wholesale
Agribusiness (for example, tea growers, coffee processing)
Construction
Hotels
Restaurants/catering
Repair
Other sector (Name it)

10. Does your enterprise have any branches or joint ventures located abroad?
(a) Yes
(b) No
11. If your enterprise has branches abroad, please complete this table.
Name of the Country List names of Location (s) in the country

Key Obstacles to Doing Business in South Sudan and Kenya
12. To what extent has the lack of formal finance (credit from licensed and regulated
commercial banks) affected growth of your business?
Check one only Major
Moderate Minor
Not

Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle

13. To what extent has the lack of informal finance affected growth of your business?
Check one only Major
Moderate Minor
Not

Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle

14. To what extent has the lack of microfinance finance affected growth of your
business?
Mark one only Major
Moderate Minor
Not

Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
Obstacle
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15. Which of the following has been the major constraint on your business
performance since the time it was formed? Check any that applies by ranking
them from major to least obstacle.
 (Mark it)
Major
Moderate Minor
Not
Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle
Lack of business credit
High interest rate
Taxation
Corruption/rent-seeking
Too much competition
Unfair competition from
foreign owned
enterprises
Inflation
Poor infrastructure
Poor judicial system
Lack of skilled labor
Implementing new
technology
High collateral
requirements
Bureaucratic constraints
(licensing requirements,
reporting, controls,
health and labeling
requirements

16. To what extent has the lack of access to market been a problem to your business?
Mark one Major
Moderate Minor
Not
only
Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle


Credit Allocation and Type of borrowers
To distinguish between use and access (or successful borrowers, non-borrowers, denied
borrowers and discouraged borrowers) each SME respondent is asked to answer the
following:
17. Have you ever applied for loans before?
(a) Yes
(b) No
18. If the answer is yes in “17” above, have you received approval?
(a) Yes
(b) No
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19. If you applied and received approval, who was your lender?
Name of the Lender
 (Mark it )
Commercial Bank
Microfinance Institution
Cooperative Bank or Societies
Moneylenders/Family
Members
20. What was the reason or use for the loans? Check any that applies to you.
 (Mark it )

Reason for the loan
Working capital
Expenditure on stationery/office materials
Purchases of new equipment
Own consumption
Workers’ training/skill upgrading
21. Was the interest on the loan fixed or variable?
Interest rate
Fixed interest rate
Variable interest rate
22. If it is a fixed interest rate, what is it?
Interest rate
Fixed interest rate

 (Mark it )

%

23. If it is a variable interest rate, what was it then and now?
Interest Rate
Variable Interest Rate in the past
Variable Interest Rate in now

%

24. For a variable interest rate, what was it based on?

25. If the answer to “17” is “No”, then why did the firm not apply for loan? Check
one only.
Reason for not applying
The firm does not need loan
It does not think it will be approved
Application procedures are too burdensome
Collateral requirements are strict
Interest rates are too high
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 (Mark it )

26. If you applied and was rejected, what was the main reason the loan application
was rejected? Check one only.
Reason for loan denial
 (Mark it )
Perceived lack of profitability
Lack of acceptable collateral
Inadequate credit history of the firm
Incomplete application
27. How many commercial banks do you have credit line with?
(a) None
(b) only 1 bank
(c) 2 or 3 banks
(d) 4 or more banks
(e) I do not know
28. How many informal banks do you have credit line with?
(a) None
(b) only 1 bank
(c) 2 or 3 banks
(d) 4 or more banks
(e) I do not know
29. How many microfinance institutions do you have credit line with?
(a) None
(b) only 1 bank
(c) 2 or 3 banks
(d) 4 or more banks
(e) I do not know
30. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any commercial
bank during the last six years?
(a) Less than 1 month
(b) 1 to 6 months
(c) 6 months to 1 year
(d) 2 to 4 years
(e) More than 4 years
31. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any informal
bank during the last five years?
(a) Less than 1 month
(b) 1 to 6 months
(c) 6 months to 1 year
(d) 2 to 4 years
(e) More than 4 years
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32. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any money
lenders during the last five years?
(a) Less than 1 month
(b) 1 to 6 months
(c) 6 months to 1 year
(d) 2 to 4 years
(e) More than 4 years
33. What is the term for the largest loan you have ever received from any
microfinance institutions during the last five years?
(a) Less than 1 month
(b) 1 to 6 months
(c) 6 months to 1 year
(d) 2 to 4 years
(e) More than 4 years
34. Which of the following forms of information communication technology does
your enterprise use? More answers are allowed.
ICT Items
 (Mark it )
Mobile phones
Standalone Personal Computers (PCs)
Email
Intranet
Own website
Fax machines
Landlines
35. Have any of these people been a source of knowledge/skills for your enterprise?
Sources of Skills and Knowledge
 (Mark it )
for Enterprise
Family members
Independent auditors
Consultants
Clients/suppliers
Trade associations
Training centers/public
universities/government authorities
None of the above
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36. Has your enterprise been involved in any of the following activities? Check any
that applies.
Economic Activities
 (Mark it )
Trade fairs
Study visits
Business conferences/Networking
others
37. When starting this enterprise, where did the initial fund come from? Rank them
from major to the least obstacle.
Source of initial
capital
Commercial banks
Microfinance
Moneylenders
Family members
Friends
Personal
contributions

Major Moderate

Minor Not Source

38. For your cash needs, which one do you use the most?
(a) Withdrawals from ATMs
(b) Make visits to the banks to withdraw money
(c) Personal vault, home safekeeping or shop-drawer for all cash
needs
39. How frequent do you use mobile money transfer service to do these transactions?
(Skip if these does not apply to your enterprise). Check any that applies.
Mobile Money
Major Moderate Minor Never
Transactions
Pay employees
Pay vendors/suppliers
Pay overhead costs
Pay taxes
Pay staff allowances
40. Which of the following statements is true about your business enterprise
appraisal?
(a) Managerial competency and adoption of technology are behind the success of
this enterprise.
(b) Managerial incompetency and neglect of technology are behind the failure of
this enterprise.
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(c) My business is not improving because of unfavorable business climate in
South Sudan (or Kenya).
41. Which of the following insurance policies do you have? Check any policy that
you have purchased.
 Mark with a tick
Type of Insurance Policy
I.
Life Insurance
II.
Property Insurance (shop, car,
land)
III.
Theft Insurance
IV.
Fire Casualty

42. What other financial services do you want the commercial banks or Central Bank
of South Sudan or Kenya to provide for your business needs?

43. What is your annual employment history over the years? (South Sudan data time
series runs from 2005 to 2011; Kenya 1991 to 2012.
Year Number of Paid Employees Per Year
Comment

44. List down your yearly gross revenue in dollars (time series like in # 43)
Year
Annual Gross Sales in Dollars Comment (optional)

45. List the total amount of size loan borrowed in each column (like in # 43):
Year

Loan Size Per Year in Dollars

Comment (optional)

46. Of the total yearly amount of loans received/borrowed, how much is due to each
institution? (fill in like in # 43)
Year Loan
Loans from
Loan from
Loan from
from
Microfinance Moneylenders family
formal
institutions
members
banks
and friends
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47. Can you breakdown the total liabilities due to banks and other sources as follows?
Terms of the loan structure
Short term
Medium Term
Long-term
(90 days to 3 years) (3-5 years)
(6-15) years
Value
$
$
$
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APPENDIX C
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS
(Some of these questions were also modified for the interviews for Microfinance
institutions both for South Sudan and Kenya. I have also removed tables in some
questions for the sake of space).
1. What is the total estimate of your bank customer base (all accounts) in each of
these three periods?
Year
Customer /Client Base
(All Account holders)

July 2011 August 2011

March 2012

2. What is your total estimate of SME accounts in each of these three periods?
Year
July 2011 August 2011 March 2012
SME Accounts Only
3. What is the size of your loan to each SME 40 borrower?
 Estimate of minimum loan (ever approved: USD________________
 Estimate of Maximum Loan (ever approved): USD_____________
4. Describe your top five SME borrowers. In addition to serving or not serving
SMEs, which category of the economy do you serve the most?
5. Which of these 5 C’s do you consider most important when appraising SME
projects? Rank them accordingly.
 (Mark it)

Major
Factor

Moderate
Factor

Minor
Factor

Not
Factor

Character of the owners
Capacity of the firm
Collateral requirement
Firm initial capital
Macroeconomic conditions in
country
6. List some of your customized SME products

40

SME stands for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In term of size, small business
has about 5 to 50 employees; medium 51 to 200 employees.
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7. In what ways are you planning to expand the access frontier especially to SMEs
and poor borrowers?
8. What role has mobile technology played in terms of helping you to expand access
frontiers and in reducing horizontal inequality? Are information systems
developed enough to facilitate lending to SMEs?
9. List the development agencies or institutions you have collaborated or continue to
partner with in pooling resource and lending to SMEs.

10. What is your bank doing to improve the customer service in general, reduce long
waiting hours at bank premise and to encourage the culture of public savings?
11. What has been the major barrier to extending credit to SMEs? Check only one.
Obstacles
 Mark it
Lack of collateral
Lack of profitability
Limited information
Illiteracy
Distance
12. How many branch networks does your bank have in each province in Kenya over
the years? (Table by province by years from 1991 through 2012)

13. Please fill in the table about the total annual lending to all SMEs and their
numbers (Period: 1991-2012 in Kenya and 2005-2011 for South Sudan).
Year Total Annual Loan No. of SMEs served
($) to SMEs
Each Year
14. How many ATMs do you have in each province in Kenya over the years?
(The Total Number of Live ATMs Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012)
15. How many ATM Cards do you have in each province in Kenya over the years?
(The Total Number of ATM Cards Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012)
16. How many bank agents do you have in each province in Kenya over the years?
(The Total Number of Bank Agents Per Province Per Year, 1991-2012)
17. SME Geographical Distribution (those you serve; give a number only)
Province in Kenya
Current Number of
SMEs
5
e.g. Central

276

18. How much credit does Government of Kenya owe you?
 Amount: $_________________________________
19. Nonperforming loan (NPL) and percent due to SMEs and big businesses, 19912011.
Year Total NPL (%) % of NPL Due % of NPL Due to
to SMEs
Large Businesses
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20. Please fill in the following table appropriately; that is fill only the columns that correspond to the name of your bank, for
example, ABC Bank.

Name of
Bank

Characteristics of Commercial Banks in Kenya, 2011
Year
No of
State share Public
Total
Depo
of
Branches
(%)
share
assets
sits
(million (milli
creation
(%)
$)
on $)

Loans
(milli
on $)

Loan
/Deposit
s (%)

Total Current
Employment

ABC
Bank
(Kenya)
278
21. SME Money Demand through ATM withdrawal and at-the –Bank-Window, 1991-2012.
Year Central
Coast
Eastern
Nairobi
Northern
Nyanza
Rift Valley
Western
Province
Province
Province
Province
Eastern
Province
Province
Province
Teller ATM Teller Walk Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM Teller ATM

22. Do you have excess reserves? If you do, why do banks hold excess reserves
instead of lending to SMEs? Why is the cost of borrowing high in Kenya for
SMEs?
23. List the top five things you would like to see happening so as to improve the
business environment and to enable you to lend to small businesses which are job
creators (i.e. what would small businesses do in order to help your bank lend to
them?)
24. What would you like the Central Bank of Kenya to do to improve the business
climate in Kenya? List at least three of those enabling factors.
25. Which of the following accounts does your bank pay interest on?
Account Name
Check if it applies
Savings Accounts
Checking Accounts
Business Accounts
Other Accounts (Name them here)
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APPENDIX D
POLICY QUESTIONS FOR THE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA
(The same questions were modified to suit interviews for the South Sudan Central Bank)
1. Is an extension of credit to SMEs by financial institutions (such as commercial
banks) one of the objectives of the CBK?
2. What is CBK doing to encourage the development of inclusive financial sector
and to motivate banks to lend to all businesses, more importantly small businesses
which are the job creators? (I am interested in identifying the barriers to SME
lending).
3. How and in what practical ways is the role of technology factoring into this
endeavor of inclusive and financial sector development as well as reduction of
horizontal inequality? Are information systems developed enough to facilitate
lending to SMEs?
4. Write the number against each name to indicate their totality in the Kenyan
Financial Sector.
S/N Name of the Institution
Number
Comment
1
Commercial Banks
2
Microfinance institutions
3
Insurance companies
4
Re-insurance companies
5
Loan savings and credit associations
6
Cooperative Banks
7
Housing/Mortgage Societies
8
Foreign Exchange Bureaus
9
Western Union Companies
10
Dahabshiil Companies
11
Amal Express Money Transfer
Companies
10
Moneygram Companies
11
SACCOs

5. Can you also please provide me with the official listing of all exchange bureaus
operating presently in Kenya as well as their central functions? I also want to ask
about exchange rate policies and their impact on SMEs. I don't know the current
situation, but for some time, there were fears that the shilling was overvalued which would add pressures to SMEs competing with imports (but possibly benefit
other SMEs - e.g. retailers selling imported goods).
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6. What are your current top 5 challenges in the conduct of monetary policy with
regard to credit expansion?
7. What financial and monetary lessons can South Sudan learn from Kenya’s long
innovative experience and inclusive financial sector development initiative?
8. What is the Kenyan experience with agency model banking and is it something
that you can recommend to South Sudan?
9.

Questions on a few specific issues that could affect credit to SMEs:
I.
What is the current situation with non-performing loans throughout the
commercial banking sector, since this was a major problem in Kenya in the
past (and froze a lot of lending)?

II.

What about excess reserves held by the commercial banking sector? Do these
exist? How big are they? Why do banks hold excess reserves instead of
lending to SMEs?

III.

Tell me more about the growth areas of credit expansion. Is credit channeled
to productive uses, including SMEs? Or is it primarily financing consumer
spending, real estate investments, etc?

IV.

Please comment on the role of SACCOs in financing the smaller-scale end of
the SME spectrum.

10. Can the Bank also grant me an access to publications giving an overview of the
banking/financial sector in Kenya or commercial banks /financial sector lending
to SMEs by sectors and regions? These may give me more information than I
might gather from interviews with the financial sector in general).
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